Exploring lean production in the flexible manufacturing systems environment: some tensions between features of advanced manufacturing technologies and new wave manufacturing strategies by Jihad Khalil Alwazir (7196807)
 
 
 
This item is held in Loughborough University’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) and was harvested from the British Library’s 
EThOS service (http://www.ethos.bl.uk/). It is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
Exploring Lean Production in the Flexible 
Manufacturing Systems Environment: 
Some tensions between features of advanced manufacturing 
technologies and new wave manufacturing strategies 
BY 
JIHAD KHALIL ALW'VAZIR 
--A Doctoral Thesis .' 
Submitted in partial. fulfilment of the requirements for the award of 
Doctor of Philosophy of the Loughborough University 
mJihad Alwazir 2000 
BEST COPY 
AVAILABLE 
Variable print quality 
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate 
In memory of my father 
ii 
Acknowledgements 
This research would not have been possible without the direction and support of professors John 
Storey and Malcolm Hill. Professor Storey's help and support as the research advisor in the early 
stages of the process had a major impact on the direction of the research. His help in getting 
access to companies in the UK was instrumental in making the case study methodology a viable 
option for this research. 
I would also like to thank Professor Harry Boer for his invaluable advice and help in getting 
access to the three Dutch manufacturing companies used in this study. The hours of discussion 
with professor Boer were very helpful in crystallising the research objectives and framework as 
well as helped me make sense of the Dutch system of work organisation and management. I 
would also like to thank Dr. Nick Bacon for his help and critical comments on this work. 
Special thanks to Leo S. of EBG truck manufacturing company for his help in extending the 
duration of access to the company and Tony N. of CMN for facilitating further access over the 
four year period even after he moved to another plant. Additionally, this work could not have 
been possible without the cooperation of the managers, production staff, supervisors and 
operators of the case companies. I had expected that they would not give me more than token 
cooperation. To my surprise they were very friendly cooperative and forthcoming. 
And last, but not least, I want to thank my family. My wife Thuraya and my two kids Khalil and 
Hazim for their patience and support over the many weeks and months that this thesis has kept 
me away from them. And for my mother, as ever, for her constant support and encouragement for 
me to complete this thesis in spite of the rigorous demands of work. 
iii 
List of Abbreviations 
AMT Advanced Manufacturing Technologies 
APS Anthropocentric production system 
AGV Automated guided vehicles 
AS/R Automated storage and retrieval systems 
CMC Symbol for compressor manufacturing company 
CMN Symbol for engine manufacturing company 
CAD Computer -aided design 
CAM Computer-aided manufacture 
CIM Computer integrated manufacturing 
CNC Computer numerical control 
CAE Computer-aided engineering 
CAI Computer-aided inspection 
CAPP Computer-aided process planning 
CPM Computerised prevention maintenance 
CPS Production system used in CMN engine manufacturing company 
DFA Design for Assembly 
DFM Design for Manufacture 
DNC Direct numerical control 
EBG Symbol for truck manufacturing company 
FMC Flexible manufacturing cell 
FMS Flexible manufacturing systems 
HR Human resources 
HRM Human resources management 
JIT Just-in-time production 
LP Lean production 
LTS First level machinist certification level used in the Netherlands 
MRP Materials requirement planning 
MRPII Manufacturing resource planning 
MTS Second level machinist certification used in the Netherlands 
NWM New wave manufacturing 
PPM Plant predictive maintenance used in CMN 
TPM Total productive maintenance which aims to eliminate variability in process 
TQ Total quality 
TQM Total quality management 
WIP Work in progress 
iv 
List of figures and tables 
Chapter Four 
Figure 4.1 EBG Production areas chart 
Figure 4.2 Universal / Gears areas layout 
Figure 4.3 Organisational structure-Old EBG 
Figure 4.4 EBG Changes in organisational structure 
Figure 4.4a Operational Teams 
Figure 4.5 EBG Objective Matrix sample chart 
Figure 4.6 Old EBG high level of control 
Figure 4.7 New EBG Functional integration step 
Figure 4.8 FMS machining station 
Figure 4.9 Integration, FMS connected to two lines 
Figure 4.10 Chassis Rods Operation 
Figure 4.11 Drawing by one of the area managers autonomous groups 
Figure 4.12 The FMS area new teams hierarchy (by skill level) 
Chapter Five 
Figure 5.1 Formed extrusions manufactured in the plant 
Figure 5.2 Organisational chart- 
Figure 5.3 Organisational chart, delayering 
Figure 5.4 Increased regulation delays for two types of parts production 
Figure 5.5 Quality Assurance department 
Chapter Six 
Figure 6.1 Picture of CMC compressors 
Figure 6.2 Compressor organisational chart 
Figure 6.3 The CMC production process 
Figure 6.4 Layout of the FMS and mechanical department areas 
Figure 6.5 CMC Compressor orders and production sequences 
Figure 6.6 CMC Side view of the FMS 
Figure 6.7 CMC Compressor facilitator role and the new team arrangements 
Figure 6.8 CMC Samples of capacity and cost charts used in the FMS area 
Chapter Seven 
Figure 7.1 Organisational Structure 
Figure 7.2 Management Chart 
Figure 73 House of Quality 
Figure 7.4 CPS Model 
Figure 7.5 Standard Work Combination Chart 
Figure 7.6a Old Style Layout of the Manifold line 
Figure 7.6b New Kaizen initiated Layout here 
Figure 7.6c Standard Times before and after Kaizen 
Figure 7.7 Compliance to Commitment CPS Team Model 
Figure 7.8 Team Development Continuum 
Figure 7.9 CMN Quality Policy statement 
Chapter Eight 
Figure 8.1: Key issues revealed in the case studies 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1 Organisational differences between the old and new paradigm 
Table 1.2 Overview of New Computer-aided technologies 
Table 8.1 Summary of Case Study Results 
84 
85 
88 
90 
92 
93 
95 
98 
102 
104 
106 
112 
127 
140 
140 
146 
155 
157 
163 
166 
166 
168 
172 
174 
179 
182 
193 
194 
197 
199 
201 
203 
205 
207 
209 
211 
212 
267 
6 
7 
271 
V 
V1 
Table of Contents 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 1 
1.2 Need for the Study and Choice of the Research Questions 4 
1.3 Organisation of the Study 11 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 The Lean Production System 
2.3 Flexible Manufacturing Systems 
2.4 Criticism of Lean Production 
2.5 Research Dimensions 
2.5.1 Complexity 
2.5.2 Integration 
2.5.3 Regulation 
2.5.4 Flexibility 
2.5.5 Automation 
2.5.6 Expensiveness 
2.6 New Technology and the Emergence of a New Paradigm 
2.7 Making choices about Technology and Organisational Arrangements 
2.8 Skilling, Deskilling and Employment Debates 
2.9 Factors that led to the push for AMT 
2.9.1 Technological Advances in Microprocessors 
2.9.2 Changing Market Conditions 
13 
14 
15 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
26 
28 
28 
30 
31 
36 
39 
39 
40 
vii 
2.9.3 Increased Competition 
2.9.4 Social Factors 
2.10 Strategy 
2.11 Organization 
2.11.1 The Older system of Mass Production 
2.11.2 Reflective Production 
2.12 Gaps in the Literature 
CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
41 
41 
42 
46 
46 
47 
49 
3.1 Introduction 51 
3.1.2 Research Questions 51 
3.1.3 Research Issues 53 
3.2 Methodology 54 
3.2.1 Choice of Qualitative Methodology 55 
3.2.2 Case Study Methodology 57 
3.2.3 Site Selection Criteria 57 
3.2.4 Data Collection 60 
3.2.5 Interview Schedules 62 
3.2.5.1 EBG European Truck Company 62 
3.2.5.2 Fokker Aircraft 63 
3.2.5.3 CMC Compressors Manufacturing Company 64 
3.2.5.4 CMN Engines Manufacturing Company 65 
3.2.5.5 Notes on the Interviews and Questions 66 
3.2.6 Duration of the study 71 
3.2.7 Interview Procedures 71 
3.2.8 Questionnaire 73 
3.2.9 The Role of the Questionnaire 74 
3.2.10 Details of the Questionnaire 74 
viii 
3.2.11 Qualitative Analysis 
3.2.12 Data Triangulation 
3.2.13 Relevance of the Methodology 
3.2.14 Researcher Credibility 
CHAPTER FOUR 
EBG EUROPEAN TRUCK MANUFACTURING COMPANY 
76 
79 
80 
80 
4.1 Introduction 81 
4.2 The Company 83 
4.3 Organisation and History 84 
4.4 The New Organisational Structure 86 
4.5 New Wave Manufacturing 88 
4.6 Lean Enterprise 88 
4.6.1 Continuous Improvement 90 
4.6.2 The Objective Matrix 91 
4.6.3 Teamwork and Cell Formation 94 
4.6.4 Skill Level and Multiskilling 94 
4.6.5 Delayering 96 
4.6.6 Communication 96 
4.6.7 Training 99 
4.7 Advanced Manufacturing Technology 100 
4.7.1 The Flexible Manufacturing Systems Environment 101 
4.7.2 The Three Dimensional Measuring machine 104 
4.7.3 Computer Numerical Control (CNC) 105 
4.8 Cultural Change 107 
4.9 Organisational Changes 109 
4.9.1 Team and Work Group Development 110 
4.10 `Lean Enterprise' in the Flexible Manufacturing Systems Area 112 
4.11 The Key Dimensions 115 
ix 
4.11.1 Complexity 
4.11.2 Integration 
4.11.3 Regulation 
4.11.4 Flexibility 
4.12 Increased Production Demands and Lean Production 
4.13 Operational Issues 
4.13.1 Changes to the Teamwork Structures 
4.13.2 Tensions and Stresses: Lean Production in the FMS 
4.14 Human Resources 
4.15 Summary and Conclusions 
CHAPTER FIVE 
FOKKER AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 
5.1 Introduction 
5.2 The Company 
5.3 Organisation 
5.4 Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
5.4.1 The FMS Environment 
5.5 Cultural and Organisational Change 
5.6 Tensions and Stresses: Lean Production in the FMS 
5.8 Teamwork 
5.9 Key Dimensions 
5.9.1 Complexity 
5.9.3 Regulation 
5.9.4 Flexibility 
5.10 Analysis and Discussion 
X 
CHAPTER SIX 
CMC COMPRESSORS MANUFACTURING COMPANY 
6.1 Introduction 161 
6.2 The Company 162 
6.3 The Organisation 164 
6.4 The Production Process 165 
6.5 Key Organisational Developments 167 
6.6 The Flexible Manufacturing Systems Environment 173 
6.7 Lean Production 174 
6.7.1 Kaizen 176 
6.7.2 Teamwork and Multiskilling 177 
6.7.3 Communication 178 
6.7.4 New position of Facilitator 180 
6.7.5 Supervisor as team leaders 180 
6.7.6 Outsourcing 183 
6.8 Key Dimensions 184 
6.8.1 Complexity 184 
6.8.2 Regulation 184 
6.8.3 Integration 186 
6.8.4 Flexibility 187 
6.10 Conclusions and Summary 189 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CMN ENGINES MANUFACTURING COMPANY 
7.1 Introduction 190 
7.2 The Company and its Internal Environment 191 
7.2.1 The Delta Plant 191 
X1 
7.3 The Plant Organisational Structure 192 
7.4 The New Production system 196 
7.4.1 The CMN Lean Production System (CPS) 196 
7.4.2 Continuous Improvement (Kaizen) 199 
7.4.3 Training 206 
7.4.4 Teamwork 207 
7.4.5 Total Quality System (TQS) 209 
7.4.6 Multiskilling 210 
7.4.7 Communication 213 
7.5 The Flexible Manufacturing System (FMS) Environment 214 
7.5.2 Three Dimensional Measuring Machine 215 
7.6 CMN Human Resources Policies 215 
7.7 Analysis of the CMN lean production system 216 
7.7.1 The CMN lean production system (CPS): rhetoric versus reality 217 
7.7.2 Tensions and Stresses in the CPS System 217 
7.7.3 Implementation of CPS and Increased Pressures on Operators 219 
7.7.4 Managerial Control versus Employee Empowerment 222 
7.7.5 Corporate Transformations: macro level changes and CPS 223 
7.7.6 Suspension of Production Teams 225 
7.7.7 Reversal of Operator Programming Privileges 227 
7.8 CPS on the Production Floor (Key Dimensions) 228 
7.8.1 Complexity 230 
7.8.2 Integration 232 
7.8.3 Regulation 232 
7.8.4 Flexibility 
7.9 CPS Dilemma: Bureaucratic versus Organic Organisation 236 
7.10 Human Resources Department (The other side of CPS) 237 
7.11 Summary and Conclusions 241 
xi i 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
8.1 Introduction 
8.2 Overview of the Research 
8.3 Tensions and Stresses: lean production in the FMS Environment 
8.4 The Key Dimensions 
8.4.1 Complexity 
8.4.2 Integration 
8.4.3 Regulation 
8.4.5 Flexibility 
8.5 Thematic Analysis 
8.6 Directions for Future Research 
Appendix 
List of Questions 
Questionnaire 
Bibliography 
213 
266 
246 
250 
250 
276 
276 
268 
270 
280 
302 
X111 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
In the new era of Globalisation and open and common markets, the search for 
competitive advantage has become increasingly more complicated. Stiff international 
competition and the emergence of dramatically different sets of market demands such as 
quality, variety and speed of delivery, have led many companies in the West to 
experiment and adopt new production processes, develop innovative manufacturing 
systems, and adopt novel work organisation structures. The success of Japanese 
manufacturers throughout the 1980s and early 1990s led many western companies to 
adopt and adapt many of the Japanese managerial and organisational innovations that 
were deemed to be the secret to Japanese success. In the 1990s there has been a 
proliferation of these new manufacturing innovations, strategies, and systems. 
Organisational innovations such as `just in time' (JIT) (Schonberger, 1982) and `total 
quality management' (TQM) (Crosby, 1979,1984; Deming 1986; Feigenbaum, 1983; 
Hall, 1987; Juran 1988; Oakland, 1989), were adopted in various forms in European and 
American plants. 
These systems were developed into a wide array of concepts with nomenclature such as 
'flexible specialisation' (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel 1989), the `Toyota Production 
System' (Ohno, 1978; Monden, 1983), 'Toyotism' (Imai, 1986), 'post-fordism' (Roobeek, 
1987; Kenney and Florida, 1988), `New production concept' (Kern and Schumann, 
1987), `lean production' (Womack et al., 1990); `lean enterprise' (Lamming 1993; 
Harrison, 1992; Jones, 1994), and 'New Wave Manufacturing' (Storey, 1994; Harrison 
and Storey, 1996). 
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Coinciding with the development of these innovations and work organisation structures, 
was a new technological revolution characterised by the emergence of the microprocessor 
and the development of programmable controllers and 'smart' sensors. In the 
manufacturing environment, the impact of the microprocessor was seen through the 
introduction of Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) and the development of 
advanced robots which are now applied to mechanical handling, are and spot welding, 
paint spraying and many other applications (Greenwood, 1988; Noori, 1990; Ayers, 
1990). AMT refers to a family of technologies which includes computer aided design and 
engineering systems, material resource planning systems, automated materials handling 
systems, robotics, computer-controlled machines and computer integrated manufacturing 
systems (Schroder and Sohal, 1999). (see table 1.1). 
This thesis will explore the application of lean production to the flexible 
manufacturing systems environment and investigate the existence of tensions 
between features of advanced manufacturing technologies and new wave 
manufacturing strategies in four manufacturing companies in Holland and the 
United Kingdom. 
Derived from the Toyota Production System and adopted by most Japanese automakers, 
lean production is a production system which uses less of everything compared to mass 
production: half the human effort in the factory, half the manufacturing space, half the 
investment in tools, half the engineering hours to develop a product in half the time. Also, 
it requires keeping far less than half the needed inventory on site, results in many fewer 
defects, and produces a greater and ever-growing variety of products (Womack et al, 
1991, p. 13). 
Combining advanced manufacturing technologies with flexible work the new wave 
manufacturing strategies promised to usher in a new productivity technology paradigm 
with improved operational control, increased flexibility, and drastically reduced lead 
times. Proponents of this paradigm argued that it is through the coupling of advanced 
manufacturing technology and new wave manufacturing strategies that the full potential 
of the technology can be realised to achieve true productivity gains (Bessant 1990; 1993, 
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Clark, 1993). This coupling or linkage between AMT and NWM is seen to maximise the 
gains from the use of advanced manufacturing technologies. 
The proponents who claimed the existence of a new productivity paradigm presented a 
favourable picture of the fit between the AMT and the NWM. It was assumed that these 
new wave manufacturing strategies are universal and accordingly are compatible with all 
the types of advanced manufacturing technologies. In particular, the proponents of the 
lean production paradigm believed that lean production will supplant all other types of 
production to become the standard global production system of the twenty-first century 
(Womack et al., 1990, p. 278). Haslam et al., (1996) noted how throughout the 1980s and 
well into the 1990s, innumerable articles took, as axiomatic, the superiority of this lean 
production paradigm. 
With each new generation of microprocessors, new generations of production equipment 
and systems were developed, and continue to develop, with a better level of control, 
increased power, and higher degrees of flexibility and processing ability. These 
developments dramatically changed the existing norms and structures and hence, 
researchers saw a new `techno-economic paradigm' emerging based on the advances in 
microelectronics (Dosi et al, 1988; Freeman et al, 1993). 
Jones (1990, p. 291) saw a `new technological paradigm' which `resolved the traditional 
incompatibility between efficiency and stable forms of productivity growth, on the one 
hand, and continuing innovation on the other'. Table 1.2 describes in detail the 
organisational differences between the old and new paradigm and presents the 
characteristics that are at the heart of the new wave manufacturing strategies and lean 
production. 
Other researchers recognised this new paradigm in the apparent move from `inflexible 
division of labour' towards a `comprehensive system design' (Trist, 1981; Jurgens et al, 
1986). Roobeek (1987) pointed to a crisis in the traditional mass production or Fordist 
model and to the emergence of a new technological paradigm. The Fordist production 
system was increasingly viewed as cumbersome, inefficient, unable to respond rapidly to 
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changing consumer tastes, and wasteful of the creative potential of production workers 
(Womack et al., 1990; MacDuffie, 1995; Adler and Cole, 1993; Adler, 1992). 
Technology in the old paradigm was regarded as fixed, unchangeable and as determining 
the remaining factors within the company, while in the new paradigm there is `common 
optimisation of the technical and social systems' (Salvendy and Karwowski, 1994). The 
installation of advanced manufacturing technologies did not seem to resolve the existing 
productivity and performance problems of the mass production system. With all their 
potential to reduce lead time, improve quality, and increase throughput, the performance 
of the AMT has been disappointing to many manufacturing companies (Kalb, 1987; Long, 
1989; Uzumeri & Sanderson, 1990). Although many reasons have been proposed to 
explain these difficulties, inappropriate organization and human infrastructure were put 
forward as the major contributing factors for the AMT failures (Barley, 1990; Bronder, 
1991; Karwowski et al. 1994; Majchrzak, 1992; Unterweger, 1986; Zylstra, 1987). It was 
argued that for the advanced manufacturing technology to achieve its optimum level of 
performance, it is necessary to adopt new human resources and work organisation 
arrangements. Combining flexible production technologies with flexible work (i. e. lean 
production) promised to usher in improved operational control, increased flexibility, and 
drastically reduced lead times. 
1.2 Need for the Study and Choice of the Research Questions 
As Harrison and Storey (1996) indicated, a gap in the literature on new wave 
manufacturing strategies exists in that few studies have elaborated on the implementation 
of NWM beyond the traditional surveys which generally fail to grasp the nuances and the 
true dynamics of the implementation, while single case studies lack comparative value. 
Thus, by choosing a multiple case studies format for examining the interaction between 
NWM and AMT, this study attempts to add comparative value while at the same time 
engaging both the technical and organisational (social) arrangements side of the 
literature. As Harrison and Storey indicated, the literature on new wave manufacturing 
strategies has remained largely `locked into two camps: operations management and 
organizational behaviour' (Harrison and Storey 1996, P. 71). Accordingly, by focusing on 
the interface relationships between the technical side of production in the form of the 
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FMS and the organisational side in the form of lean production systems, this study hopes 
to further explore the dynamics of interaction between the two in the hope of contributing 
new insights into this debate. 
The dissatisfaction as a result from not fully realising the benefits of the technology has 
been discussed in a number of studies (Rosenthal, 1984; Voss, 1985; Jaikumar, 1986; 
New, 1986; Tarnfield and Smith, 1989; Bessant et al., 1993; Udo and Ehie, 1996; Lei et 
al., 1996; Sohal, 1996). 
The original ideal vision of the combination of lean production and satisfied workers has 
been rejected by many researchers who examined changes in the quality of work life 
under lean production (Parker and Slaughter, 1988; Klien, 1989; Fucini and Fucini, 1990; 
Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992; Graham, 1993,1995; Babson, 1995; Delbridge, 1995, 
Landsbergis et al., 1996; Nishiyama and Johnson, 1997; Lewchuck and Robertson, 1997). 
Other researchers questioned the claims that lean production practices necessarily lead to 
high manufacturing gains. Lowe et al., (1997) looked at the performance of 71 `first tier' 
automotive components plants based in Europe, North America and Japan and their data 
did not support the notion that work organisation and human resources policies associated 
with the production model represent a universal "best way" for achieving high 
manufacturing performance. 
In the Worldwide Manufacturing Competitiveness Study, Oliver et al., (1994) found that 
high productivity was virtually uncorrelated with human resource policies intended to 
modify the attitude of workers towards their employers. They noted the successful lean 
plants are controlled plants and that worker empowerment is secondary. This focus on 
control stands in sharp contradiction to the picture painted by supporters of lean 
production who argue that authority will become more diffuse within the organization 
and that workers will be empowered to improve their working lives. The Oliver study 
appears to argue quite the opposite. 
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Table 1.1: Overview of new computer -aided technologies (based on Groover and 
Zimmers. 1984: Meredith. 1986: and Boer. 1991) 
Technology Acronym Description 
Computer-aided design CAD The use of computers to assist in the creation, 
modification, analysis, or optimisation of product 
design 
Computer-aided engineering CAE Computerised software for engineering analysis 
Computer-aided process planning CAPP Computerised software for determining operations 
and product routings 
Manufacturing Resource MRP Interconnected computer software systems for 
Planning manufacturing, planning, scheduling and control 
Computer aided quality control CAQC Computerised software for testing and inspecting 
quality 
Numerical Control NC A hard-wired (tape driven) machine tool 
Computer numerical control CNC A soft-wired (mini-or-microcomputer 
controlled)machine tool 
Direct numerical control DNC Multiple, machine tools controlled by central 
computer 
Industrial robot IR A re-programmable, multi-function manipulator 
Automated storage and retrieval AS/RS Computer controlled equipment used to handle, 
system store, and retrieve material 
Automated material handling AMH Computer controlled material handling using 
robots, automated guided vehicles manipulators or 
transport systems 
Flexible manufacturing system FMS Cells of computerised machine tools and material 
handling devices. 
The use of computers to plan, manage, and control 
Computer-aided manufacturing CAM manufacturing operations 
The integrated application of computers to all of 
Computer-integrated CIM the operational and information processing 
manufacturing functions in manufacturing from order receipt, 
through design and production, to product 
shipment 
6 
Table 1.2: Organisational differences between the old and new paradigm with 
the new paradigm encompassing the NWV111 strategies 
The Old Paradigm The New Paradigm 
Technology is fixed and determines Common optimisation of technical and social 
remaining factors within a company. systems. 
Jobholders are assigned to machines. Application of materials and equipment 
matched to capabilities and requirements of 
jobholder. 
Jobholders with lower qualifications can be Jobholder capabilities regarded as a resource 
exchanged with one another. to be developed. 
Maximum subdivision of tasks with simple Extensive combination of tasks, many 
repetitive job requirements. comprehensive skills. 
External control by supervisors or specialists. Internal control (self-regulatory subsystems). 
Many levels in the hierarchy, complex Fewer levels in the hierarchy, simple 
organisation structure. organisation structure. 
Authoritative style of leadership with Participative style of leadership. 
individual decision-making. 
Excessive competitive thought. Teamwork, work with colleagues. 
Only counting the objectives of the Consideration of the objectives of the 
organisation. jobholders and community as well as the 
objectives of the organisation. 
Alienation. Knowledge and command of the technical 
and social relationships within the company. 
Willingness on the part of the company to 
Reduced willingness on the part of the innovate. 
company to take risks. 
(Source: Salvendy and Karwowski, 1994, pp. 23-24) 
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James-Moore and Gibbons (1997) and Oliver et at. (1994) also noted that the focus of 
lean production research was primarily on high volume automobile and automobile 
components and some electronics plants. James-Moore and Gibbons (1997) questioned 
its applicability to other types of industries without modification. 
These previous studies identified a discrepancy between the theory and actual results on 
the shop floor suggesting that the combination of lean production and the FMSs may be 
problematical and point to potential tensions or contradictions in the emergent new 
paradigm. This study aims to explore the fit between lean production and its application 
to the flexible manufacturing systems (FMS). A FMS is a type of production process 
conversion technology that uses computers to aid the manufacturing process (Gerwin and 
Kolodny, 1992). It is defined as a group of workstations integrated by automatic material 
handling equipment and controlled by a central computer (Chin, 1996). 
The marriage of advanced manufacturing technology and lean production including new 
human resource policies is certainly a new phenomenon and one which has come on the 
heels of a large body of research that pointed to the disappointing results of AMT 
implementation (Udo and Ehie, 1996; Sohal, 1996). The high failure rate of AMT 
implementation in the 1980s was mainly attributed to non-technical, people related 
organisational reasons (See Rosenthal, 1984; Voss, 1985; Jaikumar, 1986; New, 1986; 
Tarnfield et al., 1989; Bessant et al, 1990,1993). Womack et al. (1990) found that the 
automation levels did not account for the wide differences in performance between lean 
and traditional plants. They noted that `what is truly griking is that- at any level of 
automation- the difference between the most and least efficient plant is enormous' 
(Womack et al., 1990, p. 94). 
Although recent improvements in U. S. competitiveness was thought to be the result of 
closer match between computer technology and innovative administrative solutions 
(Gleckman et al., 1993), there were major differences in human resources practices and 
work organisation. Saraph and Sebastian (1992) stated that between 50 to 75 per cent of 
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AMT implementation in US firms had failed mainly as a result of `their neglect of human 
resource factors'. 
This led to an increased focus on ways to develop appropriate structural, organisational, 
human resources and personnel policies to achieve better results from the new 
technologies (Wall et al, 1987; Campbell and Warner, 1992; Clark, 1993; Storey, 1994; 
McLoughlin and Clark 1994). Other studies indicated that plants that effectively 
combined technology improvements with a human orientation achieved higher levels of 
productivity (Horte and Lindberg, 1994). Thus, the development of lean production as 
one the tools to address the organisational issues seemed to offer practitioners the answer 
to their AMT problems. 
At the heart of lean production is the powerful combination of just-intime manufacturing 
(JIT) and total quality management (TQM) and the development of consistent bundles of 
human resource practices (MacDuffie, 1995) that deploy teamwork, multiskilling, 
continuous improvement, increasing worker autonomy and empowerment. The 
introduction of lean production is presented as the path to achieve optimised performance 
from the Advanced Manufacturing Technology including flexible manufacturing 
systems. 
Certainly, many of the adopters of these approaches did experience significant 
improvements from this coupling with AMT (MacDuffie 1991,1995; Adler and Cole, 
1993). However, closer scrutiny of this formula points to a significantly more complex 
interaction relationship between the two. This interaction requires a deeper level of 
analysis and evaluation that goes beyond the mere statement of the need for such 
organisational changes and the subsequent expectation of significant productivity and 
flexibility gains once the lean production system is implemented. 
There have been appreciable increases in productivity and flexibility as a result of the 
introduction of lean production. Nevertheless, in many cases, these productivity and 
flexibility gains do not appear to be extensive enough or sizeable enough to justify some 
of the far reaching claims of the emergence of a new paradigm and the associated 
revolutionary change. I 
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To date, the issue of AMT and the new organisational arrangements still occupies a 
significant portion of the interest of researchers and practitioners alike. Manufacturing 
companies are continually facing new challenges that call for an ongoing process of 
analysis and examination of the core competencies and contingencies necessary for their 
survival. Choices are being made about advanced manufacturing technology and new 
organisational arrangements, structures and systems are being adopted and adapted in an 
effort to maximise these competencies and achieve and maintain competitive advantage. 
The key aims of this thesis are: 
to outline the interaction between lean production and flexible manufacturing 
systems; 
" to explore the extent to which the characteristics of flexible manufacturing 
systems and lean production systems features are compatible or incompatible; 
and the key research questions to be addressed are: 
" are their any tensions or inconsistencies in this tight linkage between lean 
production and flexible manufacturing systems? 
" if there are tensions in the relationship and interaction between FMS and lean 
production are these the result of a logical inconsistency: an inherent 
contradiction at the conceptual (design) level? 
" alternatively, if there are tensions in the linkage between lean production and its 
application to the FMS, are these tensions the result of an internal factor such as 
actions by management or employees resulting in a mismatch in the coupling 
between the two? Are these tensions the result of a flaw in the application of the 
lean production system? 
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These questions will provide a platform for the examination of the dynamics of lean 
production and its interactions in the flexible manufacturing environment. This 
relationship will be examined in terms of the assumptions associated with the coupling of 
both these techniques and systems in four European manufacturing companies. 
This study will address in detail, the critical dimensions of interaction between lean 
production and flexible manufacturing systems and will give evidence to reveal the points 
of tension and their consequences. 
1.3 Organisation of the Study 
This thesis is presented in eight chapters. Following this introduction, chapter two will 
review the literature on AMT and NWM, and will describe these two sets of phenomena 
in more detail. It will attempt to address why these AMT systems have been put in place 
and what caused managers to introduce NWM and will address lean production systems 
and FMSs in particular. It will also present the key dimension chosen for the analysis of 
the case studies. Key potential issues concerning the existence of inconsistencies and 
contradictions between AMT and NWM are examined. 
Chapter three further clarify the research questions and describe the theoretical 
framework and methodology of this study. On the basis of the literature review and actual 
reports from field study, complexity, integration, regulation, and flexibility will be 
chosen as the focus dimensions for investigation in the field. In reporting the case 
findings, information will be reported on each of the key dimensions identified as 
important in the literature review. These key dimensions are further discussed in the 
concluding chapter. 
Chapter four presents the case of EBG a Dutch truck manufacturing company and 
examines the application of lean production to its FMS environment. Chapter five studies 
a Dutch aircraft manufacturing company (Fokker Aircraft) in the period before its closure 
and focuses on one fabrication and components plant which utilised FMS and lean 
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production. Chapter six, switches to yet another Dutch, but smaller size company which 
manufactures refrigeration compressors. And finally, chapter seven presents a UK diesel 
engine manufacturing company that also adopted both lean production and FMS systems. 
These case studies were chosen because certain key similarities suggested that any 
observed differences may be due to the combination between lean production and FMS 
rather than other features of organisational context. All four companies process or 
machine common materials consisting of metal components (ferrous and non ferrous). 
All four companies had introduced lean production and the FMS systems in relatively 
close periods of time to each other. All four companies are subsidiaries of large foreign 
corporate parents. Semi structured interviews and a questionnaire were used to 
investigate these companies over a period of four years. 
Chapter eight will analyse the results of the field research in these four companies and 
will compare, summarise and present the general conclusions of the thesis including 
some recommendations for possible future research directions in this area. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
As the title of this thesis indicates, the core of this study addresses the interaction 
between lean production systems and the flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) and its 
environment. The literature on FMS and lean production is a subset of the broader body 
of knowledge related to technology, work organisation and human resources structures. 
This chapter will present a review of the literature associated with the interaction between 
technology, work organisation and human resources structures and interactions. This 
chapter will be divided into three sections: the first section will introduce the definitions 
and key concepts used in this thesis, followed by a review of the criticism associated with 
lean production. The second section presents the key dimensions of complexity, 
integration, regulation, and flexibility as the characteristic features of FMS. The third 
section will present a general overview of the technology-organisation interaction 
literature. 
The original ideal vision of the combination of lean production and satisfied workers has 
been rejected by many researchers who examined changes in the quality of work life 
under lean production (Parker and Slaughter, 1988; Klien, 1989; Fucini and Fucini, 1990; 
Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992; Graham, 1993,1995; Babson, 1995; Delbridge, 1995, 
Landsbergis et al., 1996; Nishiyama and Johnson, 1997; Lewchuck and Robertson, 1997). 
Other researchers questioned the claims that lean production practices necessarily lead to 
high manufacturing gains. Lowe et al., (1997) looked at the performance of 71 `first tier' 
automotive components plants based in Europe, North America and Japan and their data 
did not support the notion that work organisation and human resources policies associated 
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with the production model represent a universal "best way" for achieving high 
manufacturing performance. 
Disappointment resulting from failed of AMT implementation (Udo and Ehie, 1996; 
Sohal, 1996). was mainly attributed to non-technical, people related organisational 
reasons (See Rosenthal, 1984; Voss, 1985; Jaikumar, 1986; New, 1986; Tarnfield et al., 
1989; Bessant et al, 1990,1993). Womack et al. (1990) found that the automation levels 
did not account for the wide differences in performance between lean and traditional 
plants. They noted that `what is truly striking is that- at any level of automation- the 
difference between the most and least efficient plant is enormous' (Womack et al., 1990, 
p. 94). In many cases increasing automation lead to a decreases rather than an increases in 
plant flexibility (Upton, 1995), the high failure rate of technology implementation was 
mainly attributed to non technical, people related organisational causes (Rosenthal, 1984; 
Voss, 1985; Jaikumar, 1986; New, 1986; Tarnfield and Smith, 1989; Bessant et al, 1990, 
1993). AMT refers to a family of technologies which includes computer aided design and 
engineering systems, material resource planning systems, automated materials handling 
systems, robotics, computer-controlled machines and computer integrated manufacturing 
systems (Schroder and Sohal, 1999) 
As Karwowski and Salvendy (1994) pointed out, the importance of the human issues 
behind the implementation of manufacturing technology should not be underestimated. 
Additionally, the importance of effective operator interaction with the machine has been 
widely recognized in the literature ( Bailey, 1989; Schneiderman, 1992; Johannsen et al., 
1992; Ruge et al., 1995). This part of the broader body of knowledge indicating the need 
to balance increased automation with improvements in human resources management 
(Horte and Lindberg, 1994). Beaty (1992) suggested that AMT implementations have 
their own unique "process and logic" and researchers have only just begun to understand 
the entire phenomena. 
Chen and Small (1996) Studied various companies that implemented shopfloor 
automation and found that top management support and employee participation were 
among the key factors that lead to AMT success in addition to vendor relationships, 
product-process dependence, and manufacturing strategy. 
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2.2 Flexible Manufacturing Systems 
An FMS can manufacture assorted products using the same group of machines linked by 
automated materials handling systems and controlled by a computer system. Automated 
and pre-programmed workstations are linked for different operations, ensuring that all 
members of a family of parts can be produced whenever needed. It is a form of advanced 
manufacturing technology where the production machines (computer numerical control) 
are interconnected by a transport system. The transporter carries work to the machines on 
pallets or other interface units so that work-machine registration is accurate, rapid and 
automatic. A central computer controls both machines and transport system (National 
Bureau of Standards, in Upton, 1992; 1994). The key in an FMS is that the coordination 
of the work flows is carried out by a central control computer. This computer performs 
functions such as: scheduling jobs onto the machine tools; downloading part-programs 
(giving detailed instructions on how to produce a part) to the machines; and sending 
instructions to the automated vehicle system for transportation (Upton, 1992). 
The machines use numerical control which is a generic term describing machine control 
technologies that use numerically coded instructions to guide machining operations. A 
numerically controlled machine tool has (1) specifically equipped motors to guide the 
cutting process and (2) a controller. The controller receives numerical commands and 
translates them into electrical impulses that operate the motors, guiding the metal cutting 
process. 
There has been a number of papers indicating that the economies of scope expected in the 
implementation of the FMS will not be achieved unless they are matched by 
organisational changes (Adler, 1988; Chang, 1989; Chen and Adam, 1991; Elango and 
Fried, 1993; Gephart, 1995; Goldhar & Lei, 1995; Graham & Rosenthal, 1986; Hayes & 
Jaikumar, 1988; Jaikumar, 1986; Maffei & Meredith, 1994,1995; Mueller et al., 1986; 
Nemetz & Fry, 1988; Nemetz, 1990; Parthasarty & Sethi, 1992; Sethi & Sethi, 1990; 
Teresko, 1995; Walton & Susman, 1987). 
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Since human resources are central to an administrative system (MacDuffie, 1995; Maffei 
& Meredith, 1995; Majchrzak, 1988), the extent to which FMS achieve economies of 
scope is expected to be a function of the extent to which human resources change to meet 
the requirements of FMS. 
Taheri (1990) asserts that parts which have similar physical configurations or can be 
partitioned into distinct product families, and which require similar machine operations 
on similar machines are prime candidates for FMSs. The above requirements provide an 
explanation for the proliferation of FMSs in metal working operations for the 
manufacture of machining components. 
2.3 The Lean Production System 
The concept and acceptance of lean production as a set of principles is now fairly rooted 
in the literature (Womack et al., 1990; Karfcik, 1988; Monden, 1983). Haslam et al., 
(1996) noted how throughout the 1980s and well into the 1990s, innumerable articles 
took, as axiomatic, the superiority of lean production. Although the distinctive "logic" of 
flexible production in auto assembly emerged from the experiments of Japanese 
companies in the 1950s and 1960s (Monden 1983; Cusumano 1985; Ohno 1988), the 
study of JIT as a conscious manufacturing strategy in the West was spearheaded by 
researchers like Abernathy et al. (1981), Hayes and Wheelwright (1981). Detailed 
descriptions of the way in which the production systems based on the Japanese justin- 
time principles such as the elimination of waste, reduction of production cost, total 
quality control and recognition of employees' abilities can be found in specialised texts: 
Shingo(1981) and Ohno (1978,1982,1988) explained the development of JIT in Toyota 
while Monden (1983), Schonberger (1982,1984,1986) discussed various philosophical 
and implementation issues of JIT. Schonberger analysed the adaptability of JIT practices 
by the Western manufacturing firms and provided a systematic framework for the JIT 
principles. There have been a considerable number of books and papers which have 
reviewed the JIT literature (Berkley 1992; Golhar and Stamm, 1985; Harrison, 1992; 
Hallihan et al., 1997; Keller and Kazazi, 1993; Singh and Brar, 1992; and Sohal et al., 
1993) however, it was primarily the study of the Japanese auto industry by Womack, 
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Jones, and Ross (1990) preaching the gospel of lean production as offering the promise of 
tremendous improvements that the total concept became popular. 
In simple terms lean manufacture was defined by Womack et al. (1990), as follows: 
" integrated, single piece production flow, small batches, justin-time giving low 
inventory; 
" defect prevention not fault rectification; 
" production pull not push with smoothed demand; 
" flexible, team-based work organization with multi-skilled workforce and few indirects; 
" active involvement in root cause problem solving to maximize added value; 
" close integration from raw material to customer through partnership. 
Krafcik and McDuffie (1992) and Womack et al. (1991, p. 13) noted its emphasis on `lean' 
for its use of less of everything compared to mass production: half the human effort in the 
factory, half the manufacturing space, half the investment in tools, half the engineering 
hours to develop a product in half the time. Also, it requires keeping far less than half the 
needed inventory on site, results in many fewer defects, and produces a greater and ever- 
growing variety of products. 
Womack et al. (1990) argued that lean production represented a dramatic shift from the 
traditional Taylorist and Fordist principles of mass production such as detailed division of 
labour and fragmentation of jobs, deskilling, and centralised managerial and supervisory 
control (Braverman 1974, Giordano 1992). They presented lean production as the 
historical successor of the mass production: "... we believe, lean production will supplant 
both mass production and the remaining outposts of craft production in all areas of 
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industrial endeavor to become the standard global production system of the twenty-first 
century" (Womack et al., 1990, p. 278). 
In addition to the just-in-time low inventory levels and just-in-time delivery driving the 
the detection of error sources, A key element of lean production is its vigorous focus on 
quality management compared with the traditional mass production approach (Levy, 
1997). A number of authors identified the core features of the total quality management 
used in the lean production framework and the practice and ideologies that comprise it. 
On the practical side, these included ( Garvin, 1987,1991,1993; Crosby 1979,1984; 
Juran 1988,1992; Deming 1986) who attempted to provide managerial insights on the 
effective `management of quality'. These books provide recipes or principles (see Powell 
1995 for summary) based on the vast experience of leaders in the field such as Deming, 
Juran, and Ishikawa. 
Lean production is often referred to as a combination of just4n-time manufacture and 
total quality management (TQM). TQM is a management strategy that is intended to 
produce continuous improvement in work processes. Logically flexible production 
technologies are needed to support continuous improvement (MacDuffie & Krafcik, 
1992). The term flexible technology has been used in the past to describe programmable 
production equipment that can be easily reprogrammed to produce customised products 
to meet customer demand (Jaikumar, 1986). The technology is also flexible because 
production workers can stop machines if quality problems arise. Hence, an organisation 
that implements TQM has to have flexible technology in order to achieve continuous 
quality improvement. 
The key emphasis in lean production was on successive quality control integrated in the 
production process and the integrated approach to quality management that lean thinking 
emphasises (Lamming, 1993; Womack & Jones , 1996) conducted by all actors through 
design for manufacture by integrating product and process engineering, team work, 
quality circles, and company wide information sharing, and directly by workers through 
preventive maintenance where shop-floor workers have maintenance roles; statistical 
process control; standardised procedures at all levels and in all functions (Womack et al., 
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1990; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) in addition to more recent trends which include self 
assessment through internal quality audits, and focus on administrative routines for 
quality improvement ( Soderquest and Motwani , 1999). Lean production has been 
extended to encompass the whole spectrum of activities in the business such that world- 
class companies are seeking to become lean enterprises (Lamming 1993; Harrison, 1992; 
Jones, 1994). Burcher and Dupernex (1996) noted That the underlying philosophy can be 
applied universally within manufacturing, but the tools used to enable the philosophy 
need to be applied in a context-sensitive manner. 
The lean production methodology encompasses the organisational structure, systematic 
education and training, and the use of Japanese manufacturing principles, such as: 
systems design; supplier integration; teamwork for continuous improvement; flexible and 
simple systems; attention to detail; inventory elimination; set-up reduction to facilitate 
batch size reduction; systematic de-bottlenecking; total quality; preventive maintenance 
to eliminate unscheduled breakdowns; eradication of non-value-adding activities. 
2.4 Criticism of Lean Production 
There has been considerable criticism of the lean production system. The primary 
argument against lean production is that these lean plants achieve much of their 
productivity by "sweating" workers through faster work pace, standardised jobs, social 
control via peer pressure, and stress from lack of buffers in the production system and 
Kaizen efforts that emphasise the labour input (Parker and Slaughter 1988; Fucini and 
Fucini 1990; Graham 1993). Even Womack et al., cited criticism by the UAW (United 
Auto Workers union) who call lean production "management by stress" because 
managers continually seek to eliminate "slack" from the system (Womack et al., 
1990: 4 1). Researchers like Bennett Harrison (1997, p. 38) referred to this as the `dark side 
of flexible production' while others like Turnbull (1988, p. 18) observed the British 
experience in operating JIT and saw it as illustrating " both the degree off work 
intensification involved and the added stress that is endemic to the system". Klien (1991) 
19 
questioned the motives of employers who promise "autonomy" when what they really 
intend is for workers to deliver an unprecedented level of cooperation. 
A key element of the criticism of lean production is its claim of productivity gains. Lowe 
et al., (1997) examined the hypothesis that lean production practices necessarily lead to 
high manufacturing. Studied the performance and management of 71 `first tier' 
automotive component plants base in Europe, North America, and Japan. Their data did 
not support the notion that the work organisation and human resource policies associated 
with the lean production model represent a universal "best way" for achieving high 
manufacturing performance. Rather, the findings emphasise the importance of context, 
specific plant characteristics, and choice for understanding the performance of 
manufacturing organisations. 
Another key criticism of lean production system was that LP implicitly require different 
approaches to managing human resources, Womack et al. did not explain how human 
resources practices are integrated into these different production systems, nor did they 
test the relationship between these practices and performance. While work practices and 
human resources policies are considered central to the Japanese production system and 
the success of the Japanese automobile industry (producers (Womack et al., 1990; 
MacDuffie, 1995; Pil, 1996), the original book by Womack dealt with the human 
resources management aspects of lean production in a relatively elementary way. There 
was a need to explore the role of human resources in the "organizational 
logic"(MacDuffie, 1995) of lean production system and for further elaboration of the 
"social arrangements of production" (Harrison and Storey, 1996). 
MacDuffie (1995) argued that an `organizational logic' of lean production underpins 
three generic collections of bundles of organizational practices. These are: factory 
practices (related to the minimization of buffers, for example through the reduction of 
inventory levels and minimization of repair space), work systems (related to teamwork 
and the development and application of employee knowledge and skill on the shop floor) 
and human resource management (HRM) practices (concerning the encourgement of high 
commitment and motivation of the workforce). 
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Harrison and Storey (1996) pointed to five areas in which were considered as 
prerequisites for successful implementation: 
`first to overcome the barrier of treating NWM approaches as simply a series of technical 
fixes; second, the need to improve integration; third, the need for premium levels of 
commitment from employees; fourth, the need to widen the managerial agenda beyond 
the firm to encompass the entire supply chain; fifth, the need for change in company 
culture. ' (Harrison and Storey, 1996, p. 66). 
In the next section, I will discuss the key research dimensions associated with the flexible 
manufacturing systems in particular 
2.5 Research Dimensions 
At the conceptual level, it is possible to identify a set of dimensions which encompass 
certain characteristics associated with flexible manufacturing systems (FMS). Using 
Mintzberg's (1979) dimensions for the technical system employed by the organisation, 
Krabbendam (1988), Boer (1990), Boer and Krabbendam (1991) identified six key 
dimensions to these production technologies: complexity, integration, flexibility, 
automation, regulation and expensiveness (Boer, 1990: 30). 
In order to develop a frame of reference and consistency in the investigation of the 
interaction between lean production and the flexible manufacturing systems used, the 
same dimensions used by Krabbendam (1988) and Boer (1990) (complexity, integration, 
flexibility, automation, regulation, and expensiveness), will be used as measures for 
exploring the relationships between the lean production and its application to the flexible 
manufacturing systems used in the case companies. 
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2.5.1 Complexity 
Kuhrana (1999) categorised the various complexity concepts into fou types - 
technological, logistical, organisational, and environmental complexity. (1) Logistical 
complexity is the result of a high volume of transactions or tasks, or product proliferation; 
(2) Technological complexity is related to the inherent complexity of the system and its 
technologies (for both products and processes; (3) Organizational complexity pertains to 
the organisational structures, forms, and procedures that make organisations complex. 
There are several factors that determine the overall manufacturing system complexity. A 
main set of factors relates to the manufacturing processes being supported by the system: 
the complexity of the supervisory tasks performed, the complexity of the operators tasks, 
and the complexity of the required operators behaviours (Martensson and Stahre 1992). 
Another major determinant of the overall manufacturing system complexity is the 
complexity of the system in terms of the number of product types manufactured, number 
of manufacturing operations involved, and the amount of systems maintenance necessary. 
In an FMS system, the technology introduces new levels of complexity to the work 
environment by virtue of the software and hardware requirements. Its introduction 
increases the number of interrelated elements in the system compounding the level of 
complexity. FMS complexity reaches a stage were it becomes necessary to use special 
diagnostic equipment and process planning as well as decision making and tool / part 
management software in order to maintain control over the production process. 
This complexity is also evident from the high, on-line, computing power requirements 
(including a large stored part program inventory) which means that there is a need for 
extensive preparation and implementation requirements (Luggen, 1989). In contrast to 
this complexity, new wave manufacturing focuses on simple work organisation and 
restructuring approaches i. e. human centred approaches (Ebel, 1989) which characterised 
the Japanese style production methodologies and systems. This simplification approach 
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was clearly evident in the case of lean production (Womack et al., 1990) in the car 
industry. 
An FMS is a complex, automatic system in which many failures must be anticipated and 
catered for. The software for controlling mediun/large FMS has to handle the 
tremendous complexity of scheduling and dispatching multiple products through a variety 
of processing routes, transporting them around the system and recovering from any 
failures in system components. Failures such as tool breakage, machine and vehicle 
failure are fairly common. In such circumstances, methods for recovering from the faults 
must be built into the central control software which adds to the complexity of the control 
software (Upton, 1994). 
In this thesis, the discussion is limited to the production environment in each of the 
factories studied where the relevant dimensions include technological and logistical 
complexity. Both dimensions, when viewed from the perspective of the users of the 
technology, relate to overall job complexity. Job complexity is a measure of autonomy, 
variety and feedback derived from the Job Diagnostic Survey (Hackman & Oldham, 
1975). The model developed by Hackman and Oldham showed that outcomes such as 
internal motivation, quality performance, satisfaction, absenteeism, and turnover were the 
result of five core job dimensions: skill variety, task identity and task significance, 
autonomy, and feedback. 
2.5.2 Integration 
A second comparative criterion between FMS and lean production is the degree of 
overall integration of resources and processes. Krabbendam (1988) considered integration 
as a key characteristic of FMS technology. He defined integration as ` the extent to which 
the system is able to perform different types of operations, to change tools, to transfer and 
load work pieces, and to download part programs and production schedules from a 
central storage' (Krabbendam, 1988 in Boer, 1990, p. 101). This definition could be 
expanded to include the ability to perform and harmonise the various operations within 
the system and is done through the use of special hardware/ software linkages. 
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This need for integration is of no less importance lean production systems. The difference 
is that this integration is often achieved not through dependence on the technology, but 
through developing internal cooperation and teamwork mechanisms, as well as 
developing proper communication structures. 
Therefore, considering the relationship between the FMS and lean production along the 
integration dimension, we can see that the need for integration mechanisms is necessary 
in both cases. The use of FMS increases the need for organisational coordination and 
integration (Kaplinsky, 1984). A number of authors looked at the need for integration 
within manufacturing and found that the use computerisation and advanced 
manufacturing technology increases the complexity and internal interdependence which 
in turn increases the need for greater integration (Kaplinsky, 1984; Haywood and 
Bessant, 1990; Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992). Coupled with the lean production structures, 
AMT can act as a catalyst which increases and promotes overall organisational 
integration by improving 'the accessibility and speed of information capture and display 
across different levels and areas of operation' (Clark, 1993, p. 11). 
2.5.3 Regulation 
Regulation is defined as the influence the system exerts on the work of operators, process 
planners, production planners and maintenance engineers (Krabbendam, 1988; in Boer 
(1990, p. 101). It closely rehtes to formalisation (the extent of written rules, procedures, 
and instructions) which is a central feature of Weber's bureaucratic ideal type and an 
extensively researched dimension of organizational structure (Pugh and Hickson, 1976; 
Mintzberg, 1979). The degree of formalisation can be conceptualized in the conventional 
terms of the Aston group (Pugh and Hickson, 1976) as the extent of formalised rules 
governing work behaviour and the extent to which they are enforced. Arches (1991) 
found formalisation negatively associated with job satisfaction, and Kakabadse (1986) 
found formalisation of tasks and work processes positively associated with feelings of 
powerlessness and self-estrangement. Organizational researchers have noted that people 
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particularly resent what they consider "bad" rules, while "good" rules are taken for 
granted and rarely noticed (Perrow, 1986, p. 24). 
Lawler (1994) pointed to the existing tensions between employee involvement and the 
TQM focus on codification of the work processes. Applebaum and Bart (1994) described 
the existence of contradictions between the `lean' and `team' approaches. 
Based on contingency theory, negative attitudinal outcomes attributed to formalisation 
are often due to a misalignment of task requirements and organisation and job design. 
Employees will react positively both when high levels of formalisation are associated 
with repetitive or routine tasks and when low levels of formalisation are associated with 
more task variety and complexity (Adler and Boryes, 1996). However, lack of autonomy 
and control will create negative feelings and act as a de-motivater. 
Scott (1992, p 31) noted that structure is formalised to the extent that the rules governing 
behaviour `are precisely and explicitly formulated and to the extent that roles and role 
relations are prescribed independently of the personal attributes of individuals occupying 
positions in the structure'; formalisation thus `serves to objectify the structure'. 
Formalisation procedures provide organisational memory that captures lessons learned 
from experience (Levitt and March, 1988; Walsh and Ungson, 1991). Formalisation 
codifies best-practice routines so as to stabilise and diffuse new organisational 
capabilities (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Adler and Boryes(1996) pointed to two types of 
formalisation: the enabling and coercive. This idea of an enabling type of formalisation is 
consistent with Blau's (1955) finding that "good" procedures are those seen as valuable 
resources that help professionals meet clients" needs. 
Coercive type of formalisation, procedures fit Waltons (1985) characterisation: They are 
a substitute for, rather than a complement to commitment. Instead of providing 
committed employees with access to accumulated organisational learning and best- 
practice templates, coercive procedures are designed to force reluctant compliance and to 
extract recalcitrant effort. 
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This assumption was re-enforced by a number of studies which confirmed that simply 
investing in advanced technology did not guarantee successful performance and 
productivity gains (Bessant et al, 1992; Burnes, 1988; Waterlow and Monniot, 1986). It 
became clear that these AMTs were not being used effectively (Tarnfield and Smith, 
1989; Saraph and Sebastian, 1992), and that the original promises of increased 
productivity and flexibility were not being fulfilled (Bessant et al, 1990; New, 1986; 
Voss, 1985). Because organisational rather than technical reasons were given for the 
disappointing AMT performance (Rosenthal, 1984; Jaikumar, 1986; Callerman and Heyl, 
1986), there was a trend towards adopting many of the Japanese techniques and other 
work organisation initiatives which). An army of industrial and business consultants 
helped in the dissemination of these new work organisation and management techniques 
such as JIT and TQM. 
2.5.4 Flexibility 
There are many kinds of flexibility and indeed a sizeable literature devoted to competing 
typologies of the various kinds of flexibility (see overview by Sethi and Sethi 1990). 
Upton (1994) defined flexibility in abstract general terms as " the ability to change or 
react with little penalty in time, effort, cost or performance" (P. 73). Adler and Goldoftas 
(1999) noted that from an organisational point of view, all forms of flexibility present a 
common challenge: efficiency requires a bureaucratic form of organization with high 
levels of standardisation, formalisation, specialisation, hierarchy, and staffs; but these 
features of bureaucracy impede the fluid process of mutual adjustment required for 
flexibility; and organizations therefore confront a trade off between efficiency and 
flexibility (Knott 1996, Kurke 1988). 
Slack (1991) identified two critical factors for judging the flexibility of process 
technology: `range flexibility' which indicates how far an operation can change, and 
`response flexibility', which indicates how fast the operation needs to change. Generally, 
flexibility is defined as the ability of a company to respond to market demands and react 
to market changes with few penalties with regard to time, effort, cost or performance 
(Upton, 1993a) There are four types of flexibility: mix flexibility, product flexibility, 
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volume flexibility, and delivery flexibility (Slack, 1989; 1991). The desired flexibility 
associated with the introduction of certain types of AMT are seemingly introduced to 
achieve inter alia any one of these flexibilities depending on the overall strategic and 
manufacturing objectives of the organisation. 
Although FMSs introduce technical flexibility through the reprogramable control of 
operations and integration mechanisms, developing the necessary manufacturing 
flexibilities is not limited to the choice of production process but also involves 
organisational and infrastructural transformation throughout the organisation. Operational 
advantages are not automatically achieved through the introduction of these AMTs. 
Adaptations in areas such as production, process planning, quality control, and 
maintenance are essential if the technology is to lead to operational advantages (Boer, 
1990). These adaptations are key elements of the new wave manufacturing strategies. It is 
assumed that coupling these NMW strategies with these technologies will lead to gains in 
the overall flexibility of the manufacturing function. The flexibility associated with the 
new wave manufacturing approaches revolves around the organisation of work and the 
optimisation of labour productivity, skill, and training and the use of 'functional 
flexibility' which involves job range and task enlargement (Atkinson and Meager, 1986, 
Pollert 1991a). 
There are many existing factors associated with the technology which affect the 
manufacturing flexibility. For example, in an empirical study on the flexibility of 61 
plants in the paper industry, David Upton (1993b, 1995) found that actual day to day 
flexibility was severely limited by the existence of a high degree of computer integration: 
` There is a consistent, strong, negative relationship between computer integration and 
range, particularly integration aimed at automating grade changes. ' (Upton, 1993b, p. 25) 
Upton presented two plausible explanations for his findings: (a) that 'system designers are 
conservative, and complex automation systems require a clear understanding of the range 
of control tasks requires', or (b) that 'firms only install computer integration systems on 
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those systems which have a limited range' (Upton, 1993b, p. 26). Both of these involve 
infrastructural or organisational/ managerial rather than technical implications. 
Although the Upton study was specific to the paper industry, it served to indicate that 
claims of flexibility associated with computer integration may be misleading. The focus 
of the technology management literature in the past few years on the need for structural 
and organisational changes in conjunction with AMT introduction serves to support 
Uptons' conclusions on the lack of empirical evidence to support there is a positive 
relationship between flexibility and computer integration. Slack (1989) referred to these 
structural and organisational changes as 'infrastructural resources' which are needed to 
achieve the desired levels of flexibility. They included the 'systems, relationships and 
information couplings which bind the operation together' (Slack, 1989). 
2.5.5 Automation 
By definition, the use of advanced manufacturing technology implies an increase in the 
level of automation within the company. In terms of the FMS, Automation is defined as 
the degree to which operations such as workpiece transfer, loading and unloading and 
fixturing, tool change, machine tool control, cutting tool control and quality control, are 
performed by the system without human intervention" (Boer, 1990). On the other hand, 
the lean production systems focus less on the technology as they focus on the overall 
organisational and structural arrangements of work. The use of teamwork, multiskilling, 
continuous improvement, training, and increasing employee autonomy, and developing a 
motivated workforce, are the key components of these systems organised around the 
existing production technology. 
2.5.6 Expensiveness 
Expensiveness is defined as `the costs incurred in the investment in, and the operation, 
maintenance and regulation of the system ' (Boer, 1990). In terms of the research 
question, expensiveness is of interest as a dimension only in terms of the effect the high 
cost of the technology (the FMS) has on the actions of management (and/ or the 
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production staff) in deciding the degree of operator freedom in the operation of the FMS. 
Expensiveness is an issue in terms of managerial (specifically the manufacturing / 
production managers and staff) that the expensiveness of the equipment makes it 
imperative to increase the control over haw the FMS is used and limit operator discretion 
as not to ruin the equipment. This also related to fear of production line down time and 
stoppage if there was crash in the FMS operation 
The preceding dimensions directly relate to the interaction between the FMS technology and the organisational 
structures and approaches that characterise lean production. These dimensions were used as the mechanism to collect 
evidence at the point of interaction between the FMS and the lean production system at the shop floor. While the 
original intention was to collect evidence on all these dimensions (Complexity, integration, regulation, flexibility, 
automation, and expensiveness), expensiveness of the FMS did not seem to be an issue to the actors on the shop floor 
and even through some of the managers used the expensiveness of the equipment as a reason to maintain tighter control 
over the process. For the majority of operators, supervisors, production and manufacturing staff, the expensiveness 
dimension did not solicit any interest. Accordingly, the dimension of expensiveness was not pursued further. As for the 
automation dimension, the very core of this study is AMT and the FMS in particular which meant that the focus of the 
thesis is automation anyway and is not limited to viewing it as only one dimension out of six. Thus, the key 
dimensions used to explore lean production in the FMS environment are: Complexity, integration, regulation, and 
flexibility. 
The overall framework of the lean production and flexible technology is a subset of the theoretical debate that is part 
of a long history of debates on technology and automation and its impact and role in the workplace. In order to put 
these interactions in perspective, the next section will present a brief history of the debate and the key developments in 
the strategy, technology, and organisation triangle. 
2.6 New technology and the Emergence of a New Paradigm 
New technology' in the work place has always attracted the attention of researchers and 
practitioners. With each new technological innovation new assumptions are made and old 
ones recast, about the role and impact of new technology on the organisation and 
structure of work. The debate can be traced to the introduction of automation to the 
workplace in the 1950s, and has continued to resurface throughout the past four decades 
whenever a new form or a new generation of technology is introduced in the workplace. 
The number of these studies continued to grow as the pace of innovation and technical 
development surged to new heights, mainly as a result of the development of the 
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microprocessor and its proliferation at all levels of the organisation. With each new 
generation of microprocessors, new generations of production equipment and systems 
were developed with a better level of control, increased power, and higher degrees of 
flexibility and processing ability. These developments dramatically changed existing 
norms and structures both at the macro and micro level and hence, researchers from 
various schools of thought saw a new paradigm emerging as a result of these 
technological changes. The new paradigm was seen to discard the old mass production 
(Fordist) model which dominated the economies of the West for most of this century, and 
to usher in a new `techno economic' model (Perez, 1985; Freeman, 1990; Dosi et al, 
1988; Freeman et al, 1993). Translated at the micro level within the production (factory) 
environment, the model became a `new technological paradigm which resolved the 
traditional incompatibility between efficiency and stable forms of productivity growth, on 
the one hand, and continuing innovation on the other' (Jones, 1990). This paradigm was 
also seen in the move from the `inflexible division of labour' towards the `comprehensive 
system design' (Trist , 1981; Jurgens et al , 1986). The old ways where technology was 
fixed, unchangeable and determined the remaining factors within the company were gone 
and a new entity based on the common optimisation of the technical and social systems 
of the organisation was formed (Salvendy and Karwowski, 1994). 
At the macro level, the debate between `demand pull' and `technology push' that were 
used to explain the technological revolution as far back as the late 18th century was at the 
heart of the innovation theory school developed by Schumpeter (1950) and recast by 
modem researchers such as Rosenberg (1982), Dosi (1982), Pavitt (1984) and Freeman 
(1990), who now form a neo-Schumpterian school ( Schumpter, 1950; Harris, 1997). This 
neo Schumpterian school viewed the successive waves of technical change as the new 
force for economic growth. The dramatic changes resulting from the new technological 
advances did not fit into the traditional economic models that were based on the profit 
maximising imperatives and the workings of markets and the speculative activities of 
investors (Harris, 1997). A new `techno-economic paradigm' ( Freeman and Perez, 1988; 
Dosi et al, 1988; Freeman et al, 1993) was seen to be at work precipitated by the dramatic 
developments in microlectronics and its application in all sectors of the economy. This 
was a new paradigm which ushered in the decline of the traditional industrial economy 
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and the development of new engines and entities for economic growth. Nelson and 
Winter (1982) saw `technological trajectories' derived partly form the possibilities 
inherent in these new technologies (Harris, 1997, p. 28). 
2.7 Making Choices about Technology and Organisational Arrangements 
This `deterministic' (or structural) account of technical change and its opposing views 
championing the role of human agency, organisational processes, and social choice have 
dominated the debate over the past fifty years and is at the heart of the story of 
technology and work. In the 1950s and 1960s the debate focused on the 'impact' of 
technology on work organisation and worker's behaviour and skill as well as on its 
impact on managerial control (Woodward 1958,1965,1970; Sayles, 1958; Blauner, 
1964; Thompson, 1967). Thompson (1967) focused on the co-ordination requirements of 
technology making an important early contribution to our understanding of the 
relationship between technology, structure, and work design. 
Research by Burns and Stalker (1961) approximated the working of organisations into 
'mechanistic' and 'organic' systems of management which were seen to be determined by 
internal factors such as the strength of personal commitment and managerial ability, and 
external factors such as the rate of technical and market changes (Burns and Stalker, 
1961, p. 209). This research was influential in the development of 'Contingency theory' 
that saw organisational structure as a function of the firm's environment (Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967,1969) and was influenced by the Tavistock studies development of the 
sociotechnical systems approach which recognises among the key principles of the 
sociotechnical model: human resources development, response to the environment, 
innovation, cooperation, commitment, and joint optimisation of both social and technical 
dimensions of the organisation. 
The 'technological impact' approach dates back to the Tavistock studies and the socio- 
technical systems view of organisation (Trist and Bamforth, 1951; Emery, 1959; 
Touraine, 1962; Trist et al., 1963). This approach viewed organisations as systems of 
interrelated structures that are affected by the environment in which they operate, the 
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technology being utilised, and the sentiments of the users. Although these studies focused 
on the technical characteristics of the production systems, in their seminal work on the 
Durham coal mine (Trist et al, 1963) as Brown has indicated 'they did not see technology 
as having direct effects on workers' attitudes or behaviour, nor as determining a particular 
set of work and social relations ( Brown 1992, p. 74). 
One of the most influential representatives of the 'impact of technology' school was Joan 
Woodward (1958,1965). Woodward was the first to empirically disseminate that 
technology is an important variable that contingently interacts with structure to influence 
organisational performance. She believed that there was 'a particular firm of organisation 
most appropriate to each technical situation' (Woodward, 1965, p. 72). The theoretical 
framework for this view laid the foundation of 'Contingency theory'. She saw 
'technology' as the key contingency factor affecting organisational structures as well as 
the behaviours of individual actors within organisations. Focusing on the production 
technology of manufacturing firms, she observed that the technical complexity and the 
level of predictability of production tended to increase as one moved along the 
production spectrum from the unit and small batch production to the continuous now 
production processes. Woodward observed that there was a linear relationship, an 
increase in the level of authority and bureaucracy as technical complexity increased. She 
also pointed out that at the unit production and process production ends of the spectrum, 
firms had less bureaucratic and more flexible structures than mass production due to the 
need for innovation (a curvilinear relationship) in product development for unit 
production technology and in marketing innovation for process production. Thus, her 
conclusions were that there was a strong relationship between the type of production 
technology and the managerial and organisational systems and structures being used. 
Achieving the optimum organisational performance was seen as contingent on using the 
appropriate organisational structures with the appropriate production technology. A 
number of other writers reached similar conclusions and asserted that technology does 
have an influence over organisational structure (Harvey, 1968; Kotter & Schlesinger, 
1979; Boddy & Buchanan, 1986; Helfgott 1988; Fry, 1992; Parthasarthy & Sethi, 1992). 
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Woodward's findings about the relationship between production systems and patterns of 
management were tested by Thurley and Hamblin (1963) in a study focusing on 
supervisory jobs. Their conclusion was that the relationship between technology and the 
supervisor's job was a complex one affected by factors such as: the degree of planned 
variation in the operations (related but not identical to the type of production system); the 
degree of complexity of the operations supervised; the degree of mechanisation of the 
process; and the organisation of supervisory systems. Blauner (1964) also saw technology 
in a deterministic light with different forms of technology leading to different forms of 
control. He argued that technology was the cause of workers' alienation and not the social 
relations of production. Accordingly, technology determined the social organisation of 
the factory and workers behaviour. Blauner saw automation as the way to end workers 
isolation and alienation associated with assembly line work, and took the chemical and 
oil refinery production technology processes as the model for the automated factory 
replacing mass production. 
Overall, the work of these authors had a considerable influence on the study of industrial 
organisations. For example, Woodward (1965) and Bums and Stalker (1961) 
considerably weakened the arguments for 'a one best way' to organise and manage 
organisations, and gave credence to the impact of the environment and associated social 
and technical systems, specifically the different demands that technical systems exert on 
these organisations. Later, a number of researchers based at Aston University further 
developed the previous approaches by focusing on the organisational structures of the 
organisations under study, and investigating, inter alia, the relationship between 
organisational structure and technology. Pugh and Payne (1977), and Pugh and Hickson 
(1976) related the variability in organisational structures to the overall organisational 
'climate' and context of these organisations. They identified six primary dimensions of 
organisational structure: specialisation of activities; standardisation of procedures; 
formalisation of documentation; centralisation of authority; configuration of positions; 
and flexibility (Pugh and Hickson, 1976). They developed quantitative scales for 
measuring and comparing organisational characteristics and the relationships between 
variables (such as scales for measuring variation in the operations technology). 
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By the 1970s, the 'organisational choice' thesis was put forward as a counter argument to 
the 'impact of technology' school. Its adherents rejected the view that technology has an 
'impact' on organisations and instead argued that the link between the technology and 
organisation is essentially the result of a political process that reflected choices that are 
based on managerial perceptions (Child, 1972). Child argued that managers will normally 
have several goals in mind, for example, when introducing new technology. He identified 
four management objectives which were prominent in new technology introductions: 
reducing operational costs; increasing efficiency; improving quality; and improving 
managerial control (Child, 1984). Other authors such as Clegg and Dunkerley (1980) 
stressed the role of strategic choice in skill decisions. 
Technological change was seen as primarily an opportunity for various social forces to 
play out another round in their rivalry. This argument was reinforced by research 
showing that implementation is typically accompanied by modifications that adapt the 
technology to local technical and social conditions (Sahal, 1981; Leonard-Barton and 
Sinha, 1993). A plausible middle ground was charted by Corbett (1992), who argued that 
some technologies, and some aspects of any given technology, are less organizationally 
constraining and more technically malleable than others; he therefore characterized the 
nature of the impact of technology on work organization as "soft determinism. " 
This technological determinism versus organisation choice debate continued to fuel the 
interest of researchers throughout the 1970s and 1980s (See reviews by Buchanan and 
Body 1983; Huczynski and Buchanan, 1991; Adler 1992; Gerwin and Kolodny 1992). By 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, following the spread of new microprocessor technologies 
into the workplace, a middle ground of 'technological imperatives' was introduced 
(McLoughlin and Clark, 1988). It argued that although technological change involves a 
process of choice and negation which provides the actors a role in the change process, 
technology does generate its own imperatives for work and skill in a variety of ways. 
Other researchers argued for even a 'softer' form of technological determinism which is 
being brought about by managerial insistence on optimising the returns on the heavy 
investments in new technology (Adler, 1992). Adler then went on to posit that the heavy 
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investment in Advanced Manufacturing Technology, both in time and financial resources, 
led managers to adopt new and novel work organisation and human resource initiatives in 
order to achieve an optimum return on their technology investment. 
As managers have become more and more aware of the influence of social system 
characteristics on performance, a general move away from the belief that technology 
alone should determine the task environment the focus has expanded to include the social 
system, as well (Astley, 1985; Ford & Randolph, 1992; Scott, 1992). 
2.8 Skilling, Deskilling and Employment Debates 
Skilling and deskilling is another traditional area of the debate concerning new 
technology. The debate in the 1950s and 1960s was dominated by authors who saw 
automation as leading to the broadening of jobs and upgrading of skills relative to the 
limited job requirements of the 1950s assembly line (Adler, 1992). By the 1970s, inspired 
by Marxist labour process analysis, new technology was seen as leading to deskilling due 
to 'capitalist' insistence on lowering production costs and achieving greater control over 
the labour force ( Braverman 1974; Kern and Schumann, 1970; Beynon and Nichols, 
1977). Supporters of this view believed that human know-how is increasingly being 
incorporated into the new technology (Braverman, 1974; Wilkinson 1983). Other authors 
such as (Nobel, 1979; Shaiken, 1984) viewed this new technology as a real threat to craft 
work and as the cause of a drastic reduction in worker control over labour processes. This 
reduction of worker control over the labour process was exemplified in the introduction 
of Direct Numerical Control (DNC) machines which separated the programming function 
(i. e. control) from operation (Wall, Clegg, and Kemp, 1987). On the other hand, 
Hirschhorn (1983) saw automation as leading to the creation of new technically oriented 
and upgraded jobs. Hirschhorn's work was based on the socio-technical systems theory 
discussed earlier, which defined technology as the key feature in determining new work 
designs. 
With the development of new technologies, these arguments saw a revival in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. For example, Kern and Schumann 1992, revised their 1970 study 
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of German automation. In the original 1970 study their conclusion was that automation 
seemed to be associated with deskilling and 'skill polarization'. Yet in their 1992 study, 
Kern and Schumann pointed to a skilling and workforce upgrading trend. In the data 
collected from the auto, machine manufacturing, chemical, and electrical and electronic 
industries, they noted, as an example of the upgrading trend, the emergence of a new 
`Systems controller' job category (Kern and Schumann, 1992). 
Another group of researchers saw technological change aimed at increased productivity 
requiring higher levels and broader varieties of skill from the work force ( see Spenner 
1982 and Barley 1988). They saw new microelectronic process technologies as creating 
skilled tasks and altering the relationship between the conceptual and sentient skill while 
eliminating unskilled work (Adler and Borys 1986; Attewell 1987; Hirschhorn 1984; 
Zuboff 1988). They suggested that conceptual activity replaces physical labour, and 
continuous learning becomes the core of new work. Accordingly, systematic learning 
should be instituted to prepare workers to intervene in cases of failure in automatic 
systems (Hirschhorn 1984) 
Other authors noted that with the introduction of new production technologies, there 
would be a 'hybridisation' of skills, with workers gaining several new skills with greater 
emphasis on trouble shooting skills and a shift towards the multi-disciplinary worker 
(Campbell and Warner, 1987; Campbell and Warner 1992). 
Other research into skill levels continued to support the new evidence pointing to a 
distinct net up grading trend (Adler, 1992). This debate over skilling and deskilling 
makes it clear that there are choices in the design and implementation of new technology 
which carry implications for both productivity and the quality of working life (Gerwin 
and Kolodny 1992). 
Employment is another angle to the historical debate closely linked to the skilling and 
deskilling arguments. AMT is assumed to have lead to high displacement of labour at a 
ratio between 7: 1 to 9: 1 (Lund and Hansen 1986). Others reported that in CNC-based 
shops in engineering, reductions of 30 to 50 percent occurred in the number of operators 
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and setters (Bessant and Senker 1987, Daniel 1987). Nevertheless, there seems to be a 
general agreement that automation as a whole will lead to a gradual transformation of the 
employment structure. Forester (1989) argued that most of the evidence showed new 
technology as creating jobs rather than increasing unemployment, and improving quality 
of working life instead of deskilling. For example, A United Nations report on FMS 
trends in 1986 indicated that while there was a 'decrease in direct work', there was also 
'an increase in indirect production-support'. In the short term, unemployment may occur 
as workers shift from jobs lost to jobs created by the new technology (Noori, 1990). 
However, in the long run the net effect of this transformation will be minimal (Cordell, 
1985). 
This debate over the effects of new technology introductions also involves an industrial 
relations dimension. Both management and labour unions would have to negotiate a 
common framework and a clear understanding of the new technologies. This framework 
is contingent upon the existing organisational context and the level of antagonism 
between management and the labour unions. 
Inter alia, these debates over the role of new technology in organisations are centred on 
the relationship between an organisation's competitive strategy, its technology, and the 
organisational structures and transformations needed to achieve that strategy. Changes in 
market demands and increased competition are the key factors that helped the trend 
towards AMT implementation. These changes were instrumental in the development of a 
new competitive strategy based on product differentiation and innovation (Porter, 1980 
and 1985; Tidd, 1994). When this competitive strategy is translated into 'order winning 
criteria' (Hill, 1985), matching this criteria to a proper manufacturing strategy will 
require changes in the manufacturing / production processes, as well as in the 
organisational infrastructure. The use of advanced manufacturing technology can help 
firms to adapt their existing resources to suit the desired 'order winning criteria' and 
accordingly lead to the successful implementation of the designated strategy. In the next 
sections, a more detailed analysis of the relationship between strategy and technology 
will be presented. 
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2.9 Factors that led to the push for AMT 
The move towards the new paradigm was precipitated by a number of factors arising over 
a long period of time. At the micro level, in addition to the technological advances, 
dramatic changes in the market place, increased competition, and even social factors were 
instrumental in pushing Western firms to adopt new production technologies and systems 
in their quest for competitive advantage. These factors are described in the following 
subsections. 
2.9.1 Technological Advances in Microprocessors 
The changes in the nature of competition were coupled with a significant number of 
technological innovations and inventions, chief among them was the emergence of the 
microprocessor. In the manufacturing environment, the impact of the microprocessor was 
seen through the introduction of Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) machines used 
for component production and the development of advanced robots that are now applied 
to mechanical handling, arc and spot welding, paint spraying and many other applications 
(Greenwood, 1988). Other developments included Computer Integrated Manufacturing 
(CIM), and new production planning and scheduling systems such as Management 
Requirement Planning (MRPII), and Computer Aided Design (CAD) and Computer 
Aided Engineering (CAE) in the Design and Engineering functions. As new and more 
powerful generations of microprocessors continued to be developed, the span, power, 
flexibility, and ability of the resultant new generations of equipment and systems 
continued to grow. 
These advances in the technology gave the companies that utilise Advanced 
Manufacturing Technologies the potential to effectively respond to the challenges of the 
market place through improved operational control, increased flexibility and quicker 
response time. 
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2.9.2 Changing Market Conditions 
The survival of any firm is dependent on its sensitivity to market demands. As market 
demands change, companies have to reorient their manufacturing process accordingly. 
Bolwijn et at (1986) suggested that market demand evolved through a series of phases. 
The first phase, which lasted until the late 1960s, had price leadership as the key 
competitiveness criteria. As companies competed on the basis of price, efficiency became 
the key performance factor in the manufacturing process. Improved manufacturing 
efficiency would reduce production costs allowing the company to reduce its price per 
unit manufactured and hence increase sales. The second phase of market demand changes 
began in the early 1970s through increased customer awareness of product quality. As 
product quality awareness increased, companies were forced to reorient their 
manufacturing processes and focus on quality as another key competitiveness criterion. 
As more and more manufacturing companies began to compete on the basis of quality, 
customers increasingly differentiated between products on that basis reinforcing the trend 
towards producing a high quality product at a competitive price. The 1980s ushered in the 
third phase of market demand changes in which customers began to demand increased 
product range, product variety (Bullinger et al, 1985), product innovation, as well as 
faster delivery times. This last stage has led to a new focus on flexibility as yet another 
critical industrial performance criterion. This was especially true in the supplier- 
manufacturer relationship where a supplier's performance was primarily determined by 
its ability to produce a wide range of products, of high quality (defined as meeting or 
exceeding the customer's expectation), at a competitive price, and to reliably and 
consistently deliver these products within specified short lead times. 
Thus, the basis of competition for manufactured products has expanded to include such 
attributes as customisation, speed-to-market, flexibility, quality and reliability (Small 
1993) and in order to remain competitive in this environment, many manufacturers have 
installed advanced manufacturing technologies AMTs. 
2.9.3 Increased Competition 
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By the 1970s it had become clear to the majority of Western companies that they were 
losing market share at a very high rate. The coming of age of the Japanese multinational 
corporation with its ability to produce higher quality products at more competitive prices 
and at faster delivery times were warning signs to the West. The success of these 
Japanese companies had been attributed, inter alia, to the development of new managerial 
and operational structures, new production planning systems, as well as the use of 
automation in the manufacturing process. It became increasingly evident that if Western 
companies were to compete successfully with the Japanese, they needed to radically 
change their manufacturing processes and structures. By the early 1980s, these 
companies increasingly began to adopt many of the Japanese production systems and 
concepts such as the Just-In-Time (JIT) scheduling system and Total Quality 
Management (TQM) concepts. These systems and concepts became the focus of the new 
effort to recapture lost competitiveness and the rallying cry for an ever-growicg 
management consultancy industry. While the Japanese companies challenged the West at 
the high end of the market, lesser developed countries offered another challenge to 
market share through their ability to achieve high volume production at a much lower 
cost through the use of cheap labour (Bolwijn et al 1986; Reich 1983). These factors of 
continuously changing market conditions and increased competition from a variety of 
sources, have raised the level of uncertainty of product demand (Noori, 1990). Under 
such an unstable demand environment, a firm's ability to adapt its production processes 
to the change in the environment became very critical. 
2.9.4 Social Factors 
In addition to the economic factors, AMT proliferation has also been affected by social 
factors. Hamid Noori, 1990 referred to three major forces that have contributed to the 
pressure to automate: first, a continued shortage in skilled labourers; second, a move by 
employers towards job satisfaction and job enrichment, which has resulted in removing 
employees from tedious and repetitive tasks; and third, the pressure from governments 
and unions to free workers from unhealthy and hazardous tasks (Noori, 1990, p. 4). These 
social factors combined with a desire by many companies to be at the leading edge of 
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technology implementation increased the pressure to implement some form of Advanced 
Manufacturing Technologies. 
2.10 Strategy 
Strategy researchers such as Kotha & Orne, (1989); Nemetz & Fry, (1988); Parthasarthy 
& Sethi, (1992) have offered conceptual models which consider some of the linkages 
between and among manufacturing strategy, business strategy, structure, environment, 
and performance. Whittington (1993) identified four generic approaches to strategy 
formulation: The classical approach, which looks at strategy as a rational process of 
deliberate calculation and analysis designed to maximise long term advantage; the 
evolutionary approach, which models evolutionary theory ( survival of the fittest) on the 
business environment; the processualist approach, which considers the processes of both 
organisations and markets as imperfect and 'fallible ; and finally, the systemic approach, 
which is a relativistic approach which regards the 'ends and means of strategy' as 
inescapably linked to the 'culture and powers of the local social systems in which it takes 
place' (Whittington, 1993, p. 2). Each of these four perspectives provide widely differing 
assumptions about the nature of organisations. In the literature on strategic management, 
the classical and systemic approaches provide the two basic models used for strategy 
formulation. Tidd (1994) refers to these as the traditional and behavioural models. The 
traditional model states that corporate strategy is based on analysing market opportunities 
and competitive threats, and the strengths and weaknesses of the company (Chandler, 
1962; Asnoff, 1965; Sloan, 1963; Porter, 1980). The chosen strategy then determines the 
appropriate manufacturing strategy that in turn determines the appropriate production 
technology. In contrast, the behavioural model of strategy formulation considers the goals 
of the different groups within the corporation (such as marketing, finance, engineering, or 
production) as the key determinants of the strategy and technology. . 
An important contribution in the particular area of manufacturing strategy was the work 
of W. Skinner (1969,1978,1985) who identified the strategic role of manufacturing 
within the organisation. Skinner argued that organisations have to recognise the need for 
trade offs in the structuring of their factories, as manufacturing can not perform all tasks 
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to the same high standard (i. e. to achieve the same level of optimisation in price, 
flexibility, quality, and delivery speed). Organisations therefore have to recognise these 
trade offs in the structuring of their manufacturing organisations and the need to achieve 
internal consistency and fit between the corporate/marketing strategy and manufacturing 
strategy. Skinner was one of the first to have emphasised the need for aligning decisions 
in the "infrastructural" areas with the manufacturing strategy of a firm. Subsequently, 
Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) and Skinner (1985) argued that strategic thinking about 
the role of manufacture requires a manufacturing strategy that involves structural and 
infrastructural decision categories. Among others, production, planning and control and 
quality management were identified as two potential areas where the choice of systems 
was emphasised to be consistent with the manufacturing strategy of a firm. These 
included such decisions as the amount, timing, type of capacity, size location and 
specialisation of facilities, the technology incorporated in manufacturing equipment, the 
degree of automation in manufacturing process, and the linkages between different 
stages. Ward, Miller and Rollmann (1988) also found empirical support and wide 
agreement in the literature for a circumscribed set of strategic choices in manufacturing 
which included: (1) process technology (2) capacity, facilities, and vertical integration (3) 
quality systems (4) production planning/inventory management systems (5) work force 
management, and (6) manufacturing organization. 
Skinner (1985) pointed that simply copying the Japanese techniques or other similar 
practices serves only to keep the adopting company one step behind while the original 
users or implementers have had more experience and are better equipped to stay ahead of 
the game. Skinner also noted that many companies were trying to adopt too many 
contradictory solutions especially tailored by consultants. 
A review of the developments within manufacturing strategies indicates that despite 
differences in terminology, general agreement exists in the manufacturing literature about 
the dimensions of competitive capabilities or priorities that are generic in manufacturing: 
cost, quality, delivery performance, and flexibility. This assertion is supported by 
literature reviews by (Leong et al., 1990) and empirical evidence (Cleveland, Schroeder 
and Anderson, 1989; Ferdows and DeMeyer, 1990). Looking at its history in the West 
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suggest that until the 1970s manufacturers concentrated on productivity and efficiency 
based on a strategy of cost leadership. Porter (1980) identified this strategy as one of two 
basic strategies, the other being differentiation. In the 1980s, spurred by strong Japanese 
competition and changing consumer taste and demands, there was a shift away from cost 
leadership towards a differentiation strategy. This differentiation strategy focused on 
improving product quality. A large number of firms adopted quality programmes during 
this period including major international corporations such as Ford, General Motors, 
IBM, Hewlett Packard, Kodak, and Xerox (Shetty and Buehler, 1991). In the 1990s, the 
shift in the differentiation strategy appears to be concerned with reducing the lead times 
of product development and offering a wider range of products (Tidd, 1994) implying a 
further shift from concentrating on quality towards concentrating on increased product 
innovation plus high quality. The traditional and behavioural models imply that the 
relationship between the manufacturing strategy, technology, and organisation should be 
consistent (Tidd 1994). This necessary consistency between the manufacturing strategy 
and the organisational arrangements, structures, and human resources requires a higher 
level of linkage between business strategy and human resource strategy. This link was 
proposed by Lengnick-Hall (1988) who presented a topology for strategic human 
resource management which emphasised the dynamic relationship and interaction 
between the competitive strategy and the human resource strategy. 
Advanced manufacturing technologies (AMT) offer the technical means for facilitating a 
strategy based on product innovation and product variety. The flexibility engendered by 
advanced manufacturing technologies challenged the traditional wisdom about what is 
possible in manufacturing. For example, Goldhar and Jelinek (1983) pointed out that 
"economies of scope" are achieved when manufacturers are able to economically produce 
a number of different product designs appealing to different market segments. The 
flexibility inherent in the AMT should allow the technology implementers to broaden 
their manufacturing scope with little sacrifice in production cost. Noori (1989) 
maintained that while traditional job shop producers (e. g, machine shops) pursue 
economies of scope and traditional continuous process plants (e. g., paper mills) pursue 
economies of scale, firms adopting AMTs can pursue a third dimension, economies of 
integration and simultaneously enjoy scope and scale economies. In other words, AMTs 
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tend to allow even manufacturers of customised products to achieve scale economies, and 
high volume producers to pursue niches formerly occupied by custom shops. 
The successful integration of such a strategy in the production processes depends on the 
dynamic interaction between the characteristic features of the technology utilisation, such 
as the flexibility and complexity of the automated processes, and the organisational 
arrangements, logistics, work organisation and human resource requirements being used. 
Several studies suggested that technology implementation is more likely to be successful 
when the technology, organization, and people issues have been designed to complement 
and integrate with each other and that such integrative planning is rarely done 
successfully (Preece, 1995; King & Anderson, 1995; Ford & Saren, 1996). Other authors 
also found that new technology cannot be placed into an organization without carefully 
attending to a number of human resource issues (Dina, 1994; Kidd, 1992; Unterweger, 
1986; Zylstra, 1987). Structure, organisational arrangements, and human resource 
policies all have a significant bearing on the success or failure of the advanced 
manufacturing technology implementation (Barton & Kraus, 1985; Fallik, 1988; 
Wilkinson, 1989; Bessant, 1991; Milkman & Pullman, 1991; Ramamurthy & King, 1992; 
Noori, 1997). 
This failure to realign the organisational and human resources structures to fit with the 
AMT is seen as the key cause of the failure to achieve the desired efficiency and 
productivity goals (Bessant et al, 1990; New, 1986; Voss, 1985; Callerman and Heyl, 
1986; Tarnfield and Smith, 1989; Noori, 1990; Clark, 1993). In the next section, these 
work organisation structures and the new organisational arrangements will closely be 
examined. 
44 
2.11 Organisation 
In the next section, a brief review of mass production will be presented with the details of 
the new `paradigm' being put forth as the alternative to the traditional mass production, 
Fordist model of work organisation and design. 
2.11.1 The Older system of Mass Production 
Developed in the car industry by Henry Ford (1922), the mass production system 
dominated industrial organisation design for most of the twentieth century. The system 
involved, inter alia, a continuously moving assembly line and highly mechanised 
production of standardised parts. It relied on large numbers of unskilled or semiskilled 
workers and focused on the sharp division of labour between management and the 
workers. Mass production, or `Fordism' as it later became known, relied on F. W. 
Taylor's "principles of Scientific Management" (1911). Scientific management, also 
referred to as `Taylorism', offered a systemic and logical approach to organisational 
design through hierarchical control, work specialisation and the notion that the best way 
to execute a job can be determined scientifically through "time and motion 
studies"(Noble, 1977,1979; Hounshell, 1984, Giordano, 1992; Dankbaar, 1997). 
Ford coupled the elements of scientific management with the use of specialised 
mechanisation and dedicated automation to pace work. Time and motion studies were 
used to determine the manning levels for the assembly line. The machines set the pace of 
work and a system of strict separation of planning and execution of work was used. This 
resulted in a very high division of labour in production. Short cycle time, machine-based 
production work, functional specialisation of support departments, and firm discipline 
through hierarchical organization became the hallmarks of this system. Stability in the 
manufacturing environment was achieved through the use of finished goods inventories 
which decoupled production from market demand uncertainties. 
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These Fordist principles dominated industrial production of the twentieth century and 
extended beyond the car industry to consumer goods production and other industries all 
over the world. Nevertheless, throughout its history, significant criticism of the practices 
of mass production were put forward by contingency theorists, sociotechnical design 
advocates, and lean production advocates. In Particular, Womack et al. and the 
International Motor Vehicle program researchers believed that lean production, 
developed by the Toyota car manufacturer, will supplant mass production to become the 
new global standard (Womack et al., 1990). 
2.11.2 Reflective Production 
Reflective production embodies the principles of the socio-technical systems design 
(STS). Since the Tavistock Institute studies of the 1950s (Trist and Bamforth, 1951; 
Emery, 1959, Trist, 1982; Pasmore, 1988), particular emphasis was directed by the 
proponents of STS towards improving the quality of working life and increasing worker 
satisfaction through changes to the technical systems and structures on the shop floor. 
At the most basic level, the sociotechnical systems perspective considers every 
organization to be made up of a social subsystem (the people) using tools, techniques, 
and knowledge (the technical subsystem) to produce a product or a service valued by the 
environmental subsystem (Shani and Sena, 1994). It viewed people as a resource to be 
developed through giving workers as much autonomy to perform work tasks as possible 
based on their knowledge and experience. A key element in this focus on the quality of 
working life was the search for alternatives to the short cycle work that was characteristic 
of mass production. Instead of the mass production separation of preparation and 
execution, reflective production advocated a unity of preparation, execution, and control 
at the lowest level possible in an organisation (Dankbaar, 1997). The design put much 
effort in reducing the need for control by reducing the complexity of the organization. In 
addition, the control capacity of the organization, and especially of the shop floor, were 
enhanced by the semi-autonomous work groups who are responsible for complete tasks 
(Hummels and De Leede 2000). 
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Autonomous work groups were introduced as the basic unit of organisation and were 
made responsible for their work. Their success depended on the restructuring of 
production by the creating parallel flows of production where each flow would be 
responsible for a complete product or range of products (group technology). This 
involved the elimination of functionally specialised departments in favour of product- 
flow-oriented groupings of machinery (Sandberg 1982,1995; Berggren, 1992; Medbo, 
1994; Dankbaar, 1997). 
Reflective production was developed as an alternative to the mass production system 
(Berggren, 1992,1994; Christensen, 1993; Ellegard et al. 1992; Rehder, 1992; Berggren, 
1993; Sandberg, 1982; 1995; Benders and van Hooft, 1995; Pot, 1993) emphasising 
economies flowing from integration of tasks and self-regulation of work groups. It 
presented autonomous groups as the basic unit of organisation and gave allowance to the 
lengthening of individual work cycles, job enlargement, and job enrichment (self- 
regulation) and the Organising of work around parallel product flows (Dankabar, 1997). 
This system was perfected in Sweden's car plants at Volvo's Kalmar (1970s and 1980s) 
and Uddevalla (1989-1993). The Kalmar plant introduced a system of `parallel 
manufacture' in which work moved through a series of operations in parallel work 
stations and used programmable carriers which allowed for a longer cycle time and team- 
based operations. The Kalmar partial dismantling of the assembly line revealed two 
problems that barred further progress. First, the longer the work cycle at fixed docks, the 
more difficult and expensive it became to deliver the store necessary parts at multiple 
work stations; and second, the more difficult and expensive it became to provide the 
necessary training. (Sandberg, 1995). 
The experiences of reflective production at Kalmar were fine tuned at the Uddevalla plant 
and a number of researchers such as Berggren (1994) and Sandberg (1995) reported on 
the its promising success. At Uddevalla the problems were solved by delivering whole- 
car "kits" on AGVs in formats that corresponded to the assembly sequence rather than 
delivering parts lineside as a series of separate pieces. This aided learning and eliminated 
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the need for lineside stockpiling. Eventually, team members at Uddevalla were 
assembling entire automobiles alone in groups of two or four workers (Sandberg, 1997). 
The closure of the Uddevalla Plant in 1993 cast a shadow over the claims that it is a 
viable alternative to mass production. Nevertheless, authors such as Berggren (1994) and 
Sandberg (1995,1997) continued to defend this system and stated that the closure of the 
plant was primarily due to macro-economic, non productivity related reasons. They stated 
that Volvo continued to use the system in its other plants and in 1995 the Uddevalla plant 
was restarted as a part of a joint venture with the British TRW Car Company. The 
reopening of the Uddevalla plant seems to continue the debate on the prospects of this 
human centred approach to production. 
The sociotechnical systems approach traditionally emphasised organisational solutions 
rather than technological solutions. Nevertheless, its organisational designs adopted 
technologies that appeared to fit them better than traditional technologies. Flexible 
Automation, including robotics, appeared to give a new impulse to the use of group 
technology (the grouping of machines needed to manufacture a specific family of 
products), which had always been a central element in sociotechnical redesign of 
facilities for component manufacturing. Advanced manufacturing technology was 
implemented with emphasis on decentralisation of administrative tasks combined with 
enriched work content with less fragmentation of work at operator levels (Tryggested, 
1994). 
Several variations of the socio-technical systems approach were also developed. 
Concepts such as 'skill-based production', 'human-centred manufacturing systems', and 
`anthropocentric production system (APS)' were introduced as possible alternative 
production models to the traditional mass production and as an alternative to the 
technocentric approach of the unmanned factory (Ebel, 1989; Alasoini et al, 1994). The 
APS model was viewed as a European alternative approach to production and was chosen 
as the conceptual basis for the modernisation of industry in the European community. 
Wobbe (1991,1992) characterised APS principles as follows: the unity of conception and 
execution of work; decentralised decision making; flat hierarchies; collaboration between 
engineers and workers; skill-enhancing job design; and interaction between design 
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departments and the operational level. (Wobbe, 1991, p. 5). This system pays special 
attention to the shaping of the new technologies and focuses on the use of the 
professional skills of the employees. It strives to improve control by concentrating 
primarily on increasing the internal flexibility of the companies by means of multi-skilled 
personnel. 
There were serious criticisms of this sociotechnical /reflective production system. Either 
for its overemphasis on the psychology and sociology of the work place viewed as 
engineering problems to be solved through the traditional Industrial Engineering 
department (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992). The Uddevalla plant represented in many ways 
the most radical break with Fordism in car production as it eliminated the moving 
assembly line completely and had a complete car assembled by small groups of workers 
(Ellegrid et al., 1992; Sandberg, 1995). The lean production advocates saw this as a 
regression to craft production. They believed that LP will supplant both mass production 
as well as " the remaining outposts of craft production in all areas of industrial endeavor" 
(Womack et al., 1990, p. 278) to become the standard global production system. Adler 
and Cole (1993) echoed the same view stating that that however commendable the 
experiment at Uddevalla was, it could not match the performance of the Japanese lean 
production plant, such as NUMMI, the GM-Toyota joint venture. Yet, Berggren (1992) 
drew attention to the many methodological problems in comparing plants that produced 
such different automobiles, particularly when Uddevalla was producing a more-difficult 
to assemble model. Also while lean production has been refined over the decades, 
Uddevalla was still in its infancy, yet has already matched the productivity of Volvos 
assembly lines in Gothenburg and demonstrated a far steeper learning curve for new 
model introductions. ' 
2.12 Gaps in the Literature 
With the increase in the pace of new technology introductions (Such as AMT), and the 
adoption of new organizational innovations and methods of production, a considerable 
number of researchers focused primarily on the success and failure of organisations in 
achieving productivity and efficiency gains (Voss, 1985; New, 1986; Ettlie, 1988; 
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Bessant et al., 1990; Bessant 1991; Noori, 1990; Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992). Many of 
these researchers correctly pointed out that these failures were due , to a large degree, to 
managerial and organisational impediments rather than any inherent failures from the 
new technology introduction (Wall et. al., 1987; Warner et al., 1990). Nevertheless, for 
the most part, these researchers remained prescriptive in their diagnosis of the causes for 
AMT failures. Their discourse was limited to alluding to the need for organisational and 
managerial transformations without going into the details of the necessary organisational, 
human resources management, and structural changes needed for the success of such a 
transformation. At the beginning of this research, few studies had elaborated upon the 
necessary details of these organisational and human resources policies and practices. 
Storey's (1994) book titled New Wave Manufacturing Strategies and Clark's (1993) book 
Human Resources Management and Technical change were two works which attempted 
to address this gap in the literature. The focus on the organizational aspects of AMT 
implementation was based on the view that the use of new wave manufacturing strategies 
and techniques, such as those of lean production (JIT and TQM), with AMT, would lead 
to achieving the desired optimum efficiency and productivity gains. (Adler, 1988; Chang, 
1989; Chen and Adam, 1991; Elango and Fried, 1993; Gephart, 1995; Goldhar & Lei, 
1995; Graham & Rosenthal, 1986; Hayes & Jaikumar, 1988; Jaikumar, 1986; Maffei & 
Meredith, 1994,1995; Mueller et al., 1986; Nemetz & Fry, 1988; Nemetz, 1990; 
Parthasarty & Sethi, 1992; Sethi & Sethi, 1990; Teresko, 1995; Walton & Susman, 1987). 
Nevertheless, the application of lean production to the flexible manufacturing systems 
environment in particular remains thinly researched even though it is apparent on the 
shop floor that the FMS adds additional constraints and variables to the interaction 
between the technology and the organisational arrangements. The dynamics of the 
relationship between the FMS and lean production remains unexplored in the literature 
and its importance to the debate is yet to be emphasised. By focusing on the point of 
interaction between the FMS and lean production this thesis will shed light on this thinly 
researched aspect of the debate. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Questions and Framework 
3.1.1 Introduction 
This thesis will explore the application of lean production to the flexible manufacturing 
systems environment and investigate the existence of tensions between features of 
advanced manufacturing technologies and new wave manufacturing strategies. It 
investigates the interaction of these lean production (JIT/TQM) techniques and systems 
within FMS production areas chosen for investigation in this study. This chapter will 
present the research questions and the overall conceptual framework and major research 
propositions and dimensions. 
3.1.2 Research Questions 
As presented in chapter two, in the discussion of the literature on new technology and 
organisational innovations, there is a new awareness in the organisation and technology 
literature of the failures of the traditional mass production paradigm to respond to the 
competitive realities of today's market environment. In addition, increasingly, researchers 
and practitioners have begun to realise that achieving the desired productivity gains from 
advanced manufacturing technology application requires adopting new organisational 
arrangements, work organisation structures, and new human resources policies and 
practices. 
The adoption of lean production, appeared to encompass within its systems the requisite 
work organisation changes needed for optimising productivity and efficiency. It coupled 
just-in-time production with total quality management and adopted inter alia, teamwork, 
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multiskilling, increased autonomy, and increasing problem solving skills. Such work 
organisation innovations seemed to offer a satisfactory response to the advocates of 
organisational change as a prerequisite to effective AMT implementation and use. 
The key objectives addressed in this thesis are: 
" to outline the interaction between lean production and flexible manufacturing 
systems; 
" to explore the extent to which the characteristics of flexible manufacturing systems 
and lean production systems features are compatible or incompatible; 
and the key questions addressed: 
" are their any tensions or inconsistencies in this tight linkage between lean production 
and flexible manufacturing systems? 
" if there are tensions in the relationship and interaction between FMS and lean 
production are these the result of a logical inconsistency: an inherent contradiction at 
the conceptual (design) level? 
" alternatively, if there are tensions in the linkage between lean production and its 
application to the FMS, are these tensions the result of an internal factor such as 
actions by management or employees resulting in a mismatch in the coupling between 
the two? Are these tensions the result of a flaw in the application of the lean 
production system? 
These questions will provide a platform for the examination of the dynamics of lean 
production and its interactions in the flexible manufacturing environment. This 
relationship will be examined in terms of the assumptions associated with the coupling of 
both these techniques and systems in four European manufacturing companies. 
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This study will address in detail, the critical dimensions of interaction between lean 
production and flexible manufacturing systems and will give evidence to reveal the points 
of tension and their consequences. 
3.1.3 Research Issues 
This thesis will explore the application of lean production to the flexible manufacturing 
systems environment and investigate the existence of tensions between features of 
advanced manufacturing technologies and new wave manufacturing strategies. It will 
explore the degree of compatibility between lean production the most widely used form 
of new wave manufacturing strategies and its implementation to the flexible 
manufacturing systems (FMS) form of advanced manufacturing technology. 
Are there any tensions in the interaction relationship between lean production concepts 
and systems and its coupling with Flexible Manufacturing Systems. 
What constraints exist, if any, to the overall flexibility associated with the application of 
lean production to the FMS. 
What impact will the coupling of the lean production and the Flexible Manufacturing 
Systems have upon to the productivity gains claimed by the proponents of these new 
wave manufacturing systems and techniques. 
These questions framed the initial approach. In order to avert any ambiguity, these 
propositions will need to be further clarified as to the specifics of the advanced 
manufacturing technology (the FMS system) and new wave manufacturing strategies 
(lean production systems) being used in the manufacturing environment under study. 
By exploring any existing mismatch or compatibility in the application of lean production 
and its coupling with the Flexible Manufacturing Systems form of advanced 
manufacturing technology. 
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Although there are a variety of systems and hybrid approaches that fall under AMT and 
NWM, the focus of this study is on the FMS technology and the implementation of lean 
production to the flexible manufacturing systems environment. Regardless of the specific 
name or terminology given, lean production is broadly defined as the combination of just- 
in-time manufacturing (JIT) and total quality management (TQM) that has been adopted 
as the key competitive factor in Western manufacturing companies. A large management 
consultancy industry has mushroomed in relation to the development of, for example, 
TQM training programs, to help implement these concepts. Similarly, new qualityand 
work organisation standards were also developed either through large companies 
attempting to insure a better quality from supplier networks, or through manufacturing 
and industrial associations and boards developing certifications and awards for insuring 
standards of quality and efficiency. 
3.2 Methodology 
This section begins with a general presentation of qualitative research and an account of 
the choice of qualitative methodology before moving to the specific approach to data 
collection and analysis chosen for this study. 
In line with the established recommendations of Mile and Huberman (1994), the 
qualitative analysis approach of this study will attempt to be both as systematic and as 
disciplined as possible in an effort to make it possible to "walk through" the thought 
processes and assumptions that underline this research. 
The choice of qualitative case study methodology for this research attempts to discern 
and examine how social experience and meaningful patterns and themes emerge in 
relation to the interaction between lean production systems and their implementation to 
the Flexible Manufacturing systems environment within each of the chosen companies. 
An attempt is made to adequately articulate the standards for assessing qualitative 
analyses. Knowing that qualitative data can be analysed and synthesised from multiple 
angles depending on the objectives of the research and the evaluation of the questions 
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being addressed, this relative lack of standardisation provides more versatility to this 
research. 
3.2.1 Choice of Qualitative Methodology 
Although it is often the case that the core ontological constructs of research remain 
implicit rather than being explicitly stated, the aim of methodological roots of this study 
are derived from action research (Silverman, 1970) and the notion of `verstehen' (Weber, 
1949) were the researcher strives to achieve both an understanding and an explanation of 
the particular phenomena under investigation. Using Burrell and Morgan's (1979) 
sociological paradigms, the roots of this study can be positioned within the functionalist- 
interpretivist paradigms. 
According to Yin (1994), it is possible to identify a specific research strategy, that might 
have an advantage over other strategies, based on the type of research question being 
asked. In this thesis, qualitative research is seen as more suited to presenting a processual 
view of social reality. As Miles (1979) suggests, qualitative data preserves the 
chronological flow, and suffer minimally from retrospective distort. Denzin and Lincoln 
(1994) noted that qualitative methodology emphasises "processes and meanings that are 
not rigorously examined, or measured (if measured at all), in terms of quantity, amount, 
intensity, or frequency". They go on to explain the nature of qualitative research as value- 
laden and one that emphasises "how social experience is created and given meaning". 
Similarly, Miles and Huberman (1994) state that in Qualitative analysis " Meaningfulness 
is determined by the particular goals and objectives of the project at hand: the same data 
can be analyzed and synthesized from multiple angles depending on the particular 
research or evaluation questions being addressed". 
Critics of qualitative analysis question whether a truly rigorous analysis can be achieved 
in the absence of such universal criteria. They note that qualitative analysis will not 
specify uniform procedures to follow in all cases. This view mistakenly looks at 
qualitative analysis as unsystematic, and "purely subjective" which is not the case. 
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While it is true that qualitative analysis deals in words and is guided by fewer universal 
rules and standardised procedures than statistical analysis, Guba and Lincoln (1989) and 
Maxwell (1992) argued for the need to replace the positivist notions of validity in 
qualitative research with the notion of authenticity. Maxwell (1992) argued that 
qualitative researchers need to be cautious "not to be working within the agenda of the 
positivists" in arguing for research to demonstrate "concurrent, predictive, convergent, 
criterion-related, internal and external validity". Miles and Huberman (1994) noted the 
distinct differences in procedures and goals of qualitative analysis from quantitative 
statistical analysis. Nevertheless, they stated that good qualitative analysis is "both 
systematic and intensely disciplined. If not `objective' in the strict positivist sense, 
qualitative analysis is arguably replicable insofar as others can be `walked through' the 
analyst's thought processes and assumptions". 
In formulating the research questions, a key objective of the questions was to find 
patterns and common themes that emerge in response to dealing with the coupling of 
FMS and Lean production. Are there tensions in the interaction between lean production 
and Flexible Manufacturing Systems? Are there any deviations in these common themes? 
Are there any factors that might explain these apparent incongruities? 
As stated earlier, this framework of the research methodology and case study approach 
was developed in line with Miles and Huberman (1994) three-element qualitative 
analysis process (data reduction, display, and analysis). The conclusions and verification 
from each of the case studies is also in line with the Miles and Huberman (1994) 
approach. 
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3.2.2 Case Study Methodology 
The aim of the case study methodology is to explore the application of lean production to 
the flexible manufacturing systems environment and investigate the existence of tensions 
between features of advanced manufacturing technologies and new wave manufacturing 
strategies in four manufacturing companies in Holland and the United Kingdom. 
Goode and Hat (1952) emphasised the holistic nature of research in organisation 
behaviour. They defined case study methodology as `a way of organising social data so 
as to preserve the unitary character of the social objective being studied' Goode and Hat 
(1952, P. 331). Similarly, Mitchell (1983, p191) described the case study as' a detailed 
examination of an event (or series of events) which the analyst believes exhibits the 
operation of some identified general theoretical principle'. Yin (1981, p59) also defined 
the case study as ' an attempt to examine contemporary phenomenon in its real life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident'. Thus the case study method tries to capture the whole, is intensive in nature, 
and is open-ended and flexible at all stages of the research process (Eckstein, 1975, p. 81) 
3.2.3 Site Selection Criteria 
A number of factors played a part in the site selection criteria. In the initial phase of the 
research, through a variety of university and personal business contacts, eleven 
companies in different industry sectors were visited. Initial contacts and first visits to 
these companies were arranged either through courtesy contacts facilitated by the Human 
Resources and Change Management Research Unit (by virtue of approved access for 
other research projects within these companies), or by virtue of personal business 
contacts (primarily with the marketing or sales organisations of these companies). These 
contacts facilitated short meetings with either the production manager or the human 
resources manager of these organisations followed by a guided tour of the plant. 
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During this initial phase of the research, the issues relating to new wave manufacturing 
strategies and the use of Advanced manufacturing strategies were still being defined. The 
purpose of the initial visits to these eleven companies was primarily to explore what type 
of new technology and work organisation structures were being applied. The questions 
asked during the tours were general in nature and explored the types of technologies, as 
well as the type of new work organisation structures were being used in these companies. 
A table containing a list of popular new management innovations was presented to the 
interviewees and the presence of any such innovation was checked. 
These companies differed in size, shape, and type of organisational arrangements. They 
included: a high volume producer of consumer products; a manufacturer of electronic 
PCB assemblies (which are incorporated into other finished goods in the automotive, 
brewing, domestic appliances and computer industries); a manufacturer of industrial 
automation products; a major truck manufacturer, one of the oldest aeroplane 
manufacturers in Europe; a producer of printing and finishing equipment for the textiles 
and wall paper industries; and a printing company that had earlier introduced digital pre- 
press computerised hardware/software systems. The exploratory visit to each of the 
eleven companies had no bearing on this study beyond the identification of four 
companies which utilise flexible manufacturing systems. Table 3.2 presents a brief 
overview of these companies and describes the type of products manufactured as well as 
the type of AMT and NWM that were used. Further access was sought only with EBG 
Trucks, Fokker Aircraft, CMC Compressors, and CMN Diesel Engines No further 
information on the other seven companies was developed and accordingly they will not 
be discussed in this thesis. 
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The key factors that influenced the choice of the four case studies: 
1. Further Access: A practical factor in which the ability to conduct interviews at all 
levels in the organisation was essential. In addition to the type technology and work 
organisation structure was the key factor in determining the choice of the focus case 
studies for this study. Agreeableness of management for conducting the study was 
also a key element in deciding on the four chosen sites. Particularly as the research 
involved requiring multiple access and interviews with a cross section of actors 
within each company ranging from the plant managers, human resources managers 
(or personnel manager), production managers to shop floor operators. Access to these 
four companies was facilitated through corporate level contacts facilitated through the 
help of Professor John Storey (then at Loughborough University) as well as Professor 
Harry Boer (then at Twente University in Holland). Both professors were generous in 
securing corporate level introductions to these companies as well as in facilitating 
middle management support for access for the duration of the study. Consequently, 
the corporate and middle management support in these companies facilitated 
cooperation and further access to lower levels of the organisation (particularly on the 
shop floor) as well as lead to ease of access to documentation deemed helpful for the 
investigation. 
2. Type of technology used: The initial choice for the study was to study companies 
where both lean production and FMS are being used. A key criteria for the choice of 
the case study company was the use of Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS) - as 
the new technology change in the manufacturing area. All four sites selected had 
FMSs as part of the production process in addition to combinations of various types 
of the CNCs. The existence of similar advanced production technologies in all four 
plants as well as the relatively similar production environments made the chosen four 
companies ideal for cross case comparisons within the framework of the research. 
3. Type of new organisational arrangements: the presence of organisational innovation 
was also a key factor in the choice of four sites. In all the four chosen sites, there had 
59 
been many organisational changes and human resource development programs. All 
four companies had passed through a tough recessionary period in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s and had gone through restructuring and redundancies. In an effort to 
become more competitive and increase efficiency, all four companies attempted to 
streamline operations and increase productivity through the implementation of the 
popular lean production (JITITQM) techniques. Thus, the adoption of lean production 
in all four companies made the four chosen sites viable for the study. 
3.2.4 Data Collection 
In each of the companies chosen for this research, interviews were conducted with area 
managers, production managers, production support staff, supervisors, and individual 
operators. Some of the interviews were conducted with two operators at a time (members 
of a particular cell). 
Primarily the research methodology and data collection were based on the following: 
1) Interviews with three types of informants seeking and contrasting their views on the 
new wave strategies and its implementation: (1) the views of decision makers such as 
plant managers, production managers, human resource / personnel managers who develop 
and introduce these concepts; (2) the views of production and manufacturing engineers 
and support staff such as quality, kaizen, and maintenance engineers; and (3) the views at 
the shop floor with interviews with supervisors or facilitators, team leaders, operators or 
team members. 
2) Observation through shop floor visits and discussion about working practices as well 
as changes due to the implementation of the advanced technology and organisational 
arrangements with both production staff with responsibilities for supporting the FMS 
environment as well as the direct actors in the FMS environment from supervisors and 
first line operators. 
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3) Analysis of documented information such as training manuals, written rules and 
procedures, improvement charts on quality, productivity and maintenance, memos / 
communications between management and the various departments especially in the 
production areas. 
4) The Interviews at the corporate level including the human resources managers and 
plant managers were helpful in two ways. First; as gate keepers, these interviews served 
as a stepping stone for further access and interviews with a wider cross section within the 
organisations. Second; they served to provide insight on the managerial perspectives and 
the associated meanings, patterns and themes that are being put forth by management. 
The next section will present the interview schedules and will present some additional 
comments on interview procedures. 
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3.2.5 Interview Schedules 
3.2.5.1 EBG European Truck Company 
Visit Dates Nov. 
1994 
June 
1995 
Nov. 
1995 
June 
1996 
May 
1997 
April 
1998 
June 
1999 
Duration 1 day 2 day 1 days 2 days 1 day 1 day 2 days 
Informants Number of 
Interviewees 
Average duration 
of Interview 
Number of interviews 
(at each position) 
Human Resources 
Manager 
1 3 -1 hour 4 
Plant Manager 2 1 hour 2 
Area Manager 2 1 2 
Manufacturing Engineer 2 1 hour 2 
Production Engineer 2 1 hour 7 
Kaizen Engineer 2 1 hour 3 
Programmers 2 'V2 hour 3 
Logistics/Planning staff 2 1 hour 4 
Facilitators 3 1 hour 9 
All Rounders (team 
leaders) 
4 1 hour 5 
Rounders (Operators) 8 'V2 -1 hour 9 
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3.2.5.2 Fokker Aircraft 
Visit Dates Nov. 
1994 
Feb 
1995 
June 
1995 
Duration 1 day 2 days 1 day 
Informants Number of 
Interviewees 
Average duration 
of Interview 
Number of interviews 
(at each position) 
Personnel/Human 
Resources Manager 
2 1 hour 2 
HR Staff 1 I hour I 
Production Manager 2 V2- 1 hour 3 
Manufacturing 
Engineers 
2 1/2 2 
Production Engineers 2 1 hour 2 
Programmers 3 'Y2 hour 2 
Programmers 4 'h hour 3 
Q. A staff 3 V2 hour 1 
Group leaders 2 1 hour 3 
Operators 8 V2-1 hour 4 
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3.2.5.3 CMC Compressors Manufacturing Company 
Visit Dates Nov. 
1994 
Nov. 
1995 
June 
1996 
May 
1997 
June 
1999 
Duration 1 day I day 1 days 1 day I day 
Informants Number of 
Interviewees 
Average duration 
of Interview 
Number of interviews 
Plant manager 2 % hour 4 
Personnel 1 1 hour 1 
Production manager 1 V2 5 
Logistics engineer 1 
% 1 
Technical/ planning staff 2 1 hour 2 
supervisors 3 1 hour 5 
Operators 9 '/2 hour 5 
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3.2.5.4 CMN Engines Manufacturing Company 
Visit Dates Jan. 
1995 
May 
1995 
July 
1995 
June 
1997 
May 
1999 
June 
1999 
Duration I day 2 day 1 days 2 days 1 day 2 days 
Informants Number of 
Interviewees 
Average duration 
of Interview 
Number of interviews 
Personnel & Industrial 
Relations Manager 
2 '/, hour 3 
Plant Manager 2 '/z 3 
Training Staff 1 1 hour 2 
Manufacturing Engineer 2 '/z 4 
Production Manager 3 '/z -1 hour 4 
Production Engineer 3 '/: -1 hour 6 
Kaizen Engineer 2 1 hour 2 
Programmers 2 %z hour 3 
Logistics/Planning staff 2 1 hour 2 
TPM Maintenance Staff 2 1/2 hour 2 
Supervisors 3 1 hour 7 
Operators 11 '/z -1 hour 20 
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3.2.5.5 Notes on the Interviews and Questions 
(a) The interviews were based on semi-structured interviews seeking a stratified sample 
of views at different hierarchical levels. Primarily seeking three perspectives: 
managerial, production and support functions staff, and shop floor workers 
(supervisors and operators). Questions about the production process and environment 
of the company were posed with particular emphasis on the FMS environment and 
the various macro and micro issues that related to the FMS. 
(b) In the first interview, a tape recorder was used to record the interviews with the 
permission of the interviewee. The tape recorder made the interview very animated 
and interviewee responses tended to be short. Additionally background noise on the 
shop floor made recordings with operators and supervisors unintelligible. A decision 
was made to discard the tape recording and use hand-written notes instead. 
(c) At the beginning of the interview a brief overview of the research project was 
presented to the interviewee. This was typically followed by providing brief 
information about the university, a short description of the research, and a brief 
personal background pointing my engineering background to the engineers and my 
short experience as a worker in an American manufacturing plant to the supervisors 
and operators. 
(d) The interviewee was assured of the confidentiality of all answers and that the research 
is not connected with the company in any way. Interviewees were told that the names 
of the company, business unit, and individuals will be not be used. 
(e) Typically, the production or area manager introduced me to the FMS area. The 
manager would briefly explain the purpose of my visit to the supervisor and once I 
was introduced to the supervisor, I was then given free access and time on the shop 
floor for the duration of the day. 
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(f) Questions that did not apply to the interviewee circumstances and position were not 
asked. Fact type questions about the process were not repeated in questions to other 
interviewees unless they related to the discussion. 
(g) An attempt was made to cover all the question areas within the time constraints of the 
interview. The semi-structured format allowed the discussion to focus on different 
aspects of the research issues that related to the interviewee. 
(h) The definition of each of concepts was checked with interviewee to insure agreement 
on the meanings. 
(i) In most instances the discussion did not follow the same chronology as the interview 
question list and some of the responses were very short. Nevertheless, issues that 
were at the heart of the dimensions were probed first. The tool of the questionnaire 
was instrumental in refocusing the discussions back on the key issues. Other 
peripheral questions were left to be answered in subsequent interviews. 
(j) Depending on the position and function of the interviewee, the questions focused on 
the individuals role and work duties and his views and comments concerning FMS 
and the lean production techniques as well as how the key dimensions relate to his 
area of work. 
(k) Interview times varied from company to company and from visit to visit. The 
duration of the interview depended on the production pressures on the FMS during 
the visit. Some of the interviews were short (between 20 minutes to '/2 hour) while 
others extended beyond that time as other operators were filling in or because there 
was less work to be done at that particular time. Sometimes interviews would be cut 
short and resumed at another time during the day. Other interviews were conducted 
between shift changes usually in the afternoon. 
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(1) An Interview with an operator would usually start on the FMS were I would observe 
the operator starting the machining of a new part. The operator would explain every 
step of the machining process and answer queries related to the operation and the 
technology. Once the FMS operation is started, the interview would typically move to 
the quality or team meeting area on the shop floor. 
(m)During the interview, a questionnaire was presented to the subject, which focused on 
the key dimensions relating to FMS and lean production interaction. Although some 
of the questions were discussed in the interview, questionnaire questions numbers 6, 
7,8, and 9 were presented to the interviewee as a way to seek direct responses on the 
key measures and as a tool to focus and recap the discussions. 
(n) Typically I would go over the questions with the interviewee and would check his 
responses on the questionnaire form. In the process of asking the questions, I would 
further elaborate on the meaning of each question to make sure that the interviewee 
has clearly understood what is meant by each question. This process was helpful to 
the research as it cleared the different meanings associated with the concepts 
discussed at different strata in the organisation. Comments and quotable statements 
were written on to the margins of the questionnaire. 
(o) Typically a period of time between 10 to 15 minutes was available between 
interviews on the shop floor which was used to write follow up notes on each of the 
preceding interviews highlighting the key comments. This process helped develop 
and a preliminary and elementary first level analysis and pointed to possible lines of 
inquiry which were capitalised upon with other interviewees in the same area and 
explored further with the same subject in following interviews. 
(p) As in any research that extends over a number of years, many of the same 
interviewees were not available for subsequent follow up interviews. A number of the 
personnel interviewed in earlier visits, particularly staff positions, were made 
redundant. Follow up interviews were then made with persons working in the same 
area and at the same level. If, as it was in one of the cases, the area was reorganised 
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and the particular supervisors were moved to different areas of operation, interviews 
with some of these supervisors were sought seeking first hand accounts on the 
changes. 
(q) In the Fokker case study, Initial visits to the Papendrecht plant were conducted in 
1994 and 1995 prior to its dramatic collapse after 77 years in business. Although the 
investigation of this company was cut short as a result of the closure, enough data was 
collected to contribute to the examination of the research questions of this study. The 
drama relating to the questionable survival of the company had shaken the spirit of 
the organisation and made it difficult to objectively discern the impact of micro-level 
changes from all the noise generated as a result of the nervousness and anxiety of 
both management and employees over the future of their jobs. On the other hand, this 
situation also made it possible for the interviews to achieve a higher level of 
frankness particularly on questions relating to the management's actions. From 
middle managers to supervisors to operators, the majority expressed their opinions 
without reservation and most of the time in a very critical manner of management 
policies. 
(r) In the CMN case study, research was conducted in three plants (Gamma, Delta, and 
Sigma plants) as all three implemented lean production. A choice was made to 
disregard the Gamma and Sigma plants and only include the Delta plant as the case 
study for three main reasons: (1) the data was collected in the Delta plant on the FMS 
environment exceeded the other two plant as a result of better access opportunities; 
(2) the Delta plant is the largest of the three plants and possessed the highest 
concentration of manufacturing conversion machinery including FMS and CNC 
machines making it the most representative and; (3) to minimise the complexity 
factors in the research and the analysis process associated with the study of three 
plants, mixed manufacturing processes, different managerial approaches, and 
different degrees of adoption of lean production in a single case study. There was no 
bias towards the content of the data from the Delta plant as all three plants exhibited 
similarity in the reactions of actors to the application of the same lean production 
system in all three plants. 
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3.2.6 Duration of the study 
The validity of the qualitative methodology results was also increased through studying 
the case companies over a period of many years. Three of the four cases were studied 
through the period from November 1994 till the end of June 1999. The fourth company 
declared bankruptcy late in 1995 and accordingly the data obtained covers a onayear 
period only. 
Studying these four companies over a long period of time increased the ability to gain 
insights over the process of interaction between the new wave manufacturing strategies 
and the flexible manufacturing systems. By following the processes within these 
manufacturing companies in over four years period, it was possible to observe the true 
transformations within these companies and to separate the fads from the true 
organisational changes. It made it possible to check operators' attitudes over time and to 
see, first hand, the transformation in these attitudes over the research period. Although 
the study is not longitudinal, through the four-year duration, it was also possible to 
pinpoint existing patterns in the relationships between the various actors (from managers 
to supervisors to team leaders and operators). The duration of the study made it possible 
to judge the reactions of these actors to the demands of the lean production system over 
time, as well as the change patterns in attitudes towards the demands of the flexible 
manufacturing systems. 
3.2.7 Interview Procedures 
Interviews were conducted with the various participants using a semi-structured format. 
The informants were selected from a cross section of the plant organization in each of the 
companies studied. This cross section of informants was necessary in order to provide a 
balanced view of each of the manufacturing organizations under study as well as to 
provide a mechanism for confirming the views of the different respondents. Interviewing 
managers, engineers, supervisors, and operators also helped to add variety to the process 
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and helped add confidence to pin pointing the key issues related to each of the 
organisations. The number of interviewees in each case ranged from 19 to 30 
interviewees as can be seen in Section 3.2.5. 
In each of the four companies, the interviews were conducted top-down: initially with 
managers and then with production engineers and production support staff, and finally to 
supervisors and shop floor operators. As the focus of the research was on the FMS 
production environment, follow up interviews concentrated on the shop floor 
environment through interviews focusing on area managers, production staff, supervisors, 
facilitators and operators in the FMS areas. Interviews were conducted in different 
locations: on the line, in group meeting designated areas, in supervisor offices, and on the 
shop floor. In a number of situations I attended group meetings in FMS cells and in one 
company an employee achievement award ceremony. 
The interviews were based on semi-structured interview process seeking primarily three 
perspectives: managerial, production support staff, and shop floor Operator's 
perspectives. Questions about the production process and the production environment of 
the company were probed with particular emphasis on the FMS environment and the 
various macro and micro issues that related to the FMS. The FMS environment was not 
limited to the Flexible Manufacturing Cells only but was usually organised as the 
cornerstone of a group of CNC machines. 
At the beginning of the interview a brief overview of the research project was presented 
to the interviewee. The interviewee was assured of the confidentiality of all answers and 
that the names of the company, business unit, and individuals will be changed. 
Questions that did not apply to the interviewee circumstances and position were not 
asked. Fact type questions about the process were not repeated in questions to other 
interviewees. 
An attempt was made to cover all the question areas within the time constraints of the 
interview. As these interviews were semi-structured, In a number of instances the 
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discussion did not follow the same chronology as the interview question list and issues 
that were at the heart of the dimensions were probed for further input while other 
questions (particularly those relating to production related facts) were left to be answered 
at later interviews. 
Depending on the function of the interviewee, the questions focused on the individuals 
role and work duties and his views and comments concerning FMS and the lean 
production techniques as well as how the key dimensions relate to his area of work. 
3.2.8 Questionnaire 
A supporting sample questionnaire was developed in addition to the interview questions. 
This questionnaire was not designed for purposes of statistical analysis purposes but as a 
pointer and a general reference to gauge the extent of agreement between the responses in 
the interview and the actual view of the interaction between lean production and the 
FMS. The questionnaire was issued to production managers, human resource managers, 
supervisors as well as operators or team members. The approach taken in using this 
questionnaire can be described as "nonprobability" sampling, the purpose of which " is 
not to establish a random or representative sample but rather to identify those people who 
have information about the process. It is a search not for a `generalisable person' but for a 
specific group of relevant people" (Hornby and Symon, 1994, P. 169). 
Although the number of questionnaire participants did not constitute a statistically valid 
sample to prove or disprove a hypothesis, it nevertheless did provide a useful tool as a 
barometer to gauge the attitudes and feelings of the individuals concerned. The 
questionnaire posed questions about the new changes both in the technology and the 
organisational arrangements. It was helpful in showing the discrepancy between the 
views of managers and operators in relation to these changes. 
3.2.9 The Role of the Questionnaire 
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Although generalisation is not possible from the four case studies and the statistical 
limitation of the questionnaire, it did provide a framework for focusing the views of the 
actors on these issues and soliciting additional inputs for further analysis. 
In addition to the semi-structured interview questions, the questionnaire consisting of 
specific questions based on the chosen dimensions (complexity, regulation, flexibility, 
and integration) provided an opportunity to focus the discussion on these issues in a 
systematic manner. The questionnaire was administered usually at the end of the 
interview in an attempt to further focus the flow of the interview in the direction of the 
key dimensions. In addition to providing a systematic mechanism for capturing specific 
data relating the dimensions, the questionnaire also provided a replicable instrument in 
which informants were asked the same questions in a similar and direct manner in each of 
the chosen production environments of the case study companies. 
3.2.10 Details of the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed to prepare the interviewees for the nature of the 
questions 
The semi-structured interviews dealt with discovery questions relating to the details of 
each of the case study companies, the description of the production process, the details of 
the production technology, the types of work organisation, and the new wave 
manufacturing strategies being used. In addition, both the interviews and the 
questionnaire focused on the key research dimensions and the interaction at the shop 
floor in relation to the Flexible Manufacturing systems and the lean production systems 
being used. 
The informants for the interview and questionnaire were chosen to represent the 
perspectives of three actors influencing the FMS environment interactions: Managerial 
perspective, production support staff perspective, and shop floor supervisors and 
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Operators' perspective. All the informants were asked about the interactions related to the 
FMS and the lean production approaches in relation to the key dimensions. 
The questionnaire asked questions about the elements that define each of the dimensions 
by assembling data relevant to its convergent and discriminant validity (Campbell and 
Fiske, 1959). For example, on the measure of regulation, the questions dealt with the 
changes in the number of rules and procedures associated with the FMS and the lean 
production systems. The various informants were asked about their view on the need for 
increased supervision in relation to the FMS, the degree of freedom of the operators to do 
their jobs, the operators span of control, and the operators freedom to plan the work and 
so on. The word `regulation' was used in the interviews but, in order to insure the validity 
of the constructs used and that the meaning of the term is understood by the users to be 
the same, the questions focused on the elements of the definition of `regulation' as used 
in this research. 
The same approach was used in questions concerning the dimensions of complexity, 
flexibility, and integration. Both the degree of integration and the extent of regulation at 
the shop floor closely related to autonomy. Accordingly, autonomy is addressed in terms 
of regulation and formalisation of rules on the FMS. Both the degree of regulation and 
degree of integration in the process impact the degree of autonomy and span of control of 
the operators. 
By selecting three types of informants (managerial, staff, and shop floor) it will be 
possible to identify any existing mismatches in the interaction between the FMS and lean 
production through the identification of potential differences or even contradictions in the 
views, perceptions, and actions of the three types of informants concerning the same 
phenomena under investigation. 
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3.2.11 Qualitative Analysis 
There are few agreed-on canons for qualitative data analysis and there are several views 
on how to perform such analysis. Miles and Huberman (1994), underscored the need for 
sensible canons of qualitative data analysis to be present in order to establish shared 
ground rules for drawing conclusions and verifying the sturdiness of qualitative research. 
They go on stating that any method of analysis that " works- that will produce clear, 
verifiable, credible meanings from a set of qualitative data" is "grist" for their mill (p. 3) 
in presenting a qualitative approach to analysis. 
Patton (1990) also describes the process of analysis as having "no absolute rules except to 
do the very best with your full intellect to fairly represent the data and communicate what 
the data reveal given the purpose of the study" (p. 372). Coffey and Atkinson (1996) also 
emphasized that the selection of the appropriate analysis approach should be based on an 
informed and principled decision. 
Lofland and Lofland (1995) maintained that : "even though there are several concrete and 
even routine activities involved in analysis, the process remains, and is intended to be, 
significantly open ended in character. In this way, analysis is also much a creative 
act"(p. 181). 
Miles and Huberman (1994) defined analysis as "consisting of three concurrent flows of 
activity: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification" (P. 10). 
They viewed the process of data reduction as a continuous process active throughout the 
study consisting of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the 
transcripts and written-up field notes of each case study. Data displa, ' is defined as "an 
organised, compressed assembly of information that permits conclusion drawing and 
action" (p. 11). Display includes different types of matrices, graphs, charts, and networks 
aimed at assembling " organized information into an immediately accessible, compact 
form so that the analyst can see what is happening and either draw justified conclusions 
or move on to the next step of analysis the display suggest may be useful"(p. 11). The 
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third flow is that of conclusion drawing and verification. Patterns and possible 
explanations start to emerge in the early phases of the data collection. It is suggested that 
the researcher must keep an open mind and remain sceptic throughout the study. 
Gradually the patterns will grow more explicit opening for "final" conclusions to be 
drawn and verified. Thus, Miles and Huberman (1994) underscore that these three flows 
are "interwoven before, during, and after data collection in parallel form, to make up the 
general domain called "analysis" (pp. 11-12). 
Two basic forms of qualitative analysis, essentially the same in their underlying logic, 
will be discussed: intra-case analysis and cross-case analysis. A case may be differently 
defined for different analytic purposes. Depending on the situation, a case could be a 
single individual, a focus group session, or a program site (Berkowitz, 1996). In this 
research a specific section within the production environment- the flexible manufacturing 
systems (FMS) area- in four manufacturing companies were chosen as the subjectfor our 
study and analysis. 
Using a combination of deductive and inductive analysis, collected data from each of the 
case studies was reconfigured and reorganised in a manageable format for further 
analysis. This approach is in line with the process of data reduction stated by Miles and 
Huberman (1994) and described as " the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, 
abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in written up field notes or transcripts. " 
In each of the case studies, immediately after site visits and or between meetings within 
each of the companies, the collected data and interview notes were put to preliminary 
analysis. Interesting comments, statements, behaviours were highlighted for further 
analysis, follow up and further evaluation. 
Side comments were added immediately following each interview highlighting emerging 
patterns and those comments that seemed to reflect new ideas, concepts, feelings, 
attitudes, or actions that are of relevance to the research question and that are deemed 
worthy for later focus in the data analysis. 
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It is important to note that the choice about which aspects of the data are emphasised and 
which aspects are minimised or set aside is based on both deductive and inductive 
process of analysis. While initial categorisations are shaped by the pre-established study 
questions, dimensions and sample questionnaire, the interview process and collected data 
was open to the introduction of new meanings from the data available. The four year time 
frame for study in three of the four cases made it possible to discern lasting attitudes from 
transient or temporary feelings and impressions resulting from specific incidents. 
As stated earlier, data display is the second element or level in Miles and Huberman's 
(1994) model of qualitative data analysis. Data display goes a step beyond data reduction 
to provide "an organized, compressed assembly of information that permits conclusion 
drawing... " A display can be an extended piece of text or a diagram, chart, or matrix that 
provides a new way of arranging and thinking about the more textually embedded data. 
Data displays, whether in word or diagrammatic form, allow the analyst to extrapolate 
from the data enough to begin to discern systematic patterns and interrelationships. At the 
display stage, additional, higher order categories or themes may emerge from the data 
that go beyond those first discovered during the initial process of data reduction. 
The third element of qualitative analysis is that in the conclusion drawing process an 
attempt is made to step back from micro picture to consider what the analysed data mean 
and to assess their implications for the questions at hand. 
In order to add an internal verification element to the collected data. The data in each of 
the case studies under investigation is revisited and the validity and plausibility of the 
emergent conclusions is followed up through discussions with production and human 
resource managers during the last set of interviews conducted in June 1999. Additionally 
follow up phone conversations with two production engineers were made to expand on 
particular research points or to check validity were possible in two of the four case 
companies (EBG Trucks and CMN Engines) as a result of friendly rapport developed 
with these two production engineers during the case study visits. It is important to note 
that the validity of the conclusions in this context is different from that found in 
quantitative evaluation were it is a technical term that specifically refers to whether a 
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given construct actually measures what it intended to measure. In the view of this 
research, validity refers to the credibility of the data and the conclusions being drawn in 
their ability to defend the resultant explanations. 
3.2.12 Data Triangulation 
In order to obtain a more comprehensive picture within each of the case studies chosen 
for this research, information was collected from a stratified sample of views from 
different sources, actors, and at different places and times within each of the companies. 
This process can generally be viewed as `Data Triangulation' in which information 
relating to AMT interaction can be more reliably obtained (Denzin, 1989). 
This process was also used to compare and cross-check the consistency of the data wihin 
each of the companies within the framework of the case study methodology. The research 
was conducted through semi-structured interviews and a sample questionnaire 
administered to plant level managers such as Plant managers, production managers, 
manufacturing engineering managers, human resources mangers, as well as with area 
managers, supervisors, team leaders, and production floor employees. The use of these 
data sources mixture in the case studies was to obtain a more comprehensive, as well as, 
convergent data bank. Where there were divergent data sources (which is inevitable in 
triangulation where data are collected from various organisational players), the aim of the 
research was to look at the various explanations for the contrary, as (Dick, 1979) 
indicated, it is only by addressing the discrepancy and discords towards the issues being 
studied that knowledge can be enriched. Patton (1990) recommend that the researcher 
should study the when and why there are differences from the various data sources. In the 
four cases investigated, following divergent views in describing the same phenomenon - 
particularly between managers and shop floor operators- constituted the central approach 
to the data analysis. 
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Documentary and archival information such as forms, policies, procedures, quality 
systems, instructions, and general memos were collected whenever possible at every level 
within the chain. Yin (1994) saw this use of multiple sources of evidence as useful in 
"the development of converging lines of inquiry"(P. 34). Potential problems of construct 
validity or subjectivity are also addressed because multiple sources of evidence or data 
provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon (Yin, 1994). 
3.2.13 Relevance of the Methodology 
In their article ' Closing the gap: a polemic on plantbased research in operations 
management', Hill, T., Nicholson, A. and Westbrook, R. (1999) argued that, within the 
operations management (OM) academic community, there has been a growing call for 
research of more managerial relevance. They noted that: 
`Given the level of complexity involved in understanding the OM perspective of business 
issues then the emphasis should be placed on plant plant-based research. Conducting 
research on-site and investigation through analysis of relevant data, issues, developments 
and events ensures relevance and a validity essential to making an impact on business 
practice' (Hill et al., 1999: 139) 
Although this thesis does not follow an operations management (OM) perspective, the 
study follows the recommendation of Hill et al. (1999) in trying to address issues relevant 
to the practice on the shop floor. 
3.2.14 Researcher Credibility 
Within the manufacturing management research there has been a tendency to ignore the 
role of the researcher altogether (e. g. De Filippis, 1994; Ratcliffe, 1997) or to discuss this 
in purely technical terms (Bagchi and Virum, 1996; Caprihan et al., 1997). Some of this 
may be as a result of underlying positivist assumptions regarding research. Hence the 
researcher is seen to be independent and value neutral. Others, like Platts and Gregory 
(1993) take time in their account of manufacturing strategy to discuss issues of researcher 
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credibility and whether to adapt their research methodology in light of experience during 
a longitudinal study. Westbrook (1994,1995) discusses aspects of researcher reflexivity 
by demonstrating its particular appropriateness for addressing theory building as well as 
integrative and unstructured problems in manufacturing firms. In this research the role of 
the researcher plays the key judgement role in the research. An attempt to cancel any 
potential bias is made through making the process of data collection, reduction, analysis, 
and drawing conclusions as systematic as possible. The data is tackled with an attempt at 
maintaining as much as possible value neutrality. 
The general results of the research were discussed with the human resources and 
production managers in three of the four companies studied. The fourth company having 
gone out of business. In general in the case studies, there was general agreement and 
recognition of the issues as well as an attempt at justifying why things have changed in 
the direction they did. The four-year duration of the study made it possible to check the 
progress of key human resources changes and policies and check the reality of true 
transformations over time. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EBG European Truck Manufacturing Company 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the situation at a major European truck manufacturing company 
EGB in the period between 1994 and 1999. During this period, EGB went through a 
period of dramatic growth that significantly increased production demands and led to 
transformations and restructuring in the company and the relationships on the shop floor. 
This chapter will focus on the application of lean production to the flexible 
manufacturing systems environment.. Underlying this interaction between the use of 
advanced manufacturing technology and the new work organisation arrangements, there 
are strategic, organisational, and cultural factors that have an impact upon and inform 
it. 
This case will serve to highlight the impact of these macro-level forces on the dynamics 
of this new technology / new organisational arrangements coupling. Investigating four 
key dimensions: complexity, regulation, flexibility, and integration, this case will 
establish the existence of inconsistencies in the messages being sent to the users of the 
new technology. The logic of the new wave manufacturing approaches points to the need 
for increased autonomy and a consistent drive towards pushing power downward to the 
shop floor. However, in this case, in spite of declared intentions towards increasing the 
role of operators, there appears to be a tendency in the implementation of lean production 
approaches towards increasing the rules and regulations associated with the use of these 
systems. Complexity and a high degree of integration characterising the use of the FMS 
is put forward by the manufacturing and production managers and staff as the primary 
cause for this increase. This will be shown below in three ways: 1) that the 
implementation of lean production has also introduced mechanisms which increased the 
degree of monitoring and control over the production process. In this case, the 
implementation of the `Lean Enterprise' system has also included with it an `Objective 
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Matrix' which is a productivity matrix designed to evaluate the accomplishment of 
specified goals and objectives. 2) Coupled with the new organisational changes, the 
number of rules and procedures associated with FMS operation, organisation, and 
utilisation has increased rather than decreased. 3) The degree of effectiveness of the new 
organisational arrangements is constrained by prior organisational experiences and 
developments. In this case, a previous company history of strong, highly independent 
groups has led to managerial over caution towards any increase in independence and 
control by the new teams. As time passed, increased pressures on the production system 
due to a three fold increase in the number of trucks produced led to the hiring of less 
skilled employees and transformed the relationship between these groups, the new 
operators, and management. Another aspect of the inconsistencies involved the 
underlying message associated with the impact of the organisational and cultural change 
on the company as a whole. When examined at the micro level (the shop floor), the 
inconsistencies were seen through operational imperatives that sought increased 
managerial control over the production process. While, simultaneously, an opposing 
message to increase operator autonomy and level of control was being sent from the 
human resources department. Production managers, production logistics staff, supervisors 
as well as operators confirmed that the Four chosen dimensions were key in informing 
the implementation lean enterprise to the FMS area. These four dimensions of 
complexity, integration, regulation, and flexibility are used as the criteria for evaluating 
the consistency between the FMS and the application of `Lean Enterprise' concepts and 
techniques to the FMS environment. The details of these relationships will be discussed 
later in the chapter, but first let us examine the particulars of this company. 
4.2 The Company 
This company is a major European truck manufacturer with a turnover of approximately 
£ 503.385 million at the beginning of this study in 1994 with a 6.8 per cent share of the 
six tones G. V. W. (gross vehicle weight) Western Europe market. 
Its core operations comprised the development, production, sale and after-sale service of 
medium and heavy commercial vehicles. The product range offered to the market 
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consisted of the EBG 45 and the new EBG 65, EBG 75, EBG 85, and the EBG 95 
series. The production of these medium and heavy trucks is carried out at this plant in 
Holland (2416 employees at the start of this study) with the emphasis on engines 
production and truck assembly which approached 70 trucks/day at the end of 1994 and 
reached 120 trucks by 1999. In 1994, the company had undergone dramatic structural and 
cultural changes that were still being defined and implemented at the beginning of this 
study. This study focused on the operation of what used to be two separate groups: 
Universal Machining & Gears, and Sheet Metal Components. These two groups were 
merged and reorganised under a single manager. The reorganisation involved eight 
production areas: Engines, both large and small; small chassis; large chassis; gears; 
assembly and test; pipes; paint; and engines overhaul ( figures 4.1 and 4.2). 
Together the Universal and Sheet Metal groups employed 1050 workers in 1994 
including both direct and staff workers. 460 were employed in the Universal/ Gears area. 
During that time, the company's output rate was around 70 trucks per day (one line 
producing 8 trucks per hour) in the EBG75, EBG85, and EBG95 model series. By 1999, 
the number of trucks produced reached 120 trucks per day. 
4.3 Organisation and History 
EBG trucks was a well established Dutch truck manufacturing company with a work 
force of about 5000 people operating in a traditional, functionally based, highly 
bureaucratic environment. Its primary focus was on maintaining and expanding market 
share in what was referred to as the `hockey stick' strategy with its focus on `more and 
more volume'. This focus led to a culture based on this high volume production strategy 
and the policy of `expansion at any price, even to the extent of seling trucks at a loss' as 
one manager explained. 
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By the late 1980s, and as competition increased, the company continued to face mounting 
pressures due to decreased sales and mounting operational and production costs. This 
downward spiral culminated in bankruptcy when early in February of 1993, the board of 
management of EBG was obliged to institute insolvency proceedings and declare 
bankruptcy. This bankruptcy came as a surprise to the majority of the employees who 
were misinformed on the seriousness of the financial situation of the company. It was 
obvious to the workers that the chief executive had deliberately kept employees and 
shareholders misinformed in an effort to limit the damage to the company's stock price. 
Four weeks later, through new financial arrangements with the banks, creditors, private 
investors, as well as the Dutch government and the workers unions, a new EBG Trucks 
with a new business plan, was formed to carry on some of the operations of the old EBG. 
During the weeks preceding this, intensive discussions were held with the unions, which 
were also faced with tremendous problems under extremely difficult circumstances. Only 
50 per cent of the old EBG employees were rehired by the new company which meant 
that this restructuring reduced the number of employees from 5000 to approximately 
2500 people. Agreement was reached on structure and the conditions relating to the 
selection of the new company's work force. This resulted in a protocol in which the terms 
of employment for the employees within the new EBG Trucks were set out. The first few 
months following the start-up were characterised by heavy pressure due to the 
circumstances under which the company had come into being. Employees had witnessed 
the redundancy of many of their former colleagues and were confronted with this after 
joining the new company. A new organisational structure had to be worked out in detail 
and refined and strengthened, in addition to the need to re-negotiate contracts with 
suppliers. In the new organisation (which from now on will be referred to as the new 
EBG) and through these drastic redundancy measures, the company was able to radically 
transform the organisational structure and work organisation of the whole company and 
introduce many of the concepts and systems which characterise new wave manufacturing 
(NWM). The new EBG introduced a `Lean Enterprise' concept (goal setting, team 
working, communication, flat organisation, reorganisation of groups, and increased 
responsibility) taking advantage of drastically reduced resistance to change resulting from 
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the immense bankruptcy shock. What emerged was a more flexible organisation which, 
as one company document indicated: 
`... has an efficient and alert organisation with short lines of communication. We have 
employees who want to be customer oriented. an organisation which is and must remain 
lean and as such still has an important lead over many of our competitors. ' 
One of the key changes which the new EBG has implemented is its reversal of the 
`hockey stick' strategy by focusing the marketing efforts on fewer markets and 
concentrating on servicing those markets. `Volume' was no longer the magic word to 
watch for in the new company. `Profit' and `Profit Margins' were added to the company 
vocabulary, and the focus switched to `making sure we know our own strengths and 
weaknesses, strong points and weak points and use them in the market'. 
4.4 The New Organisational Structure 
One of the first changes that the new EBG company undertook was to eliminate a 
significant number of the middle management positions (at least 30 per cent of the 
redundancies were in management positions). The new management reduced the number 
of organisational levels by at least two levels (as can be seen from figure 4.3 and figure 
4.4). 
From the new organisational chart, we can see that the position of superintendent has 
been completely eliminated. The position of the supervisors has been transformed into a' 
facilitator' position which involved enlarging the span of control and attempting to 
redefine the relationship between the operators and team members and the supervisor. In 
addition, the manufacturing manager position has been enlarged and a new position 
`Area Manager' has been introduced. All the engineering, production control, quality, 
and logistics staff necessary for the operation of these areas have been moved down to be 
under the control of the area managers. This led to bringing the engineering and planning 
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functions closer to the operation on the shop floor, thus going a long way to transforming 
the company from a functionally based to a process based organisation. 
4.5 New Wave Manufacturing 
The transformation from the old to the new EBG and the significant reduction in the 
work force gave management the ability to dismantle old departments and establish new 
structures without the level of resistance which is usually expected when dealing with 
traditional, long established, bureaucratic and usually powerful departments. Although 
some new wave manufacturing elements were introduced in the old EBG, their 
introductions were usually seen as half-hearted attempts at change and their effectiveness 
was severely constrained by the existing bureaucratic, hierarchical culture, and lack of 
enthusiasm towards such changes. This was especially true when these changes entailed 
attempts at the redistribution and devolving of power to lower levels in the organisation. 
With the new EBG, the opportunity arose to restructure the whole organisation in part 
through the implementation of new wave manufacturing approaches which were deemed 
essential for achieving the necessary productivity and efficiency for new EBG to survive. 
A key element in this process was the introduction of the `Lean Enterprise' concept. 
4.6 Lean Enterprise 
The lean enterprise concept was introduced immediately after the restructuring with the 
primary objective of transforming new EBG into a more focused organisation with a 
leaner, flexible, and more productive work force with `increased responsibility and 
accountability'. The new EBG was to become a flatter organisation with increased 
vertical and lateral communications, goal setting, and team working within a flexible, 
productive well integrated, cooperative environment. The key drives for the successful 
implementation of this new wave manufacturing / lean enterprise concept involved the 
following: 
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4.6.1 Continuous Improvement 
A system for continually improving the production process has been established at all 
operational levels from Area managers down to the individual cell level. The system 
involves monthly meetings where production and improvement targets are agreed upon 
and progress is evaluated in subsequent meetings through target comparison and 
monitoring. When designated targets are acquired, new objectives are established and the 
system is updated at all levels on the basis of the new changes and improvements. This 
new continuous improvement approach was exercised using what was referred to as the 
`Objective Matrix'. 
4.6.2 The Objective Matrix 
An objective matrix established in each of the production areas, focuses on increasing the 
responsibility of the teams for their own production cell or group of production cells. The 
key actors are the facilitator (supervisor), a logistics/ material planner, and a production 
engineer. These three actors designate the teams with the operational mandates which are 
then translated into very focused team objectives (figure 4.4a). The integration of these 
production and logistics personnel into the production areas has replaced the old 
functional structures and has helped to increase the integration within these areas. This 
close proximity to the production areas lends support to the established teams within each 
production area, and through the use of regularly scheduled team briefings and the 
elimination of many unnecessary steps, has helped increase the efficiency of team 
operations. 
The agenda for these team briefings includes discussions of the production targets and the 
results of actions taken since the previous meeting. These team briefings also include 
general discussion of the overall production status and issues such as customer 
complaints, projections, tool usage, illness, and production targets and milestones (see 
(Objective Matrix chart in figure 4.5). A key aspect of these meetings is planning: a six 
month production schedule is analysed and changes to the schedule are updated 
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periodically. Mix quantity and material needs as well as improvement initiatives and 
overtime needs are established in these meetings. In addition, safety and environmental 
issues as well as the general situation at EBG, including any new activities, projects, 
investments, or any other communication that management cares to impart to the teams, 
are also discussed. 
4.6.3 Teamwork and Cell Formation 
Historically, in the old EBG, while the rest of the organisation was highly functionalised 
into departments, the production area was organised into cells. The organisation of NC 
and CNC and other conventional machinery into cells was introduced into the old EBG in 
1983. These cell groups were organised around specific functions such as milling or 
boring. Although the equipment was grouped together into cells, the operators' role was 
limited and dependent on the planning department's approval of machining operation 
through the production process. In machining operations, the operator needed to fill in a 
special form that needed a stamped approval from the planning department (figure 4.6). 
With the new EBG, the new organisation set out to move more responsibility to the shop 
floor and abolish the strict controls exercised by the planning department. Gradually, 
more control was given to the operators to include functions such as quality inspections 
and maintenance functions. In order to give operators more control, the first step was to 
allow operators to do the set-up for the machine they operated. The second step was to let 
the operator do the first level quality inspection, and the third step was to move the 
planning function to the shop floor and eliminate the existing, excessively bureaucratic 
system of control. 
4.6.4 Skill Level and Multiskilling 
The key characteristic of all new wave manufacturing approaches is their focus on 
increasing employee skills. Since the production processes involve the use of NC, CNC, 
and FMS operators, by definition, the operators are required to be skilled in the operation 
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of such equipment. At EBG there are three nationally recognised accredited machine 
operator skill levels: LTS, MTS, and MTS-Plus. Depending on the accredited skill level, 
operators are divided on salary scale levels of group 4 to group 7. A group 4 salary level 
indicates a beginner or a new worker and a group 7 salary level indicates an experienced 
multi-skilled operator. In the FMS area, about 70 per cent of the operators are at MTS 
level and about 30 per cent are LTS level. One or two operators were MTS Plus. About 
two-thirds of the operators in the FMS area are at salary group seven while the rest are at 
salary Group 6. Group 7 operators are multi-skilled operators who can program the CNC 
and FMS machinery, while Group 6 operators are only allowed to make correction 
changes to the written programs while operating the machines. 
4.6.5 Delayering 
Another key element of the new wave manufacturing approaches is the move towards 
eliminating as many layers in the organisation as possible. Delayering as an approach is 
an essential element of the Lean Enterprise philosophy. New EBG restructuring has 
reduced the number of hierarchical levels in the organisation by an order of two. Thirty 
per cent of the layoffs associated with the restructuring were in management positions. 
Many well-entrenched departments such as planning, manufacturing engineering, 
maintenance, and materials / production control have been dismantled and essential 
functions in these departments were moved down under the control of the area managers 
(figure 4.7). This meant that a significant number of the staff level positions had been 
eliminated. For example, in the Universal Area, the number of materials/ production 
control employees was reduced from 20 to 8 and eventually to 3 employees. 
4.6.6 Communication 
Another key element of the new wave manufacturing approaches is the development of 
clear, on going, dual track communication both vertically between management and 
employees as well as horizontally between functions and groups. The focus of the new 
organisation was on developing lateral communication between work areas, operational 
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teams and groups. The use of operational teams and the productivity matrix was a 
consistent effort to develop cooperative teams. These teams which consisted of 
Engineering, Material / Production control (Logistics), and Production facilitators (or 
supervisors) departments, helped to improve the communication between what used to 
be competing departments with contradictory sets of priorities: The engineering 
department with its focus on the smoothness of the processes and the development of 
new projects; and the Material/ Production control (Logistics) with its focus on lead 
times and stocks and outputs; and the production supervisors with the focus on, inter 
alia, quality and productivity. 
With the development of the operational matrix and the incorporation of the three 
functions of Engineering, Logistics, and Production into the same team, management has 
gone a long way to increasing the communication and cooperation levels between what 
used to be traditionally competing functions. Through the team approach, with its regular 
team meetings and briefings, the parties were able to compromise and achieve a trade-off 
that obtained the maximum benefit for the organisation at the shortest possible time. On 
another front, following the restructuring and the drastic reduction of workers, confidence 
in the company had been shaken. However, with the new EBG, early emphasis was 
placed on building up that confidence, both internally and externally, through the use of 
regular team briefings, in addition to a series of verbal and written information provided 
for the work force at all levels. Other efforts to increase communication included the 
publishing of a weekly newspaper informing the employees about company wide 
activities and initiatives. Bulletin boards were also used in production areas as well as 
regular meeting places. 
In another step to increase confidence in the new company, plant management arranged 
general meetings conducted two or three times a year with all the people in the plant in a 
series of 3-4 sessions throughout the day. Another aspect that helped regain confidence in 
the new company was associated with the company's marketing campaign which 
comprised a large advertising campaign across Europe under the watch word `Buy an 
EBG'. A three week long `EBG trucks in Action' event was held on the company 
grounds attended by over 45000 people, customers, drivers, as well as all the plant's 
98 
employees showing all the new truck models, as well as the future plans of the company. 
Although this was mainly a marketing campaign designed to increase customer 
confidence in the new company, its effects extended to all EBG employees and has 
helped in informing the workers of the direction of the new company and the investment 
decisions both in new truck models as well as new equipment and machinery, and 
emphasising the sound financial position and the potential for growth. 
4.6.7 Training 
In order to increase the role of operators, and through the on going process of dismantling 
departments, operators on the shop floor had to learn new skills such as quality control 
and maintenance, which were the duties of separate department s in the old EBG. The 
majority of the workers were multi-skilled group 6 or group 7 salary goup which implied 
that acquiring the new skills did not require extensive training. Nevertheless, a training 
program was established with sessions on team development and problem solving 
techniques and a `HAW-Review' (which included technical machine 
operation/programming for different machines, as well as quality/ maintenance refresher 
courses for the operators 
Team leader training for every cell of 10-20 people includes management techniques, 
communication skills, problem solving skills, quality, project engineering, and logistics. 
A contract was signed with a local training institute to upgrade operator skills. Extensive 
/ accredited training on CNC operation is conducted to nationally recognised standards 
and an exchange program in which apprentice operators are employed as a part of their 
skill accreditation program. Many of these trainee students are then employed on a full 
time basis once they achieve their LTS or MTS or MTS-Plus level certification. 
As sales and production of the EBG series trucks increased, the company was faced with 
an urgent need to hire new skilled employees. For every single truck increase in daily 
production, the company needed an extra 23 employees on the shop floor to smoothly 
handle the new demands on the production floor. 
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Shortages of skilled machinists in the labour market forced the company to hire part 
timers and less skilled workers through special placement companies. A special 
introductory, one month training program in elementary mechanical engineering skills 
was developed both to provide orientation for the new workers as well as to judge their 
potential as machinists. 
4.7 Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
The introduction of new and advanced manufacturing technology (AMT) had always 
been the policy of the old company. With the restructuring, the new company continued 
to uphold the same policy with the recognition of the need for new organisational 
arrangements with the introduction of new technology. The introduction of new 
equipment was viewed as a part of a consistent innovation strategy aimed at increasing 
the competitiveness of the company as a viable alternative to increased international 
competition. The introduction of new machinery was also viewed as key in increasing the 
confidence of employees in the future of the company. In 1994, money investment in new 
CNC machines and technology had reached $11 million in Machining Equipment and a 
$7 million investment in Engines. Advanced manufacturing technology has been one of 
the positive features of the old EBG. Although new technology introduction was often 
done without the knowledge or cooperation of the operators or even supervisors of the 
area where the new equipment was to be implemented, the decision about the new 
equipment and the date and place of installation was made by the manufacturing 
engineers. As one of the supervisors (otherwise known as facilitators) explained: 
' 
... in the old 
EBG we were excluded from the decision on the introduction of new 
equipment. It happened once in my area when I came in one morning to see huge boxes 
and technicians unpacking the equipment. I had no idea what these boxes were and why 
they were in my area. I had to ask many questions of Purchasing and Engineering to get 
that information. ' 
Although other supervisors did not have similar experiences, it nevertheless illustrated 
that the introduction of new technology was clearly a top down decision: engineers had 
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the say on what new technology was needed and where it should be introduced. In 1986, 
new CNC machinery was introduced with the development of a new truck model. 
4.7.1 The Flexible Manufacturing Systems Environment 
Called the `Flexible Bewerking Centrum', this FMS is located in the Engines section of 
the newly integrated Universal Area. This area includes four machining cells for big and 
small cylinder blocks and main bearing caps. In addition, many of the CNC and old NC 
machines, which are still being used, are located in this section. There are 65 direct 
workers operating in this section organised into teams with one facilitator. Ninety per 
cent of these workers are direct workers and only ten per cent are indirect. Of the 65 
workers, 12 operators are assigned to the FMS. Operating as a team, operations on the 
FMS are done on a three shift system with four operators on every shift (with one 
operator acting as an unofficial cell leader) while the rest of the teams in the area operate 
on a two shift system. The FMS has six working stations used for machining cylinder 
blocks and cylinder heads. The machining stations are divided into three left-hand side 
and three right- hand side stations. At the centre between the six stations a carrier 
machine transfers the blocks to the stations while the loading and unloading of blocks is 
done manually. These stations are used for machining four types of engine blocks: two 
types of engine heads for 8 litre engine blocks which require half an hour of machining 
time per block; and two types of engine heads for the 11 litre engine blocks which require 
one hour of machining time per block (figure 4.8). 
In addition to the machining of the engine blocks for the new truck model engines, the 
FMS is also used for the prototype engine work and testing and depending on capacity, 
the FMS can contract to do machining jobs for customers from outside the company 
(such as, for example, Mitsubishi and Caterpillar). With the introduction of the new 
organisational structure, the FMS deals with other EBG groups or teams seeking FMS 
usage as customers. For example, one such contract focused on design for the production 
101 
Machining Machining Machining 
Station No. i Station No. 2 Station No. 3 
II II II 
II 
Machining 
Station No. 4 
II 
Machining 
Station No. 5 
II 
Machining 
Station No. 6 
Figure 4.8: FMS machining stations 
102 
testing of a4 valve engine block as well as the designs of different blocks and engine 
heads prototypes. The development and full production of the EBG95 series has limited 
the extent of these types of contracts. Currently the FMS operates 17 eight hour shifts per 
week at 80 to 85 per cent of the theoretical operational level which implies that the FMS 
is fully operational 22.5 hours a day, a relatively high rate. 
The input to the FMS comes primarily from two sources: direct from an outside foundry, 
and from the machining operations of what is called ` the old line', which has a group of 
CNC machines which are used for fine boring operations on the engine blocks. There is 
also one robot used for cleaning the blocks. Once the cleaning is finished, the blocks are 
then transferred to the FMS stations. Because of the block size, the blocks are not 
buffered and the FMS operation must follow, as far as possible, the block line. Once the 
machining operations of the FMS are completed, the blocks are then transferred to a 
Wiedemann fine boring machine. Because of the different machining times for different 
engine block sizes (i. e. 8 lit. and 11 lit) a utilisation / scheduling problem arises so as to 
maximise the usage of all six FMS stations. Figure 4.9 describes the input diagram and 
integration of the FMS within the engines area. Further detail on the integration problems 
of the FMS will be provided later in this chapter. 
Close to the FMS stations is the tool library area, where the sets of machining tools and 
spindles are kept. Each tool has its own bar code and a database containing a complete 
listing of all the spindles and tool parts which can be accessed through a computer 
terminal in the area. The operators are responsible for the pre setting and tool listing for 
the job in hand. This also includes testing for and replacing worn-out tools. Tool testing 
is done separately and not by the operators on a new computer controlled 3D (Three- 
Dimensional) measuring machine. The operation and programming of the machine is 
deemed `very complex' and is operated by quality control personnel. The operators in 
this engines area are multi-skilled operators with about 70 per cent cf them, including the 
operators of the FMS, in a Group 7 salary group which implies that the operators are 
capable of writing their own programs. In the case of prototype development and 
machining, the operators have complete control and do the full programming. 
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4.7.2 The Three Dimensional Measuring machine 
This is a new inspection machine with a three dimensional capability. Due to its supposed 
complexity, only quality control department personnel did the actual measurement on this 
technically advanced machine. It is said to require an extensive programming knowledge 
and requires extensive training. Attempts at training the FMS operators about this new 
machine appear to have failed. Whether this was due to insufficient training or due to 
resistance from the ex- quality department personnel was not clear. Nevertheless, the 
facilitators' attitude about the operator use of this machine was that `the machine was too 
complex, and very specialised for the FMS operator to operate. ' 
4.7.3 Computer Numerical Control (CNC) 
The most used type of technology in this manufacturing company is the computer 
numerical control (CNC) machinery. The company uses a variety of CNC 20, CNC 60, 
and CNC 100 production machines. These machines are used for all kinds of machining 
such as milling, boring, drilling, sawing, grinding and finishing, as well as a number of 
special machines used for bending. Many of these CNC's have multiple spindles and 
some are 4- axis machines. Uses include machining of cabin Iarts, and axles-chassis 
connections. In the same area, a number of small presses, bending, and cutting CNC 
machines using Plasma CNC cutting units are present, separated from the rest of the 
production area and surrounded by a wall to cut the noise down, and have a CAD/CAM 
interface. Other types of machinery are the new automated `side member production' 
(frame that the truck is build on) machines. These new types of machines are large 
machines which replaced older types of 2000 ton inflexible presses and the new machines 
can do many operations in one step. An overhead robot conveyor delivers the parts to 
these machines. Figure 4.10 describes the steps employed to produce the chassis rods. 
In the paint area, an ALP automated paint-electrode bath is used b paint the pressed 
parts. The painting process is complicated by the different paint specifications needed for 
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different models and orders and colour combinations. The process has nine different 
stages with different combination baths including cleaning and phosphate baths. At the 
beginning of this study, the company was in the process of implementing a number of 
networked personal computers (PCs) on the production floor with a planning module, and 
a new order release and dispatching module installed within the network. A project group 
made up of the area manager, a logistics engineer, a production engineer, and a facilitator 
were overseeing the completion of this project. In addition, an application development 
program for customising information management and analysis was also established by 
the development engineers. 
4.8 Cultural Change 
The dramatic upheavals and transformation of the organisation into a new company with 
fifty per cent reduction in the work force had a devastating effect on the morale of the 
employees who survived these cuts. What was of significant impact in this case, was the 
fact that there were no real warnings of the redundancies. In spite of the rumours about 
financial problems, nobody in the company realised or expected the company to fold. 
Two factors helped camouflage the true situation. The first was company size and long 
standing national prestige associated with it `nobody expected this large company to go 
down'. Second was the role of the chief executive in masking the true financial picture of 
EBG by maintaining a `business as usual' facade in what appeared to be an attempt to 
maintain the stock price levels. Because of these factors, rumours of financial difficulty 
were swept aside, until that fateful February day when the general manager called a 
company meeting and admitted the seriousness of the situation and announced the filing 
of bankruptcy proceedings. The shock of this announcement lead to serious confrontation 
between the manager and the employees `the manager was heckled and shouted down, it 
got really nasty, and people were very angry'. 
People were told that they would receive a letter in the mail indicating their future status 
with the new restructured company. One of the engineers described the experience: 
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`On that same weekend, you got a letter in the mail on Saturday. If you were one of the 
lucky ones, you got a two page letter: The first page was from the old EBG company 
saying that you have been fired due to the bankruptcy, and the second page was from the 
new EBG welcoming you as a new employee in the newly formed company. The unlucky 
ones only got a single page letter' 
When the chosen employees returned to work, emotions were running high and people 
'were walking around in a daze' everywhere they looked there was evidence of people 
who were fired. `desks were empty, and forms had signatures of fired managers or staff 
personnel or supervisors'. 
It took some time before people adjusted to the new reality, and having passed through 
this baptism, the attitude of the old entrenched departments and resistance to change had 
changed. As the human resources manager indicated: `... with 50 per cent of the 
employees made redundant, we were able to disable old departments and build new 
ones'. 
Management moved quickly to fully implement the `Lean Enterprise' system. External 
consultants were brought in as advisors to help move the company towards a `business 
unit' structural format. In the short period following the restructuring, the employees 
were kept on a 2-3 day week schedule in an effort to deplete the existing stocks of trucks 
that were piling up in the plant parking lots. When these stocks were depleted, workers 
were put back on a full production schedule. As sales increased and production 
operations went back to normal levels, confidence in the new company began to increase 
and the climate of uncertainty began to dissipate. Although the new EBG was still licking 
its wounds, the company was able to continue development of the new truck model 
(EBG95 Super Space Cab) and achieve full production in less than 60 weeks. At the time 
of this study, the production level achieved the 50000 trucks mark with significant 
fanfare from management. 
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4.9 Organisational Changes 
With the implementation of the `Lean Enterprise' concept (i. e. a flatter organisation with 
increased vertical and lateral communications, goal setting, team working, continuous 
improvement, and a `productivity matrix' within a flexible, productive well integrated, 
cooperative environment), the situation in the production areas has changed dramatically. 
A case in point was the move of the planning functions to the production floor. As we 
saw in figure 4.6, before the company's restructuring, the Planning department was the 
primary controller of all activities on the shop floor. Before turning, milling, boring, or 
any other machining operation on a part, the operators had to get the stamp of approval 
from the planning department at every step in the process, even if the operation involved 
a single part or component. An example of this high level of control can be seen in the in 
the pump housings operations in the Universal Area. In the old structure, the pump 
housings operations used to take six weeks on average before completion of the 
processing. By moving the planning closer to the shop floor and eliminating most of the 
unnecessary controls and stamping procedures, this same process under the new `Lean 
Enterprise' restructuring arrangements, takes only two days from start to finish. Another 
aspect of the organisational change on the shop floor is elimination of the superintendent 
role and the expansion of the duties of the supervisor to include those of the 
superintendent. Now the supervisor role has been transformed to a `facilitator' in charge 
of all the cell teams operational in his area, the name change to `facilitator' indicating the 
supportive nature of the supervisor's new role who now reports directly to the area 
manager (See figure 4.4: The new organisational structure). The other change on the shop 
floor was the elimination of the first operator position and increase team responsibility 
for all aspects of cell operation. Increased operator responsibility now means that 
operators can do quality audits which were the responsibility of the quality department in 
the old organisation. 
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4.9.1 Team and Work Group Development 
The development of the Lean Enterprise concept with its focus on productivity targets 
through the use of the Objective Matrix was the key element that helped pave the way for 
the success of the teamwork groupings on the production floor. To understand the 
significance of such a change, it is helpful to review the history of team development at 
EBG. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, following the popularity of the Scandinavian autonomous work 
group, as well as the development of similar socio-technical approaches by a number of 
Dutch universities, the company adopted these socio-technical approaches b work 
organisation structure on the shop floor. The work teams on the shop floor gained more 
autonomy and control to the extent that the area manager indicated: 
`... these groups focused too much on labour satisfaction and not enough on goals and 
productivity. The autonomy of these groups got out of hand to the extent that these cells 
were setting their own production schedules that often contradicted with those 
production targets set by management'. 
The high degree of autonomy led to a significant increase in group cohesion at the 
expense of other groups and functions in the organisation (see Figure 4.11): 
' ... the increased level of work group autonomy lead to the creation of `kingdoms' and 
inward looking groups that decided even on when to have a party. The cells became too 
autonomous and very inward looking. This created and in-out group phenomenon'. 
(Area Manager) 
As another manager indicated, by the late 1980s, with the coming of a new 
manufacturing manager, the excesses in the work group issue was tackled head on. The 
new manager `adopted an anti QWL' posture and forced a move towards focusing on the 
numbers' and accountability for achieving production targets. The new manager focused 
purely on results. With the coming of the Japanese production techniques and their 
110 
ý 
Diminiished 
interaction 
Group A Group B 
Figure 4.11: Drawing by one the area managers indicating the 
cohesiveness of the autonomous groups. The groups were focused 
inwardly without interacting with other groups. 
111 
increased popularity and success in other companies, the company's board of directors, 
believing in the need to adopt similar systems as a way to revitalise the company's 
declining productivity, kept pushing the manufacturing manager to adopt similar 
approaches. However, believing that such programs were 'a waste of time' and recalling 
the previous experience in the autonomous work groups fiasco, the manager continued to 
resist the introduction of any such systems. 
` This manager held back these modern concepts. and just before the bankruptcy and as a 
way to save his skin, he moved to introduce the Lean Enterprise concept at the last 
minute'. 
In spite of the introduction of Lean Enterprise, commitment to it remained limited. Yet, 
with the restructuring and the formation of the new organisation, the Lean Enterprise 
concept was adopted wholeheartedly and more fully throughout the new organisation, 
with full managerial support. 
The development of the Objective Matrix under the Lean Enterprise concept helped the 
company avoid repeating its previous experience with teams. By including a production 
engineer, a logistics engineer, and a facilitator as a part of the team approach, and 
focusing on a goals and achieving set objectives and production targets, the Lean 
Enterprise was able to achieve productivity improvements. Other aspects of the Lean 
Enterprise involved developing integration within areas and moving all the production- 
related functions closer to the shop floor. Some functionality still existed at higher levels 
in the organisation but at area levels these have been integrated at shop floor level. 
4.10 `Lean Enterprise' in the Flexible Manufacturing Systems Area 
A key element of the lean enterprise initiatives was the attempt at `devolving more 
responsibility and control to the shop floor'. This was done, as the human resources 
manager indicated, by focusing on the development of teams (cell groups), developing 
training in techniques such as problem solving, and adopting continuous improvement 
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through the use of the `Objective/ Productivity Matrix' and focusing on continuously 
improving production goals and objectives. 
Improving competitive advantage through the implementation of new technology was 
also the policy new EBG. In this case, the company adopted FMS systems on the shop 
floor in addition to the CNCs, as the production technology needed to help maintain the 
company's competitive advantage. Together, the development of `Lean Enterprise' and 
the continued introduction and usage of advanced production technologies were seen as 
the key weapons for insuring the competitiveness of the organisation particularly in 
today's increasingly unforgiving market place. This view was confirmed in the interviews 
by the human resources manager, the plant manager, the Area manager, production 
engineers, supervisors and operators alike. 
In the flexible manufacturing systems production area, interviews were conducted with 
facilitators and operators ('All Rounders' and `Rounders') on the shop floor which 
examined the details of the lean enterprise arrangements at the FMS and the perceptions 
of the facilitators and operators of the degree of success of these arrangements. 
On the surface, the issue of whether lean production is applicable to the FMS area was 
not a question that was entertained by the actors in the organisation. Lean production or 
in this case `lean enterprise' was presented and adopted in the company on the 
assumption that it was applicable to all aspects of the production processes including the 
FMS environment. 
Probing further into the relationships relating to lean enterprise application to the FMS 
area, three points of views emerged in the interviews: 
The first viewpoint, interviews conducted at the managerial level (particularly the human 
resources manager and the plant manager) pointed to an emphasis from these managers 
on their commitment to the principles of lean production including the commitment to 
giving shop floor operators more responsibility and control over the production process. 
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In the words of the human resources manager, this commitment also included `pushing 
power downward to the shop floor'. 
The second viewpoint, interviews conducted with the area manager, manufacturing, 
production, and logistics engineers pointed to acceptance of the lean enterprise, but with 
emphasis on the importance of the objective/productivity matrix (Figure 4.5) 
characterised by focusing on team objectives, production targets and on the need for 
tighter control of the production process. `Complexity' and critical `Interdependence' of 
operations especially in the FMS area were cited as the reason for the need for tighter 
control of the process. 
And the third viewpoint, based on interviews with facilitators and operators pointed to an 
apparent increase in rules and regulations that are being applied to the FMS in particular 
in conjunction with the objective matrix. The view of the operators of the lean enterprise 
indicated a perception on their part of decreased control over the production process as a 
result of the demands of the objective matrix. 
Thus, based on these three viewpoints, inconsistencies relating to the perception of the 
role of lean enterprise and its applicability to the FMS environment in particular were 
detected. These inconsistencies were seen in the message associated with FMS operation 
and that of the lean enterprise organisational arrangements. 
Underlying the messages associated with lean enterprise is the impact of organisational 
and cultural change on the organisation as a whole. This impact, when viewed at the 
micro level, is translated through designated operational imperatives which seek 
increased control over the production process. While simultaneously sending an opposing 
message, also associated with the new work organisation stuctures which are supposed 
to increase the degree of autonomy and span of control of the workers. 
What emerges from the interviews is that these efforts at increasing the levels of 
autonomy and authority on the shop floor were moderated by three factors: 
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1) Increases in monitoring and control through the `Objective Matrix'; 
2) Increases in the rules and procedures associated with the operation and utilisation of 
the FMS; 
3) Prior managerial experiences of loss of control over group developments causing 
over-caution on the part of the area manager and production staff to the independence 
of teams. This heightened sensitivity to group development was conveyed to the 
facilitators (supervisors) as well. 
These three factors appear to present a conflicting picture of the nature of the new 
organisational innovations and their relationship with the FMS. They cast a shadow over 
the compatibility of the operational imperatives associated with FMS use and those of the 
lean production approaches. In the next section, these inconsistencies will be examined 
more closely using four characteristic dimensions associated with the flexible 
manufacturing systems as key criteria for evaluating these inconsistencies. 
4.11 The Key Dimensions 
As was discussed in chapter three, it is possible to use some of the characteristics 
primarily associated with the flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) as the dimensions 
for evaluating the compatibility between FMS and lean production. The key chosen 
dimensions are: complexity; integration; regulation; and flexibility. These four 
dimensions were confirmed by the area manager, production and logistics engineers, 
supervisors (or facilitators), as well as, operators as factors that have informed and 
impacted the use of the FMS. These dimensions will similarly be used as the research 
tool for evaluating the consistency or tensions between `Lean Enterprise' concepts and 
its application to the FMS environment. 
These questions were developed to prepare the interviewees for the nature and scope of 
the questions and to gain insights on the key dimensions under study. The information 
was collected and coded based on the four key dimensions. All the data collected was 
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grouped on the basis of the key dimensions of complexity, integration, regulation, and 
flexibility and were analyzed accordingly. The grouping of the responses was done 
through cut and paste approach. 
Typically following each interview a brief period of time was used to review the 
responses of the interviewee and to highlight the key points and comments expressed by 
the respondent. By writing up the impressions of each interview, it was also possible, 
using keywords highlighting the focus of each interview, to group and organize the 
responses on the basis of the chosen dimensions. By grouping the responses based on the 
key dimensions it was possible to identify the central points as they related to each of the 
respondents and his individual experience on the interaction between lean production and 
FMS. 
4.11.1 Complexity 
Based on the interviews with facilitators and FMS operators, at least two levels of 
complexity associated with the FMS operation are evident. The first level involved tool 
management and tool kitting needed for the operation of the six FMS stations. This 
process is further complicated by the fact that at least two types of engine (an 8 litre and 
an 11 litre engines) and four types of engine heads are being machined at these stations. 
Operators have to go through a series of steps and operations which involve tool set-up 
and tool kitting, using an extensive tool library database and, depending on the type of 
machining process needed for that operation, a computer assembly print-out is produced. 
Assembling the tools is done with the help of a bar code system, and the tools are preset 
and loaded into a carrier (tool magazine). The second level of complexity involves the 
inter-relatedness between the elements of the six stations of the FMS and the machining 
operations preceding it. Coming from two different areas: one type of engine block 
coming directly to the FMS (referred to as the `block line'), and another type of engine 
block coming directly to the FMS from other areas. As one facilitator indicated, 
There is so much to do for the operators. [in FMS], they have to make sure that capacity 
is achieved through the correct mix of engine types [8 litres and 11 litres] as well as the 
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engine heads. The FMS is a bottleneck and mistakes are costly. Operators have to make 
sure that the correct choice is made other wise the incoming blocks will accumulate and 
since they are large in size, there is not enough room to buffer these engines. ' 
Because of their large size, engine blocks are not buffered; which implies that the FMS 
must follow the block line as much as possible to avoid bottlenecks. Because there are 
two types of engines (8 and 11 litres), and four types of engine blocks (with the 8 litre 
engine needing half an hour machining time and the 11 litre engine needing a full hour), 
increased complexity arises in organising the timing and planning of the capacity for the 
four types of engine blocks. For example, the 8 litre engine block line 4 machines in the 
FMS following the block line. With two spindles less, the operator needs to calculate the 
rate changes between the 4 and 8 litre blocks so as to ensure that the timing and the 
capacity are at an optimum mix (refer to figure 4.10). 
The results of the semi-structured interviews and the questionnaire administered to the 
facilitators and operators confirmed that, owing the high level of complexity associated 
with the FMS (compared to the requirements of operating regular CNCs), FMS operators 
were trained to be multi-skilled and were given salaries at the higher end of the operator 
salary scale (group 7 salary level). These operators have been trained (for periods 
between 6 to 12 months) on all aspects of the FMS operation and tooling, in addition to 
other training associated with team development in techniques such as problem solving, 
quality checks, first level maintenance, and so on. 
Another aspect of the complexity involves actual programming and operation of some of 
the machinery related to the FMS. An example can be seen in the operation of a newly 
introduced `Three-Dimensional Measuring Machine'. This type of machine is a conputer 
numerical controlled (CNC) machine used in conjunction with the FMS primarily for 
testing tool tolerances. 
Based on the interview and questionnaire to the area manager and production and 
manufacturing engineers dealing with the FMS area, two different perceptions relating 
the complexity of the production technology emerged: 
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While the both managers and operators viewed the technology as complex, a significant 
part of the complexity was seen by the operators in terms of the increase in the 
interrelatedness of the system and the increase in capacity of the FMS. The complexity 
was reflected as much as in the use of the technology as it is reflected in the increase in 
pressure on the operators. While characterised as complex by all the operators 
interviewed, the actual programming of the FMS did not appear to present a problem 
particularly to the All Rounder (LTS level, multi-skilled) operators. This view was 
manifested in terms of an apparent sense of pride in their programming abilities. For 
example, during the interviews, when describing the complexity of the FMS, the 
operators were also pointing to the significant role that they play in the process and the 
high skills and abilities that they needed to have in order to operate the FMS. 
This operators' view of complexity contrasted with the views of the area manager as well 
as the views of the manufacturing, production, and logistics engineers who saw a higher 
degree of complexity in the FMS environment. Responses by the area manager and 
production engineers to the questionnaire on the issue of complexity scored relatively 
higher than the responses of supervisors and operators. Complexity and the 
interrelatedness of operations were scored as `significantly increased' by the production 
and logistics engineers while the supervisors and operators scored "increased' rather than 
`significantly increased' in response to the same questions. 
The difference in the perception of complexity was much more pronounced when the 
interview questions referred to the complexity of the `ThreeDimensional Measuring' 
CNC. This new CNC measuring machine could be considered as a part of the FMS 
system as it is used to measure FMS tool tolerances insuring the proper operation and 
quality of the FMS machining operations. Two divergent perceptions of its complexity 
were detected: Production and logistics engineers saw the 3D measuring machine as `too 
complex for the FMS operators to operate' and accordingly its operation was left to a 
specialist quality control engineer. On the other hand, the Facilitator and a number of the 
operators did not see this machine as `any thing special except for the controls and that 
118 
its programming is similar to those of the FMS although it takes only tolerance 
measurements'. 
Thus, the perception of the degree of complexity of the 3D machine differed considerably 
between the operators and the production and logistics engineers. This discrepancy 
pointed to issues of control over the production process and the differences in terms of 
the expressed viewpoint of the production engineers of the need for tighter control in the 
FMS as a result of its complexity. 
The view of the `need for tighter control over the production process' contrasted with the 
stated views of the human resources manager and the plant manager. The responses of 
these managers to interview questions on the role of lean production clearly pointed to an 
expressed commitment towards increasing the degree of shop floor operators' autonomy 
and giving shop floor operators more say and control over their individual areas 
Shifting to the interviews with facilitators and operators on the same issue, responses to 
the interview questions confirmed that the role of teams has been enlarged as a result of 
lean production. Yet, equally, control over the FMS process was still being exercised 
primarily by the area manager and production and logistics engineers through the vehicle 
of the `objective matrix' and team meetings. Operators indicated that the operational 
objectives of the teams or cell groups are strictly specified in the team meetings, and that 
the `what, when, where, and how' of operations are thus established. A key component 
of this `Objective (productivity) Matrix' review is the assessment of productivity levels 
and the achievement of set objectives. Accordingly, two apparently contradictory 
circumstances appear to be in operation here and that the complexity of the FMS system 
is being presented as the justification for its existence. 
4.11.2 Integration 
The integration dimension in the FMS production area can be seen operating on two 
levels: the first involves the degree of FMS integration within the overall production 
function, while the second involves its harmonisation within the total system including 
the organisational arrangements and its internal cooperation mechanisms (such as 
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teamwork). In the Universal / Engines area within which the FMS is located, the CNCs 
are integrated into cell groups organised around teams. These teams are responsible for 
all the activities in their cells including engine block machining operations prior to their 
transfer to the FMS stations. Accordingly, there is a high degree of interdependence 
between the operation of the six stations of the FMS and the preceding operations as seen 
in figure 4.10. When viewed in totality, we can see that a high level of integration 
between the operation of the CNC cells and the operation of the FMS exists. The new 
organisational arrangements through their focus on eliminating the functionalism of the 
past and fostering lateral communication between teams and groups within the various 
work areas, help to develop the internal cooperative mechanisms between groups and 
make it possible to manage the various interdependence relationships within these areas. 
A significant organisational factor which helped support this integration within the 
production area was the elimination of many well entrenched departments (such as 
planning, manufacturing engineering, maintenance, and materials / production control), 
and the transfer of key personnel in these functions closer to production under the control 
of the area managers. 
4.11.3 Regulation 
A key aspect of the dimensions characterising the FMS is its influence on the work of 
operators and team members. This influence, owing to the high degree of complexity and 
integration in the FMS area, is seen through the rules and regulations incorporated by the 
system. 
Historically, EBG was highly functionalised with the planning department controlling 
every aspect of FMS operation. With the transformation of the company into new EBG, 
and the adoption of lean production (including the call for increasing employee 
autonomy), it seemed logical to expect that the degree of regulation associated with the 
FMS would also be positively affected by the new organisational transformations. 
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However, responses of facilitators and operators to interview questions about the increase 
or decrease in the number of procedures and rules indicated that the number of rules and 
regulations associated with the FMS has increased rather than decreased since the 
introduction of the lean production. This in spite of an overall, organisation wide move to 
devolve more power and control to the shop floor including the FMS area. As the FMS 
facilitator indicated : 
`... With the new company and the lean enterprise system... it made things more difficult, 
with more responsibilities for the operators and more rules for the area. ' 
These circumstances point to an apparent contradiction between the message of the lean 
production system adopted by new EBG (calling for devolving more responsibility and 
control to the operators), and the actual operational imperatives of the FMS. These 
operational imperatives were characterised an increase, rather than decrease, in the 
number of rules and regulations associated with the FMS operation. The interviews 
indicated that there was indeed a development in the role of FMS operators particularly 
within the new teamwork structures and an apparent expansion of operator roles to 
include quality control and maintenance functions. But coupled with this increase in 
operator responsibilities, there was also an increase in the operational rules and 
regulations governing the detailed execution of these new responsibilities. Added to this 
increase in rules, is the demands of team meetings and the establishment of the 
`Objective Matrix' as the instrument for setting immediate goals and objectives for each 
of the cells. From the operator's perspective, the objective matrix appeared to be acting as 
a measuring device to insure compliance to the specified goals and objectives as well as 
the adherence to the new rules. From the area manager and production engineers 
viewpoint, the justification for this increase in rules and regulations is the need for tighter 
control over the production process. Based on the interviews with the area manager, the 
production engineers and the logistics engineers, the need for tighter control of the 
system is internalised in the need limit any possible disruptions to the operation and flow 
of the production system. This was emphasised by the area manager as especially true at 
`this critical juncture in the development of company', and the imperative need to 
increase production and maintain tighter control over the production process. This is 
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reflected in statements such as `... operators have freedom as long as they follow the 
block line', indicating the limit of operator control over the process. The high complexity 
and integration perceived to be associated with the six FMS stations and the production 
of 2x4 (two types of engine x four types of engine heads) was deemed enough to justify 
the need for the increase in regulation. 
In the early interviews, both the area manager and the FMS facilitator were asked about 
the `degree of operator freedom to do the job' in the FMS area. Both responded 
enthusiastically and positively indicating that `operators have a greater freedom to do 
jobs now (with the introduction of the lean production) than they did before in the 
control culture of the old EBG. However, when the question is shifted to the `degree of 
operator freedom to plan the work' both responded was less enthusiasm (although still 
indicating that in their view `it was still high'). On the other hand, interviews with the 
FMS operators, both `All Rounders' and `Rounders', responding to the same question of 
`degree of operator freedom to do the job' pointed to positive responses. Thus confirming 
the high degree of operator `freedom to do the jobs' (owing to their high skill and training 
levels). The response to the planning aspect of their job indicated that it was about the 
same or slightly better than it used to be in the old EBG. As one operator indicated: 
`directives on what, where, and how, are still being dictated from above'. The fact that 
operators indicated that in spite of the organisational changes and the efforts made 
towards increasing the level of operator control over their work, when it comes to the 
planning aspects of that work, the new organisational arrangements did not alter the 
existing relationships. In fact the general view of operators pointed to an increase in the 
degree of control. 
4.11.4 Flexibility 
Under the new organisational arrangements, the new company concentrated on increasing 
overall flexibility of the organisation with the intention of improving its competitiveness 
and maintaining production costs at competitive levels. The new focus was primarily on 
labour flexibility with flexible working hours and longer operating times. The company 
also adopted a `build-to-order' philosophy and reorganised the manufacturing functions 
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through the adoption of new wave manufacturing techniques such as `lean enterprise' 
with the objective of increasing flexibility, reducing lead times, as well as coping with the 
changing environment and future demand. In the FMS area, the focus was on mix 
flexibility. Responses to the interview questionnaire by operators indicated that the 
overall flexibility of operations associated with the lean production in the FMS area 
appears to have remained at the same level. Because the FMS operators were Group 7 
salary group, i. e. highly skilled and experienced workers, the ability of these workers to 
exercise judgement and make `on the spot' operational changes remained the same. 
Probed further is subsequent interviews, it was noted that the implementation of 
operational teams and the Objective Matrix appears to have put certain constraints on the 
operators' discretion. On the other hand, by virtue of increased flow of information 
between production areas and increased knowledge of incoming production changes and 
targets, operators are better able to organise their work and alter their operational 
schedules to better advantage and hence increase their flexibility. 
4.12 Increased Production Demands and Lean Production 
Between 1994 and 1999, the company experienced considerable, dramatic growth in its 
market share and increased the production of the EBG95 truck from 40 trucks per day to 
120 trucks per day. This three-fold increase in the poduction volume while essentially 
maintaining the same work organisation and structure, had a tremendous impact on the 
production environment and created new challenges and difficulties on the production 
line and in the FMS area in particular. 
This increase in demand was not limited to the company, but was also a reflection of the 
positive economic environment in the manufacturing sector. As a result, overall demand 
for skilled CNC operators increased, which led to shortages in skilled operators. The 
company had to hire technical school graduates, as well as low skilled workers to cover 
for the shortfall in the number of operators. According to the human resources manager, 
for every increase in the production of EBG95 by a single truck, EBG needed to hire 23 
new people on the shop floor. Accordingly, the increase in the production of the EBG95 
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truck led to increases in the complexity of the system and created new sets of problems 
for management. 
4.13 Operational Issues 
One of the key obstacles which faced operational teams was the traditional engineering 
staff's view of the production area as their sole domain. Add to that the need for the 
engineering staff to show how indispensable they are to the production process, a 
problem arose where production and logistics engineers, even in their role as team 
members, would exercise too much control and seize the operational team as a vehicle for 
the execution of their agenda. To correct this imbalance, management tried, as the plant 
manager explained: 
`... to make it clear to the engineers that acting on behalf of the team is not welcome... for 
example we do not want to see only the engineers delivering presentations about team 
activities, but rather we want to see the whole team acting in concert , and that the 
responsibility is that of the team as a whole including production and logistics 
functions'. 
Another problem which become visible through the development of the operational teams 
was the problem of ownership due to long-standing different cultures associatai with 
membership to traditionally different specialities. For example, the different objective 
criteria for the Logistics with its focus on lead time, Production with its focus on quality 
and output, and Engineering with its focus on the smoothness of the process and the 
introduction of new projects. These conflicting objectives for each of the group member 
speciality had to be reconciled. 
A third problem the area managers and production engineers' insistence on increased 
regulation and control in conjunction with the lean production changes pointed to a 
managerial ( particularly the production management point of view) which made a 
distinction between the concept of autonomy and that of responsibility. Managerial 
emphasis on the responsibility of workers indicated a degree of lack of trust probably 
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stemming from past experience with autonomous work groups. Although new EBG 
adopted lean production, the approach to its implementation, as seen on the FMS shop 
floor can be discerned to still follow the traditional approach of the company old or new 
that emphasised tighter control and specification of work roles and structures. 
The above three issues were evident in the interviews conducted at the managerial, staff, 
and shop floor levels. Their existence raised doubts concerning the validity of new EBG 
true compliance with the lean production philosophy and the commitment to the stated 
changes. 
4.13.1 Changes to the Teamwork Structures 
In the last visit to the FMS area in 1999, the production supervisor (facilitator) was in 
charge of 70 workers working in three shifts. Of these, almost 70 per cent were new 
employees with limited manufacturing experience. The new employees were also of 
different nationalities (nine different nationalities were present on the shop floor 
including British machinists). This created an additional dimension to shop floor 
problems as a number of these operators did not speak Dutch. This meant that production 
supervisors had to deal with the language barrier as well as limited skills when working 
with these new operators. 
Looking deeper into the team structures in this area, in the three shifts numbered 71,73, 
and 74, we can see that in this area, the structure was based on three major teams with 
each team consisting between of 7 to 8 operators. The teams' leaders were of a grade 7 
scale. i. e. multi-skilled operators who were given the name `All Rounders' a term used to 
emphasise the fact that they were senior operators with experience on all the machines in 
the area and who had the skill and experience to work on every aspect of the 
manufacturing operation. Of the 70 workers in this area eleven, operators were `All 
Rounders'. In addition, each of the teams had one programmer with the responsibility for 
programming the CNC machines (This constituted a new development on the shop floor 
which will be discussed in the next section). The rest of the operators were apprentices or 
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new operators with an average experience level of one year or less. These new operators 
had LPS and LTS technical education level (figure 4.12). 
4.13.2 Tensions and Stresses: Lean Production in the FMS 
The increase in production from 40 trucks to 120 trucks per day exasperated the 
interaction between the FMS and the use of lean production. A number of problems 
developed as a result of the increased pressures, as well as the hiring of new operators 
with limited skills. For example, in shift number 71, the lean enterprise format was 
leading to problems relating to: 
1) Sick leave time, and the scheduling of holidatis: Because holiday scheduling was one 
of the responsibilities devolved to the teams to decide on by themselves, problems 
occurred over the scheduling of holiday time for each member of the cell, particularly 
with the increased production pressures and the shortage in `All Rounders' or multi- 
skilled operators. Essential personnel were taking leave at the same time causing 
disruptions to the production schedule. 
2) Machinery breakdowns: This related to the role of the maintenance department. 
According to the lean enterprise model, the operators of the FMS and other CNC 
machines were supposed to be conducting first level maintenance of these machines, 
However, in reality, it appears that this function was left to the maintenance department. 
Operators did not do any of the required first level maintenance. 
3) Division of Labour within the teams The new teams having both multi-skilled and 
semi-skilled operators, began to show divisions in the execution of tasks within the team. 
The multi-skilled operators became the strong members of the teams exercising 
considerable influence over the team and choosing to do the easy tasks or `nice jobs such 
as programming or materials planning while leaving the dirty work to us' as one semi- 
skilled team member explained. 
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"First All Rounder" 
"All Rounder " 
Grade 4 
Operators 
Grade 7 Minimum 5 
Years experience 
Grade 5 
Operators 
Grade 4 
Operators 
MTS level Grade 7 
long experience 
"All Rounder " 
Grade 5 
Operators 
Novice One year experience Novice One year experience 
Figure 4.12: FMS area new teams hierarchy (by skill level) 
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These attitudes dramatically influenced the work of the teams to the extent that the area 
supervisor decided to reorganise the team structure into a functional format as can be 
seen in figure 4.12. The new team structure was divided into three hierarchical levels: A 
`First All Rounder' level a grade 7 or grade 8 level with a lot of experience; an `All 
Rounder' level which is an MTS grade 7 level with a minimum of five year's experience; 
and the rest of the operators and new operators from grades 4 and 5. For the 
programming, a grade 7 programmer is also included in the structure, taking charge of all 
programming needs of the cells. This programmer has at least 2-3 yers experience and is 
of a high technical educational level (MTS). 
4) Increase in the rules and regulations on the FMS Overall, the complexity of the 
operation on the FMS increased. For example, while early in this study, this area 
machined two types of timing cases, by the end of this study in 1999, they were 
machining 10 types of timing cases. Problems resulting from this increase in production 
affected the MIS system of the company with increased system breakdowns, in addition 
to typical problems such as machinery breakdowns and some quality problems associated 
with the semi-skilled operators' work. In response, management instituted new rules and 
regulations throughout the production areas and focused in particular on the FMS area. 
Some of the new rules and regulations were general in nature relating, for example, to the 
holiday schedule within the FMS teams discussed earlier in this section. In the old system 
these holidays were decided within the team. However, with the new regulations, 
holidays are currently only possible through a two week notice request by the operator 
which is then put on a holiday request list and is `frozen', i. e. the schedule on the list is 
fixed and is subject to the approval of the area supervisor. 
The new team structure seen in figure 4.12 could also be viewed as a part of the increase 
in regulations at the FMS. It institutionalised the differences between the semi-skilled and 
multi-skilled operators and created an elite group of core multi-skilled operators who 
were flexible, moved from place to place on the production line depending on the need at 
the time, and gave directions and mentoring to the new semi-skilled operators. Yet, when 
128 
it came to the specific production activities, management increased its control by 
focusing on `departmental efficiencies' and a `paper system' with `performance 
indicators' detailing the set targets and the variability between them and what is actually 
being done on the shop floor. This `paper system' related to all aspects of the operation 
including worker utilisation, maintenance, machine breakdowns, machine utilisation, 
training, and others. 
What is significant is that the general focus in the company has shifted from the 
traditional issues of quality, delivery, and price which were the key terms in 1994 to `man 
utilisation' as the key term that is consistently the focus of EBG management. Targets are 
now set top down based on managerial estimates and weekly controls are instituted 
through this `paper system' to check on the targets. 
The complexity of the FMS operation and the increase in the number of semiskilled 
operators was given as one of the reasons why management opted for the new 
bureaucratic structure. Either way, the result was a definite move away from the original 
principles of the Lean Enterprise and a shift back to the traditional modes of operation 
which can be characterised as following the traditional `mass production' or `fordist' 
philosophy referred to in chapter two of this thesis. These new arrangements led to a 
decreased level of the satisfaction of operators and even a decrease in the response to the 
set targets as well as requests from other functions. This was precisely due to the lean 
enterprise concepts of continuous improvement where the management continuously 
optimises the process and sets new, more difficult targets once the old targets are 
achieved without any recognition of the operators efforts in achieving the set targets. 
The return to the traditional older mass production model of operation was not limited to 
the advanced manufacturing areas (i. e. FMS and CNC production areas) but it also 
extended to the engine assembly. Driven by the decrease in multi-skilled 
assemblers/operators a number of quality problems arose as a result of the inexperience 
of the new workers. Management moved to reorganise the assembly area and separate the 
work into simpler tasks within the cell so as to minimise the risk of quality defects. 
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4.14 Human Resources 
At the beginning of this study, the human resources department played a key role in 
organising and facilitating the new team structure. What developed was a `successful' 
team model that was viewed to exemplify the `best of the new wave manufacturing' 
approaches. With the new `build to Order' system, the teams were made up of a core of 
multi-skilled operators with increased control over their individual production areas as 
well as using lean enterprise tools to their maximum advantage. The result was the 
successful production of a high quality product with significant potential for future sales. 
Demand for this new truck increased and production soared from 40 trucks per day to 
120 trucks per day. 
The message of the human resources department in this case was in tune with what was 
being practised by the area supervisors and production managers. The obstacles at the 
early stages of the research revolved around the strong influence of the planning staff 
over production and finding the right balance between the planning function and the 
autonomy of the teams. 
The Lean Enterprise teams were given more autonomy and the strict control of the 
planning department was decreased. Teams became more and more independent 
particularly at the FMS. To some extent, the HR department worried that these teams 
were becoming too independent to the extent that it affected the production line. For 
example, the issue of holiday scheduling which was decided upon internally within the 
teams led in a number of instances to having two or more essential `All Rounders' taking 
time off at the same time and affecting the production schedule. The response to this 
increased independence was an increase in the number of rules and regulations on the 
floor. 
As complexity increased, particularly at the FMS, the human resources department and 
planning department used this complexity as the reason to institute new rules and 
regulations. The transformation of the make up of the new teams from what was strictly 
multi-skilled operators to a mix of multi skilled and semi-skilled operators, has changed 
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the dynamics of the relationship internally between team members and externally 
between the management and the teams. 
The internal dynamics within the teams created a new phenomena of what looked like a 
two class system: the multi-skilled operators acting as the elite within the teams, and the 
less skilled operators. The multi-skilled operators doing mostly the easy jobs of material 
planing and programming, while leaving the rest of the labour intensive jobs such as 
cleanup and first level maintenance to the less skilled (new) operators. 
Eventually, maintenance functions were withdrawn from the operators and even the first 
level maintenance function, which was part of increasing the autonomy of operators, was 
left to the maintenance department. As the human resources manager stated: 
`Now we have two worlds in the cells, multi-skilled operators who are in control and 
those who are less skilled, on a temporary contract, and without any control. ' 
The increase in pressure and the atmosphere of the two worlds led to a high degree of 
turnover in the new `part timers'. 10 to 15 workers left every week primarily because of 
the high degree of pressure on the shop floor, high competition for new recruits from 
other manufacturing companies and the reluctance of management to make these 
operators full time employees or to put them on `permanent contract'. 
For the human resources department, this new division within the teams created a serious 
challenge to the original ideas of lean production and the new wave manufacturing 
approaches. But as production demanded relief from the increased production pressures 
and demanded the hiring of new operators, human resources did not address this problem 
head on and shifted to the issue of hiring of new workers. 
By 1999, The role of the human resources department was transformed and focused on 
two key strategic issues of concern: 1) How to hire and keep people who are fit for the 
job. 2) How to deal with the issues of work related stress. Both of these issues were the 
result of the increased production demands due to the increase in sales of the EBG95 
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series engine. For every one truck increase in vehicle production, human resources need 
23 more workers on the shop floor. 
The Human Resources departments' policy was to fix the number of permanent contract 
workers- i. e. those who enjoy the full benefit package of EBG and a guaranteed 
employment contract, at a level sufficient for 40 trucks per day. As production 
dramatically increased, HR increased the number of fixed contract operators to be enough 
for the production of 75 trucks per day. The rest of the people were on a short-term 
contract basis or were hired as temporary operators through external hiring agencies. This 
limit on the number of full time operators reflected the sensitivity of EBG's management 
to its pervious history of large-scale redundancies. Full time workers enjoy extensive 
benefits and job security that make it very difficult to have labour flexibility. 
The decreasing pool of technical school graduates of the LTS and MTS educational 
levels compounded the skilled labour shortage problem at EBG. Left with no choice but 
to hire less skilled workers, the HR department developed a new four-week training 
program on the elementary mechanical engineering skills needed in production. This new 
program was also used as a selection tool to judge the fitness of the new recruits. 
4.15 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, the compatibility between advanced manufacturing technology and new 
wave manufacturing strategies was investigated in terms of the specific case of the 
application of lean production to the flexible manufacturing systems environment. Semi- 
structured Interviews with a cross section of managers and employees in company were 
conducted with particular emphasis on the manufacturing organisation and the FMS 
production area. Interviews and a questionnaire were administered based on an interview 
schedule (see Appendix) which included the human resources/ personnel manager, the 
plant manager, the manufacturing (area) manager, manufacturing, production, and 
logistics engineers, supervisors (facilitators), as well operators of the flexible 
manufacturing systems area. 
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The findings of these interviews and questionnaire pointed to the existence of 
inconsistencies in the interaction between elements of the `Lean Enterprise', the name 
given to the lean production system implemented in this company, and its application to 
the FMS environment. These inconsistencies related to the perception of the role of `Lean 
Enterprise' and its applicability to the FMS. Three factors appeared to present a 
conflicting picture of the nature of the new organisational arrangements and their 
relationship with the FMS: 
First, the stated commitment and efforts by the human resources department to deploy 
lean production and increase the levels of operator autonomy on the shop floor were 
moderated by Increases in monitoring and control by the area manager and production 
staff. Second, increases in the number of rules and procedures associated with the 
operation and utilisation of the FMS were detected in relation to the lean production 
arrangements. Third, other factors such as prior negative managerial experiences with 
strong groups appeared to be behind the cautious, conservative attitude on the part of the 
area manager and production staff towards the teams. 
Four out of the six characteristics primarily associated with the flexible manufacturing 
systems (FMS) were chosen as the key dimensions for evaluating the compatibility 
between FMS and lean production. The dimensions were: complexity, integration, 
regulation, and flexibility. These four dimension were seen as the key actors in the FMS 
environment from the point of view of the users while automation and expensiveness 
were viewed as self evident and did not solicit appreciable responses. 
Based on the interviews with facilitators and FMS operators, at least two levels of 
complexity associated with the FMS operation were evident. The first level involved tool 
management and tool kitting needed for the operation of the six FMS stations. The 
second level of complexity involved the inter-relatedness between the elements of the six 
stations of the FMS used in this case and the machining operations preceding it. The 
results of the semi-structured interviews and the questionnaire administered to the 
facilitators and operators confirmed that, owing the high level of complexity associated 
with the FMS, the operators were truly multi-skilled and were given salaries at the higher 
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end of the operator salary scale (group 7 salary level). Two different perceptions relating 
FMS complexity emerged: First, while both managers and operators viewed the 
technology as complex, a significant part of the complexity was seen by the operators in 
terms of the increase in the interrelatedness of the system and the increase in capacity of 
the FMS. Second, The complexity was reflected as much as in the use of the technology 
as it is reflected in the increase in pressure on the operators. While characterised as 
complex by all the operators interviewed, the actual programming of the FMS did not 
appear to present a problem particularly to the All Rounder (LTS level, multiskilled) 
operators. This was manifested in terms of an apparent sense of pride in their 
programming abilities. The view of complexity by the operators contrasted with the 
views of the area manager as well as the manufacturing, production, and logistics 
engineers who saw a higher degree of complexity in the FMS environment. Responses by 
the area manager and production engineers to the questionnaire on the issue of 
complexity scored relatively higher than the responses of supervisors and operators. 
Complexity and the interrelatedness of operations were scored as `significantly increased' 
by the production and logistics engineers while the supervisors and operators scored 
`increased' rather than `significantly increased' in response to the same questions. This 
was particularly evident in the perception of the degree of complexity of the 3D 
Measuring CNC used in the FMS area which differed considerably between the operators 
and the production and logistics engineers. This discrepancy pointed to issue of concern 
over who should have control over the production process. Clear differences emerged 
between the expressed viewpoint of the production engineers for the need for tighter 
control in the FMS as a result of its complexity and the views expressed by the plant 
manager and the human resources manger. Both managers emphasised the principles of 
lean production and the move towards increasing operator autonomy and control. 
The view of the `need for tighter control over the production process' contrasted with the 
stated views of the human resources manager and the plant manager. In interviews with 
facilitators and operators on the same issue, responses to the interview questions 
confirmed that the role of teams has been enlarged as a result of lean production. Yet, 
equally, control over the FMS process was still being exercised primarily by the area 
manager and production and logistics engineers through the vehicle of the `objective 
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matrix' and team meetings. Two apparently contradictory circumstances appeared to be 
in operation here and the complexity of the FMS system was being presented as its 
justification. 
On the dimensions of integration and regulation, responses of facilitators and operators to 
interview questions about the increase or decrease in the number of procedures and rules 
indicated that the number of rules and regulations associated with the FMS has increased 
rather than decreased since the introduction of lean production. This in spite of an overall, 
organisation wide move to devolve more power and control to the shop floor in line with 
the stated `Lean Enterprise' precepts. Coupled with this increase in operator 
responsibilities, there was also an increase in the operational rules and regulations 
governing the detailed execution of these new responsibilities. In the FMS area, the high 
complexity and integration perceived to be associated with the existing six FMS stations 
and the production of 2x4 (two types of engine and four types of engine heads) was 
deemed enough to justify the need for the increase in regulation. 
By the end of the investigation of this company in 1999, some reversals in the application 
of the lean enterprise modes were evident. The complexity of the FMS was presented as 
one of the reasons for the regression from earlier new wave manufacturing strategies and 
the return to traditional forms of operation albeit more enlightened and less ridged than 
the older mass production approaches. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AN AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on Fokker N. V. the pioneering Dutch aircraft manufactuer. Fokker 
Aircraft had a proud history with a long tradition of introducing new technologies to its 
manufacturing environment. Its acquisition by the German Daimler-Benz Aerospace 
group (DASA) in 1992 provided the company with a new direction that emphasised 
increasing overall efficiencies and productivity through the implementation of lean 
production systems. Fokker had introduced lean production approaches to its 
manufacturing operations at the Papendrecht components and parts fabrication plant. The 
plan for this case study was to investigate the interaction between the lean production 
implemented at the time as a part of an overall dramatic restructuring within the company 
and its application to the FMS environment (which included a variety of new CNCs and 
FMS) in the fabrication plant. 
Additionally, this case study contributed to the research by illustrating a fundamental 
point for this and other research, namely that companies do not operate in a vacuum. 
While the primary focus of this research dealt with microlevel issues (the interaction 
between lean production and the FMS), macro level events often have an incomparable 
impact that overwhelms the tactical aspect of operation within the company. In this case, 
the big issue was that of the lack of job security and the layoffs of large numbers of 
workers. This fact loomed large in the factory during the research and had a dramatic 
impact on the morale of managers, supervisors, and operators making it difficult to 
evaluate the nuances of the micro-level changes. 
At Fokker Aircraft, the company's financial position had deteriorated significantly (at the 
time of the second visit in 1995 losses had reached NLG 651 million or approximately 
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$325 Million). On the day of the last visit to the company, the company announced a 
further reduction of 500 employees before a scheduled meeting with one of the 
manufacturing engineers. The meeting turned into an hour and half session in which the 
interviewee let off steam and went into a lengthy, angry description of `what is wrong 
with the company'. Although his views were coloured by the unfortunate circumstances, 
it nevertheless generated new insights on the true picture of the organisation. 
Taking into consideration the above situation, we nevertheless can still examine the 
interaction between lean production and the FMS environment. At the components and 
parts fabrication area, the four major dimensions of complexity, regulation, integration, 
and flexibility were used as the measures to investigate the dynamics of interaction 
between the lean production arrangements and its usage in the FMS area. But first the 
details of the company will be examined 
5.2 The Company 
This case study focused on Fokker Aircraft's main Aeroplane components fabrication 
factory in Papendrecht, Holland. This factory employed 2644 employees of whom 980 
employees were from a previous restructuring in which Fokker went through bankruptcy 
proceedings and was able to restructure following the DASA bailout. At the time of this 
study, the factory had recently experienced yet another reduction in the number of 
employees by about 30 per cent. 
Parts fabrication ranged from the production of small parts (8mm long) to the fabrication 
of aluminium sheets, titanium, and anti corrosion steel-composite mterials fabrication. 
These parts were used in all Fokker aircraft models such as the F50 and F 100, as well as 
for other aeroplane manufacturers such as the Boeing 747, Airbus, Gulfstream and older 
Fokker aeroplane models such as the F27 and F28 that were still in service. 
In the early 1990s the company increased its capacity based on higher demand 
expectation for the F50 and F 100 new models. For example at the Farnborough annual air 
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show of 1990, the company had preliminary orders for between 100-150 planes of the 
F 100 type. Accordingly, based on the projected potential orders for all models, the 
company increased its production capacity. The total demand for the F 100 model was 
expected to be at least 100 planes per year but the actual demand for the F 100 did not 
exceed 40 planes per year. This created a problem of over capacity while the company 
was `rolling out' (producing) one F 100 plane every 3 days and later, as a result of lean 
production and increased productivity, one Fl 00 plane every 1.5 days. High 
manufacturing costs - with each plane costing $20 million, declining profits, and the high 
expense of `green space'(daily rented parking space for produced aircraft), compounded 
the financial woes of the company. In 1992 Fokker suffered the largest financial loss in 
its history and, unable to pay its creditors, declared bankruptcy. DASA, the German 
aerospace company stepped in and took control of Fokker and restructured the business 
units through the elimination of the excess capacities and layoffs of large numbers of 
Fokker employees. After the restructuring, Fokker management endeavoured to recover 
the confidence of the market and did improve the efficiencies within the new restructured 
company. Nevertheless, the company did not fully recover and orders were still less than 
needed number. Finally, in late 1995, with losses mounting and Fokker unable to find 
new investors and pay its loans, the company's credit line expired and after seventy- 
seven years in business, Fokker Aircraft went into final receivership and all 5664 
employees were sent a letter giving written notices of final dismissal. 
5.3 Organisation 
The new structure following the DASA bailout made every effort to improve the 
competitive position of the company as the plant manager indicated: 
'... It was important to establish an organisational structure that would allow Fokker 
Aviation to operate efficiently and flexibly. ' 
In the case study plant at Papendrecht, and as a part of the new lean production approach, 
management decided to integrate two units (Fokker Special Products and Fokker FAE) 
into a single unit. Both units operated largely in the same markets and with the same 
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customers. Combining forces was therefore a logical step and a plan of action for 
integration was introduced which resulted in a new business unit that eliminated 
duplication. The new unit developed as a self-supporting business unit, and supplied 
products for the aircraft, space, defence and industrial markets. 
The plant was divided into two main sections: sheet metal & parts and Assembly. The 
sheet metal and parts was divided into four `Production Technical Specialist' (PTS) 
sections with responsibilities for: welding, sheet metal, chemical and paint, and 
production (figure 5.1). 
The production operation included batch manufacturing of engine parts for the left and 
right wings of the F50 and 17100 (20 parts batch for the left wing and 20 parts batch for 
the right wing). In addition, the plant manufactured special contract jobs for external 
customers such as machining the F 19 fuselage-engine ducts for NATO military planes, as 
well as a special contract for the Boeing company BA747 components. The 
manufacturing area had 70 operators on the shop floor who were divided into teams of 
between 15 to 18 operators each team led by a group leader or supervisor. 
5.4 Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
Fokker Aircraft had a long tradition of introducing new technologies to its manufacturing 
processes. The focus on technology was clear throughout the company. In interviews 
with managers, when questioned about the use of new technology it was clear that they 
viewed `technology as number one' reflecting management's pride in consistently 
introducing new technologies. This attitude was also evident in practice at the shop floor 
through the presence of many new generation CNC machines. Fokker was particularly 
strong in specialised technologies for aeroplane manufacturing and new and advanced 
technology acquisition was viewed as key for maintaining a competitive edge. 
Management's objectives were to expand the company's niche of specialised equipment 
and maintain a high technology level while at the same time eliminating jobs that can be 
duplicated else where by other companies. 
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Figure 5.1 : Formed extrusions, one of the many parts manufactured in 
the Papendrechet plant 
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Figure 5.2: Organizational chart - Papendrecht plant 
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5.4.1 The FMS Environment 
At the start of the production process metal sheets arrived at the plant to be processed on 
the machine tools. The hub of activity revolved around the `Profile Beworking Machines 
(PBM)', a Flexible Manufacturing Systems production technology in which 15000 
different parts of different shapes and sizes were machined. In the same area various new 
CNC machines used primarily for the F100 and F50 models were used among them: A 
JOMACH 25, a `Three Dimensional' milling machine. This was an Italian-made CNC 
machine that was operated by four multi-skilled operators. 
Another CNC in the FMS area was an LGIRE- ACB 6-axis machine introduced to 
replace the hand forming process. Also a six tools CORTNI L 300 SB CNC and a 
TRUMATIC 260 BFS CNC machine tool programmable from a central database. 
Programs for this CNC were pre set and were called from a central database in a DNC 
network. Operators typically called up programs from a menu and had the ability to 
change programs in coordination with the `technical services' Programmers. Other 
machines included automated ABK riveting and boring machines. In addition, an AS/AR 
automated magazine system. 
The machined parts were then fed into the Grading (Grinding) machines to eliminate 
sharp edges. After the Grinding, the parts were then ready for forming on big presses on 
five high-pressure press machines (980 Bars pressure). 
5.5 Cultural and Organisational Change 
Historically, Fokker was used to being a traditional bureaucratic organisation with a long 
history and a proud tradition. It was thought of as paternalistic and as one of the older 
operators stated `a job at Fokker meant a job for life'. The dim prospect of closure and 
failure was a far-fetched proposition considering its long history and position of pride in 
the national psyche of the Netherlands. But times changed, and as the news of its losses 
and potential bankruptcy filtered down through the organisation, employees began to 
seriously worry about the future of their jobs. The bailout by the DASA group- although 
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was a shot in the arm, did not solve the mounting problems of the company and the 
continued decline in revenues. To reduce capacity, the new management offered 
employees a generous retirement package. As the human resources manager stated, the 
plan was to reduce the number of workers between the ages of 57.5 and 65. But what 
transpired was that about 85 per cent of the people between the ages of 55 and 65 took 
the offered package set at 87.5 per cent of their last salary. This increased the company's 
social benefits and pension costs and eventually contributed to its inability to meet its 
outstanding debits. 
The issue of over-capacity and the mishandling of the layoffs also contributed to the 
general atmosphere and sense of impending demise. The production manager described 
the situation that faced the workers in dramatic terms: 
`Without prior notification, the plant manager stood at the gate early in the morning and 
directed those who were to be fired to a separate gate while those who were lucky and be 
spared were allowed to pass to their regular places of work'. He then added ' The scene 
was very dramatic and there was a lot of shouting and it was not one of Fokker's great 
moments. ' 
The effects of the trauma of the last two massive layoffs were still having their effect on 
the operation of the company. One of the manufacturing engineers described the situation 
in his work area as follows: 
'... It is like walking into a graveyard, every where you can see that most of your friends 
have been made redundant. You look at the paper work and you see someone's signature 
who is no longer here.... You have a question about a certain order so you dial the 
extension to discover that the engineer who made the order no longer works here... look 
around and its empty offices. ' 
Employees at every level in the organisation were not given a chance to adjust to the new 
situation and for those who survived, managerial attempts at creating a new culture which 
focused on cost reduction and `lean' production only served to remind them of the dark 
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prospects of the company. The demands of the new structure and its emlhasis on lean 
production and the new work organisation structures exacted its toll on workers and 
managers alike. 
5.6 Tensions and Stresses: Lean Production in the FMS 
The new wave manufacturing approaches used at Fokker centred on the use of lean 
production techniques as a way to improve efficiency and productivity. On the shop 
floor, the lean production approaches included giving operators more autonomy through 
multiskilling and attempts at job enlargement, increasing the skill level of operators, job 
rotation and training. A number of the key lean production recognised approaches were 
introduced. These included Kaizen, TQM, SPC, Zero defect programs and it was also 
noted that the plant had BS5750 certification. 
The new management put forward lean production to be its central focus with emphasis 
on `lean' as the key objective reflecting the management's strong desire to reduce 
capacity and improve productivity. Management expected strong resistance to the 
introduction of lean techniques owing to the prior bureaucratic, traditional history of the 
company. Yet, resistance to the introduction of lean production approaches seemed to be 
minimised as a result of the recent layoffs. Operators were less resistant to the 
introduction of these new organisational arrangements following the shock of the drastic 
reductions in the number of workers on the shop floor and the realisation of the ongoing 
threat to the company's future. Acquiescence to the new organisational arrangements cut 
through all levels of the production organisation. Younger operators in the FMS appeared 
to be more at ease with the new changes and expressed opinions of their willingness to 
adapt to the lean production approaches more readily than the older operators. This 
diminished resistance was also evident with the production staff programmers who 
traditionally had a separate culture as staff employee programmers. Initially, they resisted 
efforts to move them to the production area considering that prior to lean production, the 
programming function was a separate function with a separate manager and freedom and 
control over all the programming decisions on the FMS and new CNCs. With the 
introduction of lean production, this department was dismantled and many of the 
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programmers were made redundant. Those who remained were moved and integrated to 
the shop floor under the direction of the production manager as `technical services'. 
The company was going through a traumatic period of change and uncertainty. Layoffs, 
early retirement packages, union relationships and arrangements, and the implementation 
of the new restructuring policies, were all issues that the organisation as a whole needed 
to handle and the human resources department was the leading player in all these matters. 
Consequently, when the human resource manager was interviewed and was questioned 
about the issue of interaction between the lean production approaches and its 
implementation in the FMS environment, it was clear that it was the furthest thing from 
his mind. 
The threat of company failure loomed large over the Fokker organisation as a whole. This 
feeling was in sharp contrast to the earlier lax, overconfident atmosphere that 
traditionally characterised the attitude of the organisation and its employees. The shock 
of the bankruptcy and the restructuring of the organisation after the German DASA group 
bailout created a new atmosphere in which the reality of the situation became clearer to 
all Fokker employees, and the unthinkable (i. e. the demise of the company) became a real 
possibility. Further restructuring as a result of the over-capacity led to another wave of 
layoffs that created an additional atmosphere of suspicion and resentment through-out the 
company and on the shop floor in particular. Under these circumstances, the human 
resources department had the difficult task of charting its way through these changes and 
implementing `lean production' as the new wave manufacturing approach to transform 
the company into a more efficient and productive organisation. 
The lean production policies implemented by the human resources department included 
an emphasis on increasing employee autonomy through multiskilling and upgrading of 
operators skills, developing continuous improvement, teamwork, increasing training, 
flattening the organisational chart by reducing the number of levels within the hierarchy 
and moving the production, programming, and quality assurance staff closer to the 
production floor. 
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The reorganisation involved the elimination of many mid level management positions 
and reducing the number of organisational levels. In the production area, the number of 
organisational levels was reduced from 5 to 3 levels as part of the shift towards lean 
production (figure 5.3). This reduction in organisational levels was possible through the 
following: 
A) The elimination of the Director of Manufacturing Operations and transferring the 
responsibility along unit structures position to a Unit Manager; 
B) The elimination of the Manufacturing director position; 
C) The combining of the team leader and Group leader positions on the shop floor. 
In addition, management moved towards transferring quality functions to the shop floor 
and the elimination of the quality department as a separate unit from production. 
Traditionally, the quality department was also separate from production and quality 
personnel regularly checked the production machinery through spot visits to the shop 
floor. With the new lean production, this responsibility was moved down to the team 
leaders and operators on the shop floor. The position of quality control team leader was 
eliminated and the quality teams personnel were moved to the production floor closer to 
the FMS. 
Previously, the programming of the FMS and other CNCs was traditionally separate from 
production. This separation was more poignant because the programming was done in a 
separate building creating significant communication problems and led to de-coupling 
and minimum interaction between the programmers and operators. As stated earlier, as 
part of the new restructuring the production manager changed the structure and moved 
programming to the same area of production. Later the operators were given increased 
roles in the programming with the view that `the operators are better able through 
training and multiskilling to write programs' For example, access to the DNC network 
on the shop floor was granted to the operators. This change allowed the operators to call 
up from the central database the program menus to be used on particular CNCs in the 
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area. Prior to this change, programs on the menu could only be changed with the 
programming department's approval. 
In general, following the strong push by management for lean production, the production 
manager was not satisfied with the overall performance of operators on the shop floor. He 
reflected on the situation at the shop floor as well as the on the staff functions as 
traditionally having 'a lax culture that still lacked the sense of urgency necessary to move 
the company out of its crises'. This view was directed specifically at the programmers 
who appeared to have adopted a passive approach to the new changes. In the interviews 
with the Programmers on the shop floor, it was clear that they had had a separate culture. 
They saw their job as having an intellectual content and clearly as a staff position. They 
resented the move to the shop floor. When questioned about the lean production almost 
all of them expressed negative opinion about the changes. But when probed further for 
additional explanations, it was clear that they viewed the move to the production floor `as 
the first step in eliminating our jobs'. Six of the seven programmers who have been 
moved to the shop floor expressed this pessimistic view and it was clear that it was a key 
driver of the expressed low motivation. 
5.7 Human Resources 
The human resources department sought to introduce the new ideas through developing 
educational programs focusing on increasing technical skills and the problem solving 
techniques of operators. These programs were welcomed by younger operators and were 
faced with scepticism by older more experienced operators reflecting their overall 
dissatisfaction with the new measures. This dissatisfaction explained in part the rush by 
older operators to accept the early retirement package in large numbers. 
Driven by the human resources department, the new unit manager had separate meetings 
with the production manager, group leaders and team members of the unit presenting the 
new plans of the company and the lean production strategy. The unit manager introduced 
the LP concepts and requested that all working groups should use brainstorming exercises 
focusing on ways to reduce costs each in his individual area. In addition, the unit 
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manager started a process of on-going discussions with the group leaders on the cost 
reduction strategies of the company and how best to implement them at the shop floor. 
Similarly, team leaders were expected to repeat the process with the rest of the operators. 
Reorganisation at the shop floor level has been an attempt at job enlargement and 
increasing the skill level of workers through job rotation and an in house training 
program. The training program focused on developing an educational program covering 
both technical as well as social skills and problem solving techniques. 
5.8 Teamwork 
Initially, teamwork started with the introduction of the autonomous work group concept 
prior to the DASA group bailout. But, as the production manager indicated, `these were 
half-hearted attempts at increasing the role of operators on the production floor'. With 
the new restructuring and the introduction of lean production, the focus was on 
decreasing manufacturing costs and lead times. The unit manager sought to involve the 
operators in contributing their ideas on cost reduction and productivity improvements. 
The human resources department introduced a `Cost Reduction Program' that used cash 
rewards as an incentive for employee participation. A percentage of the money saved 
through the cost cutting ideas was given to the team or person who suggested the best 
cost saving idea. During the second visit to the flat sheet metal area, I participated in a 
short ceremony in which three workers were given 14000 Guilders for a cost reduction 
idea that suggested a specific wood type change for the wood used on tooling for the F50 
wings. The new suggestion reduced the cost of the operation by 30 per cent, a significant 
reduction in cost for the company. Indicative of the increased autonomy, the workers did 
their own research into the types of wood and the amount used in tooling. They contacted 
suppliers on their own and presented their proposal for the change and were rewarded 
accordingly. But, these types of rewards were rare and most of the cost reduction ideas 
were not viewed as significant enough to merit similar rewards. 
Team development did not appear to be a concentrated effort in introducing the best team 
practice strategies of the organisation. Instead, it was basically the reorganisation of the 
148 
operators into teams around each of the function units and supervisors were simply given 
the new title of group team leaders. Quality control personnel were moved closer to the 
shop floor and became part of the teams (figure 5.5). The teams were reorganised in 
groups of 10 to 15 people per unit with a minimum LTS technical education level. Before 
lean production, in one of these team units of 15 operators only 4 were skilled enough to 
change between the different machine tools especially those with different programming 
parameters. But, with the introduction of lean production approaches, most operators 
became multi-skilled through in house training and job rotation and accordingly became 
more flexible. 
The production manager communicated the importance of various performance 
dimensions and defined targets through regular meetings with the team leaders. 
Production targets were posted in the FMS area for operators to see. The team leaders 
organised `what should be produced and which tools to use' in each particular area based 
on a set schedule. For example, in the FMS area, a chart showing the progress in lead- 
time reduction from 8 days to 3 days was posted during the second visit to the area. The 
sign was available for all to see and by the last visit to the same area, they did reach their 
target of a lead-time reduction to 3 days. 
5.9 Key Dimensions 
The use of technologies such as FMSs and CNCs has always been the policy of Fokker as 
a way to maintain its technological edge. Coupled with lean production approaches, 
improvement in efficiency and productivity were expected. Looking at the FMS 
environment, the four key dimensions of complexity, regulation, integration, and 
flexibility associated with the characteristics of the FMS, as defined by Krabbendam 
(1988) and Boer (1990), were also used in this case. 
The semi-structured interviews and the questionnaire shown in the appendix were used to 
investigate the lean production approaches implementation to the FMS area. The 
interviews were conducted with the human resources manager, the PTS unit manager, the 
production manager, two manufacturing /production engineers, 2 supervisors or group 
leaders, as well as with operators. In addition, shorter interviews were conducted with 7 
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programmers. Four of the programmers on the shop floor were interviewed together and 
the questionnaire questions were answered collectively by the group. Additionally, two 
quality assurance engineers were also interviewed. These interviews were conducted 
during three visits between November 1994 and June 1995 prior to the closure of the 
company. 
5.9.1 Complexity 
Taking a closer look at the FMS environment, it was evident that, individually or 
collectively, the technology used was complex: a `Profile Beworking Machines (PBM)', 
a Flexible Manufacturing Systems in which parts of different shapes and sizes were being 
machined; a visibly new three dimensional JOMACH 25 milling CNC with sleek LCD 
display monitors; a six tools CORTNI L 300 SB CNC and a TRUMATIC 260 BFS CNC 
machine tool programmable from a central database; a LGIRE - ACB 6axis machine 
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and so on. Interviews with the supervisor and operators in area confirmed this initial view 
complexity. The complexity was evident from the fact that operators had to undergo 
extensive programming training by the vendors as well as through in house multiskilling 
technical training programs. 
Responses to the question on general operational complexity pointed to mixed opinions 
with the majority of respondent indicating that it `remained the same' and only one 
operator indicating that it has `increased'. There was general agreement that complexity 
in the FMS area did not exhibit any appreciable change as a result of the introduction of 
the lean production approaches. Responses to the complexity questions in the 
questionnaire regarding the degree of interdependence between work stations, the need 
for increased coordination between the FMS and other stations and areas, did not point to 
any appreciable changes as a result of the introduction of new organisational changes. 
Programmers on the other hand, having recently been moved to the production floor near 
the FMS, did agree that the complexity of the FMS played a role in justifying the need to 
increase supervision of the FMS and monitoring the use of the specialised CNCs and the 
DNC database. 
From the human resources manager perspective, the complexity of the manufacturing 
process and by extension the FMS has been handled through increased training and 
multiskilling of the operators. By introducing lean production approaches, and giving 
operators more control over the production process, he expected the teams to handle the 
complexity depending on the instructions of the production manager and the group 
leaders. On the other hand, the responses by the production manager indicated that the 
degree of complexity in the FMS did not appear to increase appreciably. He indicated 
that he `had and continues to exercise firm control over the production process' and that 
with lean production, because set objectives are closely measured and are consistently 
evaluated, he expected any complexity problems to manifest themselves quickly and be 
taken care of very early. He also expressed the view that by transferring the production, 
programmers, and quality staff to the production area and by monitoring team actions, 
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particularly in relation to cost cutting measures, he made it easier for the teams to seek 
help in any arising complexities. 
5.9.2 Integration 
The levels of integration in the FMS increased as a result of the lean production 
approaches. Production units were physically moved closer to each other. Group leaders 
and operators clearly perceived an increased interaction and coordination between 
functions. The production manager also pointed to the tighter coupling of the production 
process and considered it to be at the heart of the lean production philosophy. This 
increased integration was consistent with management efforts to capitalise on lean 
production and reduce lead times driven by a sense of urgency and the realisation of the 
need to show concrete results. 
In the 8 moth period between Nov. 1994 and June 1995 the lean production approaches 
seemed to take route and gain increasing acceptance by the supervisors, operators, and 
even the programmers on the shop floor. The teams were showing increasing signs of 
cohesion and increased confidence. Operators clearly stated that they felt that they had 
more autonomy in spite of the high degree of regulation that typically existed on the shop 
floor. 
One reasons put foreword by the group leader (supervisor) of the FMS group for the 
increase in autonomy was, in part, due to the reduction in the number of engineering and 
production staff `dictates' as a result of the redundancies. Mid level staff positions 
suffered the largest percentage of cuts and the ratio of salaried employees to the total 
number of employees was reduced to ratio of 1: 3 from a ratio of 1: 1. Although by the 
standards of lean production systems this 1: 3 ratio was still high, the change was 
considered to be significant. 
By the last visit to the Papendrecht plant, apparent resistance to increases to operator 
autonomy by the production staff declined. The production managers' attitude in respect 
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to the existing high degree of regulation and control over the shop floor was transformed 
into a recognition of the need to give operators and teams more freedom and control over 
their individual work areas. Group members also perceived an increase in the 
cohesiveness of the groups and saw themselves as better able to distribute tasks and 
increase their ability to control the process. Yet some functions such as maintenance 
remained separate and maintenance staff still followed a prescribed preventive 
maintenance program. 
5.9.3 Regulation 
By virtue of the critical safety aspect of the aviation industry, the company had 
traditionally adopted a high degree of regulation in the manufacturing of aircraft parts 
and components. Over the years the company developed a highly functionalised 
bureaucracy that oversaw the establishment of rules, regulations and procedures. Prior to 
the introduction of lean production approaches, the company had a ratio of one salaried 
employee (staff) for every worker on the shop floor. Although the number of salaried 
staff positions has been reduced under lean production to a ratio of one staff for every 
three workers, as the Fabrication Unit manager stated `the organisation had a long way to 
go and still suffered a high degree of red tape'. 
The situation in the FMS area of production appeared to be similarly highly regulated. 
Every aspect of production had to follow a set of prescribed rules and be documented 
appropriately. According to the production manager, `Fokker developed a bureaucracy 
with rules and regulations for every aspect of the production operation'. The extent of the 
`red tape' as it was described by the group leader and operators at shop floor was so 
pervasive that it was estimated that for one `15 cent part the paperwork costs $150'. 
The extensive degree of regulation in the production area was further increased following 
a joint Fokker-Boeing project for a BA 747. Both companies had extensive, well 
established, bureaucracies that added to the demands on documentation at the production 
floor. Of the 66 parts produced, 324 changes were made. The contract for B747 required, 
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as per the conditions of the Boeing's company, extensive sets of rules and regulations 
governing the operation on the shop floor. Differences in part names and part numbers 
for the same manufactured items between the two companies led to complications and 
defaults in the paper work which caused the large percentage of parts changes. As one of 
the group leader stated: 
`Production is OK but there are problems in the regulation associated specifically with 
one Boeing contract. Too much regulation and red tape applied from both sides Fokker 
and Boeing. ' 
Another shop floor problem revolved around the bureaucratic delays between engineering 
and the manufacturing cells concerning the new parts manufacturing. It took weeks to 
complete the manufacturing process for a single new part as a result of `delays and 
excessive red tape' between engineering and production in finalising the manufacturing 
process for a non-recurring part (i. e. a part that is manufactured as a single order part). 
While for the manufacture of a recurring part, there was on average a five-day delay as a 
result of the same paper work (figure 5.4). This problem is multiplied significantly if we 
take into consideration the large number of parts required for each assigned job. 
The high degree of regulation was reflected in the supervisors and operators responses to 
the interview questions concerning the number of procedures regarding operations, 
process planning, production planning, maintenance, and the degree of paperwork. There 
was a general agreement that the set work procedures and the number of rules and 
regulations relatively remained the same. Yet even with the increased operator autonomy 
and multiskilling, the regulation was still seen as very high. 
Programmers responses to the same questions on regulation and the degree of control 
over the FMS operation indicated that they generally accepted the existence of high 
number of rules and procedures but that they viewed it as necessary for the efficient and 
proper function of production. The complexity of the FMS being used as one of the 
reasons for the need for the regulation. The Complexity of the three dimensional milling 
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machine and the possibility of programming errors was one example put foreword by 4 of 
the programmers interviewed. 
The high degree of regulation and tight control over the production process was even 
confirmed by the production manager `to be excessive'. When questioned about the 
degree of control, he indicated that he felt that: 
`There is certainly a need for less control by moving responsibility down to the 
operators... I don't care how they [the operators] do it as long as the job gets done and 
on time' 
Nevertheless, as testified by the group team leaders and operators, he continued to 
exercise control of the process through set team objectives that were closely measured 
and consistently evaluated. 
5.9.4 Flexibility 
The overall flexibility of the production system benefited from the lean production 
approaches. As the operators in the FMS were organised into teams of 10 45 of multi- 
skilled operators and with the participation of staff programmers and quality personnel in 
addressing production problems, the flexibility of the system improved considerably. By 
its very nature, the flexibility of the FMS system and the CNCs in the area operated by 
multi-skilled operators, made possible for the company, in times of low manufacturing 
activity, to offer its production capacity to external clients. These FMS services were 
offered for other aviation companies as well as to the military. During the research, the 
two contracts in operation were for NATO as well as for the Boeing Aircraft company. 
Production efficiencies and flexibility continued to be viewed by the group team leaders 
and operators as having been improved since the introduction of lean production. The 
responses to the questions on the degree of flexibility; the ability to adjust at any moment 
to changing market conditions; and the ability to change production parameters and make 
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design changes scored positively by all respondents (rangng from increased to 
significantly increased). 
5.10 Analysis and Discussion 
The objective of this case study was to investigate the application of lean production 
approaches to the FMS environment in an aircraft manufacturing with a reputation of 
high utilisation of advanced manufacturing technologies. Fokker Aircraft did utilise 
various forms of new production technologies including FMS and new CNCs in addition 
to adopting lean production approaches. The result of the interaction between the two, as 
indicated by the actors in management and on the shop floor, did point to improvements 
in productivity and efficiency. 
The human resources department played a key role in trying to increase the degree of 
autonomy and control of the operators through the introduction of teamwork and 
multiskilling, and problem solving techniques. On the other hand, Plant managers and the 
production manager in particular focused on reducing costs, eliminating waste, and 
especially reducing capacity. 
Yet, the company reminded burdened with over-capacity as a result of decreased 
demands for its products. In addition, Fokker carried the baggage of a complacent and 
inflexible bureaucracy that regulated every aspect of the production process. The 
restructuring of the company and the introduction of lean production played a major role 
giving the company a second chance. Nevertheless, the company needed to become 
leaner and while the financial position worsened, Fokker continued to eliminate excess 
capacity and reduce the number of employees. Given this state of flux, the points of stress 
exhibited in the FMS area as a result the lean production approaches were overshadowed 
by the larger stresses of possible job loss. These stresses played a role in reducing the 
level of engagement by the operators on the shop floor. The perceived high degree of 
regulation resulting from lean production added to these tensions and re-enforced the 
view of lack of confidence in the company's management. 
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The central issue on the minds of all the actors in the company was `job security' and the 
uncertain future of the company. This fear over job loss was compounded by media 
reports detailing the ups and downs of the management and the dire financial position of 
the company (particularly after DASA declaration of its intention not to continue to 
`bankroll a sinking ship' as was quoted in the local paper and widely talked about on the 
shop floor). Given this pessimistic outlook and the continued stream of layoffs, it was 
almost impossible to instil the desired new culture and the ability to solicit cooperation in 
all areas of operation was diminished. 
Looking at the production floor and the FMS in particular, the dramatic impact of all the 
layoffs had severely impacted the atmosphere and the attitude of operators and staff alike. 
The issue of tensions relating to the application of lean Production to the FMS 
environment were not a concern for Fokkers' managers and staff. Yet Their was a 
realisation by the production manager of the need to give operators more freedom and to 
increase operator autonomy on the shop floor. If the lean production appraoch is to 
succeed. This view was manifested in the reorganisation of teams on the shop floor and 
multiskilling of operators through increased training. 
Additionally, the production manager also viewed the reduction in the number of 
production staff and programmers as `in a way increasing operator autonomy'. Also, by 
rationalising manufacturing/production, programmers and quality staff and moving the 
remaining staff closer to production he saw this move as adding assets to the production 
teams and increasing the efficiency and productivity of the teams. 
Yet, the operators on the shop floor pointed to tensions related to the use of the DNC 
network and the tool programming database. While operators were allowed access to the 
program menus and given the autonomy to make changes, programmers considered this 
action as a direct challenge to their roles. Add to that the general uncertainty in the 
company and the overriding fear of job loss, this led to friction with the operators and 
group leaders. The situation remained unresolved up to the time of the last visit to the 
company. The actual exercise of the changes to the programmes remained with the 
`technical services' Programmers and changes were done under their direct discretion. 
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Based on the interviews with the human resources and production managers, the 
perception was that both followed the general principles of the drive towards lean 
production and both appeared to espouse to giving operators in the production floor more 
control and autonomy over their work. Nevertheless, tensions in the application of these 
lean production approaches were seen in the perception of the degree of actual 
application of the lean production approaches. While the human resources manager 
viewed the new changes as a great leap in terms of Fokker's compliance with the lean 
production philosophy, The production manager applied the same principles within the 
traditional operational paradigm were the new changes give him an improved ability for 
monitoring and continuously evaluate the performance of production teams. However, 
these apparent incongruities relating to the FMS would have to be put in perspective as 
they were overshadowed by: 
1) An overriding tension between management and operators about the future of their 
jobs and a distaste for the lean production approach which they viewed as the 
instrument for eliminating their jobs. 
2) The continuation of the pervasive bureaucracy and high degree of regulation in spite 
of the lean production approaches being practised on the production floor and in the 
FMS area. 
Even as the human resources department was developing the lean production techniques 
to be implemented on the shop floor, the company's financial position continued to 
decline and management continued its cost cutting crusade through additional layoffs. 
The publicity associated with the dire straits that the company was going through, made 
Fokkers' possible demise after 77 years in business the overriding issue at every level in 
the company. The impact on the morale of the organisation as a whole was severe. Under 
these circumstances, the research questions of this study dealing with micro 
developments on the production floor became insignificant and the operators' interaction 
with the FMS and the lean production techniques become mute. 
160 
CHAPTER SIX 
CMC Compressors Manufacturing Company 
6.1 Introduction 
So far in this study, we have seen the implementation of the lean production system to the 
flexible manufacturing systems environment in two relatively large manufacturing 
companies: truck manufacturing and aircraft manufacturing company. In these core 
companies we saw that there were inconsistencies in the interaction between application 
of these lean production approaches to the FMS environment. These inconsistencies were 
the result, in the case of EGB Truck, of the contradictory messages being sent from the 
human resources department (calling for increased autonomy and empowerment) and the 
production and planning departments introducing more regulations and control over the 
process through the lean production procedures. While in the second case, Fokker 
Aircraft, the inconsistencies were due to a pervasive bureaucracy and high degree of 
regulation particularly at the FMS area as low motivation due to job uncertainties. In this 
chapter, the focus shifts to a smaller size manufacturing company that has also introduced 
lean production to its flexible manufacturing systems environment. The results from this 
company will point to an example were the tensions predicted and found in the other 
larger manufacturing companies were less visible in this case. As the discussion of CMC 
will show, The general impression from the responses of managers and operators 
interviewed points to an apparent good fit in the application of lean production to the 
flexible manufacturing systems where the lean production system was deployed. 
This is a Dutch compressor manufacturing company that was in the process of 
introducing lean production to the production environment including its Flexible 
Manufacturing Systems (FMS) area. Five visits were made to this company in the period 
between November 1994 and June 1999. Semi structured interviews and short 
questionnaire were administered to a cross section of plant employees and staff. These 
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included interviews with the Plant manager as well as Personnel, production, logistics, 
technical and planning staff. Focus of the interviews was on the `Mechanical 
Department' which contained all the manufacturing functions in the plant. An interview 
schedule can be seen in the Appendix. 
6.2 The Company 
CMC is one of the world leaders in industrial refrigeration particularly for the food and 
fishing industries. A subsidiary of a German multinational corporation, CMC 
manufactures reciprocating and screw compressors, NH3chi11ers, pressure vessels and 
other related components. Its products are high quality, reliable, low energy consumption 
refrigeration compressors that can be applied in almost every industrial refrigeration 
process (see figure 6.1 for a picture the type of compressor manufacturing at CMC). 
Historically, CMC has been the traditional leader in the compressors manufacturing and 
industrial refrigeration business and was the first to introduce large welded steel 
reciprocating compressors to the market. In 1993, CMC was acquired by a large German 
multinational corporation specialising in all aspects of the refrigeration business. The new 
owners opted for minimum interference in CMC yet encouraged CMC management to 
adopt lean production techniques. The minimum interference policy of the parent 
company was primarily based on its business philosophy of `group decentralisation' 
through what they termed as the `FEFprogramme' an abbreviation of the words 
`focused, efficient, and fast'. The FERprogramme objectives were to encourage the 
development of leaner, smaller, and decentralised subsidiary companies in an effort to 
`avoid losing market shares to smaller, specialised and efficient competitors' as the 
parent company literature stated. 
In addition to the parent company's encouragement to CMC to develop the lean 
production approaches, they also provided CMC with additional investment funds 
directed at CMC's Research & Development (R&D) department as well as for investment 
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in new machinery. This infusion of capital helped CMC to complete the development of a 
new compressor design and increased overall confidence in the future of the company. 
In January 1998, CMC began production of a new series of screw-type reciprocating 
compressors that were designed to meet new regulatory demands for environmentally 
friendly refrigeration. The new compressor design had a bore of 160 mm and a stroke of 
110 mm used in six single stage and nine two-stage models. These new compressors were 
high quality; heavy-duty reciprocation compressors designed to operate with ammonia. 
The successful introduction of the new compressor series came on the heel of significant 
organisational and technological transformation in CMC. Over the five-year period since 
the initial visit to the company in November 1994, CMC experienced increased growth in 
sales, which reached 616 million-DM in 1996, and by 1998, totalled 676 million-DM. 
The company was also successful in streamlining its production and logistics operation, 
increasing its productivity as well as managing the introduction of new compressor 
design with the minimum of difficulties. In the next sections, I will describe these 
developments and focus on the production area where lean production techniques were 
applied. 
6.3 The Organisation 
Prior to the company being acquired by the German multinational, CMC was organised 
along traditional lines (figure 6.2) with the `Technical/Planning' department being the 
nervous system of the organisation taking charge of planning activities, scheduling, and 
even maintenance. This departments' focus was on the production operation with its staff 
micromanaging activities on the production floor. 
Although the parent company did not want to interfere in the details of the production 
environment at CMC - considering that CMC's management had the necessary 
experience in its product area and that the company was successfully producing well 
established compressor products, nevertheless, they still wanted the company to actively 
pursue the adoption of a lean production strategy. The new owners were very keen on 
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innovations made popular in the productivity and quality management literature and 
accordingly encouraged their subsidiary companies to adopt lean production as driver for 
future growth and success in the market place. CMC's management agreed with the 
parent company on the need to implement these changes and proceeded in 1994 to 
implement a pilot program based on the recommendation of a Japanese consulting 
company hired to help the company to adopt the lean production system. As a result of 
the success of the pilot program, CMC's management decided to adopt lean production 
albeit at a "gradual pace" as the plant manager indicated during the first interview in 
1994. 
By the end of 1995, the parent company was not satisfied with the `slow pace of change' 
at CMC and decided to appoint a new president of operations. The new president was 
younger, had an industrial engineering background, and was fully committed to the new 
lean production philosophy. His extensive managerial experience in another innovative, 
high profile, electronics manufacturing company immediately established his credibility 
throughout CMC. 
With this change in leadership and its stated commitment to lean production, the 
implementation of lean production took on increased urgency and gave company workers 
and staff a strong signal to pursue lean production to its full advantage. 
6.4 The Production Process 
The production process of CMC compressors is designed as follows: raw materials are 
immediately transported to the welding area where welding robots are used to do the 
initial welding of the compressor housings while the rest of the welding operations are 
completed by skilled welders. Prior to the introduction of lean production, welded 
compressor houses were done in series. As a result of lean production changes, housings 
are welded based on customer orders only (one-piece flow production). 
Once the compressor housings are completed, they are then transferred to the heat 
treatment and cleaning section. Once the cleaning is completed they are then transferred 
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to the machining area which includes the FMS and CNC machines for turning, boring, 
drilling, and grinding processes, or the machining of crank shafts, cylinder liners, 
connecting rods etc., (see figures 6.3 and 6.4). The machining area has nine multi-skilled 
operators per shift. Once the compressor is machined, it is then transferred to Assembly. 
In Assembly, 20 workers do the assembly of compressors which are assembled `one- at- 
a- time' with the full assembly being the responsibility of individual workers who have to 
personally sign for the assembled compressor once it is completed. During discussions 
with the assembly operators on the floor it was clear that they viewed this part of the job 
the most rewarding because of its variety and high skill requirement. It also offered the 
added satisfaction associated with `working by hand'. 
Once the assembly is completed, the compressor is then sent to the Pressuratest and run- 
test area where it is fully tested and is then sent to the spray paint robots and/ or to 
packaging depending on the customer order. 
6.5 Key Organisational Developments 
During the first visit in late 1994, the company was in the process of introducing lean 
production techniques including Just-in-Time, continuous improvement (Kaizen), and 
total quality. 
The reorganisation of CMC and the adoption of lean production were based on a new 
business reorganisation strategy encouraged by the new owners. CMC'smanagement 
proceeded to improve the organisational efficiency through introducing teamwork, 
improving logistics, and reducing inventories. As the plant manager indicated in the first 
interview, the objectives were set out as "increasing efficiencies through reducing over- 
capacity, achieving a significant shortening of throughput times as well as achieving 
significant reductions in inventory". 
The key focuses in that early stage was primarily on cost reduction and the elimination of 
over capacity. The plant manager made it clear that there were some tough decisions 
ahead which he had to take. That meant that the company was planning to reduce the size 
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of its labour force and as expected, within eight months from the initial visit, 
management had reduced the size of its workforce from 350 employees to 180 
employees. Nevertheless, the organisational structure remained relatively the same with 
the most noticeable reduction being the reduction in the number of employees by fifty per 
cent from every department with the exception of the welding area whose experienced 
welders were deemed indispensable. 
By 1998, following the lean production philosophy guidelines and the adoption of 
multiskilling and selective hiring practices (particularly the hiring of young technical 
diploma MTS and LTS qualification graduates), CMC still maintained the number of 
employees around its `lean' 1995 levels. 
Up until 1995, CMC had traditionally manufactured all the components of the 
compressor housings using a variety of CNC machines. Management commissioned a 
complete audit that examined every aspect of the manufacturing operation. As a result of 
the audit, which was heavily influenced by lean production guidelines, the company 
decided to `farm-out' small parts production and focus on its core competency of 
compressor housings. The decision to subcontract small part production was based on a 
`make or buy' matrix cost analysis. The presence of reliable suppliers in the region as 
well as the company's ability to achieve a good supplier relationship as a part of the 
CMC group of companies made the decision to adopt Just-intime logistics a practicable 
proposition. Today, small parts production is subcontracted to suppliers using JIT 
delivery. The fact that CMC is located near a major transportation artery and that most of 
its supplier companies are within short driving distance made the JIT system a success. 
As indicated before, the introduction of lean production into CMC was done primarily 
through the help of an external Japanese consultancy company that introduced CMC to 
the use of Kaizen, Just-in-Time/TQ techniques and principles. As the production 
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manager stated "with just in time we were able to reduce througput time considerably 
and almost totally reduced stocks ". This convinced management of the utility and 
effectiveness of lean production and accordingly proceeded to fully adopt it as a company 
wide strategy. The plant manager referred to the Japanese Consultant Company as a 
"sparring partner" reflecting the degree of intensive discussions and interaction with 
CMC's management team as well as production and logistics staff and multi- 
departmental meetings. All the lean production ideas and practicable steps were discussed 
and analysed thoroughly before deciding to implement them. The implementation of 
these Lean production concepts involved a pilot program that proved the validity of these 
concepts and thus were implemented throughout the company. 
With the help of the Japanese consultant and through the establishment of a multi- 
departmental work group, the company slowly changed its production philosophy to 
adopt the JIT methodology. By 1998, CMC had moved towards a onepiece flow 
production system that was based on customer orders as an alternative to the old demand 
forecasting method. This transformation was particularly poignant because, in a number 
of cases, the forecast method proved inaccurate. For example, the original decision to buy 
the FMS unit was primarily based on a demand projection of strong sales in the U. S. 
market. Later US sales proved to be much less than projected. Although the decision to 
adopt FMS to the production of the older type compressors was for the wrong reasons, it 
nevertheless proved to be a good decision as the FMS proved its effectiveness in 
increasing production flexibility. 
One of the important lean production transformations was the break-up of the Technical- 
Planning department. Prior to lean production, the production function in all its aspects 
was highly centralised through this department. This led to dissatisfaction from other 
departments, as well as from supervisors on the shop floor. Even the plant manager 
admitted that `this department had too much power and it controlled every aspect of the 
operation from planning to programming and even to maintenance'. Thus, a decision to 
break it up and transfer many of its functions to the production floor was taken. The 
earlier decision to downsize the company helped make the break up process smoother. 
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In addition, the production manager had two assistants to handle all aspects of production 
operation. The division of labour was haphazard and depended on the particular job at 
hand and the needs of each department. This created a problem particularly for the 
supervisors who felt that many of their duties had been taken over by these managers 
creating the feeling that there was an undue over control by the technical department. 
With the break up of the Technical/ Planning functions, each of the teams did its own 
planning. Although this gave each team a strong degree of autonomy, it nevertheless led 
to considerable delays and confusion between the departments. This process `was taken a 
step too far' according to the production manager and the department teams became `too 
independent and led to variances and confusion in the planning times'. As a result from 
these perceptions of team over independence (put foreword primarily by the production 
and logistics staff), it was later decided to re-centralise the planning function for all 
departments by deciding on an end time for each team. Accordingly, the planning for the 
departments was re-centralised under the direction of the production manager. Now, 
working in teams with the aid of transparencies, each team's `end-time' is set for every 
department. The production manager looks at efficiencies `of the total rather than the old 
method of measuring efficiency for each team' (see figure 6.5). 
The plant manager opted for increased efficiencies through, inter alia, `a lean core of 
multi-skilled workforce' rather than semi-skilled labour even though, as the production 
manager stated, that for the majority ofthe time, you only need push button people'. The 
decision to retain a leaner, multi-skilled workforce was a strategic decision that was said 
by the plant manager to "have helped the company become more flexible and adaptable 
to changing market conditions". This made it possible for the company to weather the 
shift in the industry towards new environmentally friendly compressors. New 
environmental regulations could have had considerable negative impact on the 
performance of CMC. But having retained a well trained, knowledgeable, multiskilled 
workforce, it was easier for CMC to introduce the new compressor design to the 
production floor with far less problems and with much less `growing pains' than would 
have been traditionally encountered had the work force been less qualified. 
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6.6 The Flexible Manufacturing Systems Environment 
CMC utilised a Dorress-Sharman Flexible Manufacturing System. In addition, CMC also 
introduced two Welding robots. Ten CNC machines (Crankshaft turning and milling 
machine, Vost Alpine Stienel, WNC 500 S Millturn, Mazzak) and other types were also 
used. The company introduced the Flexible Manufacturing System late in 1993. The 
original reason for the purchase was primarily based on the expectation of significant 
increases in the US market demand for the CMC compressors. 
The FMS was used for machining compressor housings and other parts. It was made up 
of two flexible manufacturing cells with a pallet-changer. With one of the cells used 
mostly for the housings. (See figure 6.6: picture of FMS). The Cells are operated on a 24- 
hour basis in three shifts with the third shift unattended. A single skilled operator (with 
programming skills) works each FMC. Once housings or components are machined, 
finishing is done by hand. The operator does the loading and unloading of the compressor 
housing, and has the freedom to change the program and has the choice in priority 
procedures for each individual job. The FMS also has an associated robot tool wheel. 
This robot replaces tools, which are pro-set in the pre-set department. Another operator in 
the tool department is in charge of the setting up and calibration of tools. This calibration 
is done by a Zoller H 4000 machine, which also requires special training. The operator 
calls up the tool list from the tool library and tool storage racks. The parts list is outputted 
from the computer once the list is completed, the operator then assembles the tools 
together and the tools are then put on the tool wheel. 
The FMS machining centre area was used for small compressor housing with 6 pallet 
stations (figure 6.6). In addition, as part of the new organisational changes, FMS 
maintenance (including preventive maintenance) was subcontracted. In case of defaults 
or breakdowns, operators cooperate with the external maintenance specialists to solve 
particular FMS problems as well as in order to increase operator familiarity with the 
machines. 
173 
Figure 6.6: CMC Side view of the FMS 
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6.7 Lean Production 
The implementation of lean production through a specialist Japanese consulting company 
with experience in lean production implementation in European manufacturing 
companies ( particularly in Germany) significantly followed basic JIT and TQM 
approaches discussed in chapter two of this study. The measures adopted by CMC 
following a long process of discussions and analysis at all levels in the company included 
the following: 
1. Stream lining the company by reducing over capacity and cutting the workforce by 
more than half; 
2. Adoption of just in time logistics internally and externally with significant reductions 
in inventories over time; 
3. A move towards `make-to-order' production; 
4. The adoption of total quality techniques including preventive maintenance, problem 
solving techniques; 
5. The development of continuous improvement (Kaizen); 
6. The adoption of teamwork using flexible multi-skilled workers. 
Additionally, outsourcing small part production functions of noncore activities which 
could be produced more economically by external suppliers, simplified the production 
process. 
The plant and production managers viewed the implementation of lean production 
measures as a success. Initially these measures were tested in a pilot program and later 
fully implemented to all areas in the company. The strong enthusiasm of the plant 
manager for lean production was a key driver in the transformation of CMC from a 
traditional organisation into the lean production paradigm. 
As the new plant manager stated during the first interview, his previous experience in 
lean production at his previous employment at an electronics manufacturing company, 
was a key factor for his strong commitment to lean production. This was in sharp contrast 
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to the views of the pervious plant manager. In the interview conducted with the previous 
plant manager during the first visit to the company in November 1994, no such 
enthusiasm was detected. In a following interview with the production manager who 
survived both regimes he indicated that: 
" one of the reasons the old plant manager was removed was because he did not believe 
in these changes and he only implemented a pilot program as a test to buy time" 
Senior or corporate CMC management apparently saw the plant manager as taking too 
much time to adopt lean production and owing to other undisclosed reasons he was 
removed. What was clear from the interview with the new plant manager and the 
production manager under the new leadership is that the initial slow adoption of these 
new organisational changes encouraged by senior management was a factor in his 
dismissal. However, with the change in leadership and the expressed deep commitment of 
the new manager to the lean production philosophy, the transformation of the company 
was seen to accelerate. 
As a result of lean production changes, the organisational format of the welded 
compressors housing was changed from a series production to an `order by order' 
production format. According to the Mechanical department charts, lead-times were 
reduced from 22 weeks (from start to finish for the production of a complete compressor) 
to seven weeks and eventually, at the end of 1998, to four weeks lead time. 
6.7.1 Kaizen 
The initial pilot program at CMC started with the formation of a kaizen team. This team 
was started in the mechanical department axle manufacturing CNC area. The team was 
trained to use fish bone diagrams and brainstorming problem solving techniques. The 
result was the development of immediate improvements in the area. Sample 
improvements involved the development of a raised platform to ease the strain on 
operators as well as the reorganisation of the layout of the machinery and a general 
tidying up of the area. 
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A full program for the implementation of Kaizen and teamwork was introduced. Twelve 
teams were formed and training was provided through a one-weekintroduction program, 
which involved a two-day lean production/ kaizen theory training while the rest of the 
week focused on JIT and other practical aspects of the new structure. 
6.7.2 Teamwork and Multiskilling 
Although prior to the introduction of lean production operators were organised ingroups 
or teams, these teams were not fully implemented. As the new group facilitator explained 
`groups were formed but only on paper'. One of the supervisors added that `in the old 
days the production manager talked about the need for workers to be organised in groups 
but on the shop floor there were no group activities'. 
With lean production, teams were given full support and commitment particularly by the 
new management. For example, group meetings were conducted during work hours and a 
special team debriefing room was established near the production area for use by teams. 
The new confidence given to the experienced operators led to the resolving of many 
problems in the area and as the FMS team leader stated ' quality problems that had 
existed for a long time were solved in a very short period of time'. 
An example of such a quality problem involved the variability of the circular shape of 
machined cylinders, the team was able to fix the problem by changing the sequence in the 
manufacturing process as well as developing a quality check prior to the succeeding 
operation. The teams would regularly meet once or twice a week depending on the status 
of production. With some group members operating in different shifts, some of the team 
meetings are held between shifts. The primary item on the agenda was usually related to 
technical and quality issues. 
This view of the success of teamwork was confirmed by the responses to the interview 
questions and the special questionnaire. Operators scored "significantly increased" on all 
items related to operator `freedom to plan their work' and `operators span of control over 
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work assignments'. Responses by operators to questions on `degree of flexibility', and 
`ability to adjust at any moment to changing market conditions', also scored `increased' 
by the operators. Although the question on the ability to adjust to market conditions is 
primarily a managerial question, it was important to gauge the operators understanding of 
the company competitive priorities. The ability to respond to `changing market demands' 
was understood by operators in terms of their overall production flexibility. 
An important factor in the view of the success of the teams was that most of the operators 
were skilled operators with the flexibility to work on different machines. In the 
machining area for example, of the nine operators working per shift, five were multi- 
skilled operators who could operate every machine in the area. The other four were in the 
process of learning the other machines. 
6.7.3 Communication 
One of the key changes introduced by lean production was an increase in the flow of 
information between the various groups and departments. Departmental chiefs met once a 
week, supervisors once a day and a general meeting with operators and managers was 
held once every 6 weeks. Near the FMS, a special area was made available for teams to 
meet. The room had bulletin boards and a variety of charts, diagrams and tables 
describing the various aspects of production and associated performance levels (figure 
6.8). The room was relatively large and both workers and staff had access to it. Teams 
met in this room at least twice a week depending on the work schedule and need. 
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6.7.4 New position of Facilitator 
This was a new position created in cooperation with a local university. The position was 
designed to complement the lean production philosophy adopted by CMC. In particular, 
the group facilitator role focused on enhancing group/ team development in the 
production area as well as throughout the organisation (figure 6.7). 
The fact that CMC had established a cooperative relationship with a nearby university 
(particularly in an area other than R&D which is typical of the type of cooperative 
relationships with academia within manufacturing companies) is indicative of the extent 
of commitment by the new plant manager to lean production strategies and their full 
implementation in the company. It can be viewed as a clear statement that lean 
production adoption was a genuine attempt at improving the performance of the 
company. By 1999, CMC had streamlined its operations and as the plant manager 
indicated 'we have successfully introduced a new compressor design to production with 
the minimum of problems using a core team of multi-skilled, experienced, and efficient 
workforce'. 
6.7.5 Supervisor as team leaders 
The new plant manager also introduced changes to the staff positions, one of the key new 
organisational restructuring decisions was to dismantle the technical/planning 
department. The reasons given for this drastic action were that the technical/planning 
department had assumed `too much control' over the production process and in the FMS 
area in particular. 
In interviews with two of the Mechanical Department supervisors had pointed to a degree 
of dissatisfaction with the existing work organisation structures. In Interviews conducted 
in November 1994, the key issue for the supervisors was the degree of the technical 
department's control over the production process and the FMS area in particular. 
Supervisors and Operators saw the technical department as exercising `micromanagement 
of work on the shop floor'. Supervisors openly referred to as `the heavy department' 
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reflecting its perceived over-control of production. This department was responsible for 
all functions related to the production process and had operated in a highly centralised 
manner. Areas such as quality control, maintenance, planning, as well as production were 
all micro-managed by the staff of the technical/ planning department. In Interviews with 
the engineers in the technical department the need avoid mistakes was given as the key 
reason for the tight control. In responding to questions on the Complexity of the FMS it 
was agreed that complexity was a factor. Supervisors and operators on the other hand did 
not see complexity as having an impact on their work. 
Another problem encountered at CMC, which could be viewed as a reaction by the 
supervisors to earlier perceptions of lack of control, was the perception by operators 
working in the newly created teams that team leaders `are doing more work' than anyone 
in the teams. This observation was particularly expressed in relation to work tasks 
associates with the FMS. 
Interviews with the production manager and operators confirmed this development in 
what could be viewed as a planning staff-supervisors-operators interaction triangle. The 
production manager referred to this problem as: 
`a tendency by the team leaders [supervisors] not to delegate work tasks'. 
As the team leaders (supervisors) also worked with other operators on the shop floor, 
they tended to do other team members' tasks. This was coupled with what could be 
interpreted as anxieties over the changes resulting from lean production. In follow up 
interviews with the two supervisors in the Mechanical Department, they confirmed that 
during the early stages of the lean production implementations and the firing of a number 
of colleagues, they were worried about their individual job prospects. The realisation of 
managerial plans to downsize and the fact that they did not see themselves as 
`indispensable' - particularly as the company was implementing the new lean production 
techniques, made them work harder. In later interviews, they reflected on this early 
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period and saw it as `chaotic'. As the company completed the restructuring, and through 
affirmations of job security from management and with a strong hint from the production 
manager for the team leaders to delegate more, the supervisors became more relaxed and 
delegated more work to the rest of the team members or operators. 
6.7.6 Outsourcing 
A key point which was viewed by the plant manager as contributing to CMC's success 
was a new focus on the `core competitive advantage' i. e. its manufacturing skills. 
Following the introduction of lean production and the reorganisation of the plant, 
management decided to outsource those functions that were deemed as lacking in added 
value to the company. Small parts production in particular was seen more costly than 
outsourcing thus it was subcontracted to external companies. The decision to outsource 
was made based on a `make or buy' matrix cost analysis. The analysis showed that many 
of the small parts produced at CMC could be bought from external supplier companies at 
much lower prices per part produced. The suppliers benefited from economies of scale 
and were able to produce high quality parts at a much lower price than CMC would be 
able to produce them. Reliability of supply was helped by the fact that more than one 
supplier for the parts existed and that the company was able to achieve good supplier 
relationship through the linkages with other sister companies in their group of companies. 
Additionally, the fact that CMC was located near a major transportation artery and that 
most of its supplier companies were within short driving distance made the decision to 
adopt JIT logistics a practical proposition. 
Another novel idea introduced in an attempt to ease the effects of the downsizing of the 
company (i. e. the layoff of workers), was to `farm out' the maintenance functions of the 
FMS and CNC machinery to an outside company in return for the contracting company 
hiring released CMC operators. The idea was taken seriously by the new maintenance 
company and a number of CMC operators were hired to work for this company. 
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6.8 Key Dimensions 
In this section, the interaction on the implementation of lean production to the FMS 
environment at CMC's Mechanical Department will be discussed based on the chosen 
dimension of Complexity, integration, regulation, and flexibility. 
6.8.1 Complexity 
With the skilled machinists and the relatively simple machining tasks required for the 
compressor housings, complexity of the FMS did not seem to be a key issue. The use of 
tools and fixtures as well as the programming of the FMS was viewed as `relatively 
standard' by the operators. In their view, once operators achieved familiarity with the 
system, the FMS operation became easier. Accordingly, no increases in complexity were 
detected in this case. Operation of the FMS by the skilled operators was `not so difficult' 
and tools and fixtures were seen as universal. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the two 
programmers who were retained from the technical / planning department and had been 
moved closer to shop floor, provided support to the production teams on the shop floor by 
checking the FMS and CNC programs. 
In early interviews with staff engineers in the Technical/planning department two of the 
respondent did agree that the complexity of the FMS was a factor in theirdecisions to 
keep a closer watch over the operation of the FMS. Yet in later interviews post the 
dismantling of the technical / planning department, responses to questions about the 
changes in the degree of complexity, there was general agreement that it remained 
relatively unchanged. 
6.8.2 Regulation 
With the full implementation of the lean production philosophy, the degree of autonomy 
of operators working through teams has been increased. This was reflected in operator 
responses to questions on the number of rules and procedures as `decreased' and the 
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degree of operator discretion as `significantly increased'. Subsequent discussions with the 
operators and team leader in the FMS area informed the following: 
Operators concurred that there has been a significant increase in their ability to do the 
work and their control over the production process as compared to the situation prior to 
the managerial change and the implementation of lean production. Similarly, with 
multiskilling and job rotation as well as the ability of the production teams to take 
corrective actions when necessary made it possible for CMC management to claim that 
the operators were `partners' and not merely employees. 
The operators are either LTS level or MTS level operators which means that the MTS 
level are capable of doing the programming of the machines from scratch while the LTS 
level are capable of doing changes to an existing program. About 50 per cent of the 
operators on the production floor can do program changes to the CNC and FMS. 
Between 20 to 30 per cent of the operators are capable of writing a totally new program 
from scratch. This is a relatively high ratio and is reflective of the Multiskilling approach 
adopted by CMC. 
The ability to program the machines including the FMS by the operators gave CMC an 
additional advantage in simplifying the steps it took from planning to programming to 
machining and corrections. Operators were given the freedom to do their own 
programming and accordingly increased their confidence in their skills. The 
programming was traditionally the role of the technical / planning department. However, 
with the dismantling of this department and the elimination of most its staff jobs, skilled 
operators were allowed to do the programming. Two of the original staff programmers 
are now working with production teams and providing help to the operators in checking 
their programmes, potential errors were significantly reduced. 
Nevertheless, as a result of this increased autonomy being granted to teams, some 
problems arose in the sequencing of jobs. However, the production manager developed a 
sequence and delivery time list for the teams in each area to follow. The operators had to 
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follow the sequence to maintain the delivery schedule. The sequence was also visible on 
a `planning board' which served as a reminder of the details of the production process. 
6.8.3 Integration 
Responses by operators to questions on changes to the interdependence of work flows 
and degree of interdependence between work stations as a result of the introduction of 
lean production did not point to any discernable trends. Responses by operators indicated 
that it `remained about the same'. Nevertheless, lean production was seen by most 
operators to have standardised the operation in the FMS area through a set of rules and 
measurements introduced in the reorganisation. 
Lean production team development had given the teams the freedom to decide on 
sequencing and delivery schedule. This resulted in sequencing and time delivery 
problems and confusion between departments. The production manager indicated that 
these problems were encountered in the as a result of the independence of the teams and 
existence of this problem was confirmed by the team leader and operators of the FMS. 
This process `was taken a step too far' according to the production manager and the 
department teams became `too independent and led to variances and confusion in the 
planning times'. As a result from these perceptions of team over independence put 
foreword primarily by the production and logistics staff, It was later decided to re- 
centralise the planning function for all departments by deciding on an end time for each 
team. Accordingly, the planning for the departments was re-centralised under the 
direction of the production manager. Now, working in teams with the aid of 
transparencies, each team's `end-time' is set for every department. The production 
manager looks at efficiencies `of the total rather than the old method of measuring 
efficiency for each team'. The guidelines according to the production manager where 
that: 
`... workers are given more autonomy but we make sure that they know their 
responsibilities and, in particular, delivery times' 
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6.8.4 Flexibility 
CMCs decision to adopted lean production was predicated on the expectation that the full 
adoption of lean production would make the company more flexible and increase its 
ability to respond to market demands at very short notice. In retrospect, The plant 
manager viewed the company as `having increased its overall flexiblity' through three 
key actions: 
1) Outsourcing of small parts production in what is referred to as non-core activities (i. e. 
those that are not critical to the competitive advantage of the company). 
2) Multiskilling of operators. The company opted for having a core multi-skilled, flexible 
workforce whose skill made it possible to adopt new systems and do changes to the 
production process without worrying about the ability of the operators to handle these 
new changes. Having a knowledgeable workforce to have `significantly reduced the 
learning curve of new systems and new production changes'. In addition, it encouraged a 
closer relationship between the operators and the new technology vendors and 
maintenance companies thus increasing operator knowledge of the systems. 
3) Flexible Manufacturing Systems: in addition to the skilled workforce, having the right 
technological tools to implement desired production changes and the ability to machine 
different jobs through simple reprogramming. 
These three components were present at CMC and as a result, the production team was 
able to adopt the new compressor design without any major disruptions and CMC did not 
experience the traditional teething problems that were usually associated with 
manufacturing of a model. 
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6.9 Analysis and Discussion 
CIVIC compressors provided an example of a relatively small sized company (180 
employees) f%hich also implemented lean production to its manufacturing functions 
including the flexible manufacturing systems environment. The results of this interaction 
led to perceived notable increases in productivity and reductions in lead times. 
Additionally, lean production %%-as seen by both management and workers alike to have 
helped the company to become more flexible and responsive to market changes. 
A situation where the planning department traditionally argues with the production over 
who does the programming %%-as not present in this case. Traditional friction was 
eliminated and management truly, it seems, believed in the need to transfer power down 
to the shop floor through giving control and support to operators and developing a multi- 
skilled, autonomous work force. Because the size of the operation was relatively small, 
operators were skilled and FMS programming was not an issue. Even for the robot 
programming, the company opted to subcontract this job too. Lean production was 
viewed by the plant manager to be a success. Successes in increasing the plant 
productivity, introducing a new compressor to production, while keeping up with 
increased product demands, were all seen to be the result of the full-hearted adoption of 
the lean production philosophy. The CHIC adoption of lean production was not trouble 
free. Tensions did arise as a result of inadequate training. While the operators working in 
teams were given increased autonomy and control over the process, they were not 
adequately trained to manage the sequencing problems that was discussed earlier. The 
production manager recentralised the operation thus reducing what he saw as `has gone a 
step too far' i. e. team autonomy. 
Two important qualifications are immediately visible when analysing this company: 
1) Production volumes: a possible reason which contributed to the successful coupling 
of AMT and NWM and the resultant perceived success of CMC could be due to the 
relatively low volumes of production associated with the market for these types of 
large compressors. 
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2) Company size: the size of CMC was of manageable proportions and made it is easy 
to maintain a small company atmosphere and develop the necessary teamwork 
structures to a higher efficiency and advantage. At the same time its size made it 
possible to minimise the traditional demarcation antagonisms between departments 
such as those traditionally found between production and human resources as well as 
between programmers and shop floor operators. 
6.10 Conclusions and Summary 
The results from this company thus seem to indicate that the tensions predicted and found 
in the other larger manufacturing companies did not surface in this case. In the early stage 
of lean production implementation to the FMS area, some problems were encountered in 
the operation and the organisation of team production deliverables and scheduling of 
work. But as these problems were later addressed by the production manager to the 
satisfaction of both production staff and the teams, and the lean production system was 
seen to perform better. The general impression from the responses of managers and 
operators and production staff interviewed pointed to an apparent good fit in the 
application of the lean production to the flexible manufacturing systems environment 
where the lean production system was deployed. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CMN ENGINES MANUFACTURING COMPANY 
7.1 Introduction 
This is another case study in which the application of lean production to the FMS 
environment was investigated. CMN was chosen for three main reasons: firstly; this 
company claimed to be in tune with the `the best practice' approaches and has 
implemented a `customised' lean production system based on these perceived best 
practices. Secondly, this company has the reputation of being on the cutting edge of the 
technology in its field and has consistently adopted new production technologies 
including flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) making it an ideal candidate for this 
study having implemented the lean production system to the FMS environment. Thirdly, 
which we will discuss in more detail later, is that this company used a systematic and 
formalised approach to the implementation of the lean production system. The 
implementation of lean production followed a highly prescriptive model that was 
developed with the help of consultants and an organised bureaucracy using high levels of 
standardisation and regulation. 
Based on these three factors and the added advantage of access to the company that 
extended over a period of four years, CMN was well suited for the detailed study and 
analysis of the relationship and interaction at the shop floor level between lean 
production and the FMS. In the first section of this chapter, a general description of the 
company and its internal environment will be provided with a description of the 
production system used as well as the lean production approaches incorporated within 
that system. The second part will describe the interaction between the two and will 
present the points of tension identified in the research and the changes that have occurred 
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over the four year period which illustrated the complex nature of this interaction. Section 
three will provide a general analysis of the case as well as a detailed analysis of the stress 
points associated with the production system and the resultant managerial changes to the 
structure of the FMS and work organisation. 
7.2 The Company and its Internal Environment 
CMN Engines is a diesel engines manufacturing company. The company has formed a 
successful joint venture relationship with a Japanese engine manufacturer and another 
joint venture with a Scandinavian company giving CMN access to engine technology for 
the above 2200-cc engine range. In its three major plants in the United Kingdom, the 
company developed specially customised lean production system that introduced total 
quality management (TQM), Kaizen (continuous improvements), extensive training 
programs, and multiskilling to all areas of plant operations. 
The second section will discuss the operation and organisational structure of the Delta 
plant, one of three CMN plants in the UK, and the interaction and use of the FMS within 
the new production system. The third section will focus on the main questions of this 
thesis and investigate the stress points as they relate to the key dimensions of complexity, 
integration, regulation, and flexibility. 
7.2.1 The Delta Plant 
The Delta plant is located on a 25000 square ft. site which houses high power engine 
manufacturing plant as well as a training centre and a CMN marketing group. The plant 
produces two main types of engines (K-series and B-series) with high horse power and 
heavy-duty engines in the 19,30,38, and 50 litre ranges. These engines are used for 
power generation, mining, and marine propulsion and locomotive. About eighty percent 
of the engines are used for standby power generation for hospitals, factories and so on. 
There are 570 employees in the plant 260 of which are direct workers working in three 
shifts. The factory produces 14 engines per day at an average $1 million per day. 
191 
The company had entered into a joint venture with a Finnish engine manufacturer of very 
large engines (traditionally engines above 6000 c. c. used in cruisers and ships) to 
manufacture jointly a medium range engine (between 2200 c. c to 6000 c. c) to be used in 
large heavy construction and mining vehicles. Additionally, the company had introduced 
a new version of the 12 cylinder and 16 cylinder engines as well as a totally new engine 
series design (Q-series) with better emission standards, better fuel economy, and more 
efficient lubrication (with less oil leakage and lower oil changes). This new engine 
required a significant restructuring of the existing production environment as well as 
phasing out of some FMS stations and the introduction of new machinery and all the 
supporting technical, physical, organisational changes, and problems traditionally 
associated of new introductions. By May 1999, the date of the last visit to the Delta 
factory, the new Q-series engine was still in its phased introduction phase with less than 
75 Q type engines having been produced. 
In the next sections, the focus will centre on the application of the lean production system 
to the FMS environment in the Delta plant. 
7.3 The Plant Organisational Structure 
The company has a divisional; highly functionalised organisational structure as can be 
seen in Figure 7.1. The Delta plant structure consists of nine departments each with its 
own manager reporting to the plant manager: Manufacturing Engineering, Shop 
Operations, Materials, Quality, Finance, New Projects, Production engineering, Personnel 
& Industrial Relations, and Customer Service. 
The Engineering Manufacturing department is run by the Manager of Manufacturing 
Engineering who has three other managers reporting to him: The Advanced 
Manufacturing Manager, the Manufacturing Engineering Manager, and the Maintenance 
and Facilities Manager. 
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In turn each of these managers has the responsibility for the following: the advanced 
manufacturing manager is in charge of new engine project development (project 
engineer), capital plan (plan admin. (1), and plant layout and material handling (a 
facilities engineer). The manufacturing manager is responsible for four departments: 1) 
Manufacturing engineering, which includes one senior manufacturing engineer and two 
process engineers. 2) Industrial engineering which includes one senior industrial 
engineer, two industrial engineers, one senior manufacturing engineer, assembly/test, and 
one process engineer. 3) Kaizen, or continuous improvement department, has two 
specialists, one responsible for the internal continuous improvement programs, and the 
other is external, responsible for developing such programs with suppliers. 4) Tool 
engineering, responsible for tool management and control of the tool library and all the 
tools and their maintenance on the shop floor. This department is made up of one tool 
engineer, one tool control supervisor, one purchasing and four workers in the tool stores. 
The third manager reporting to the manager of manufacturing engineering, is the 
maintenance and facilities manager who is responsible for three maintenance 
departments: 1) The plant predictive maintenance (PPM) / total productive maintenance 
(TPM) department which is made up of 5 core skilled indirect employees including 
diagnostic technicians; 2) The maintenance/ breakdown department which supports plant 
maintenance for the three shifts; 3) Plant engineering department made up of one plant 
engineer. 
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7.4 The New Production system 
CMN introduced new organisational structures in all its plants and introduced a company 
wide customised program designed to take advantage of the lean production especially 
Total Quality Management (TQM) and Kaizen or `Continuous Improvement'. The new 
lean production system was designed to establish clear functional structures and develop 
a common operational language and objectives for all the CMN plants and at every level 
in the organisation. The outline of this plan was based on what was referred to as the 
`House of Quality' seen in figure 7.3 which focused on developing TQM and all the 
supporting systems and training necessary for its success. The system was customised to 
fit the objectives of each function and accordingly, was divided into a Marketing System 
(CMS), a Technical System (TMS), a (lean) Production System (CPS), and a Distribution 
System (CDS). Each of these individualised systems concentrated on developing the 
necessary skills and support mechanisms on the basis of `customer focus' and 
`Customer led Quality'. 
7.4.1 The CMN Lean Production System (CPS) 
The CMN lean production system (CPS) was introduced as the first step towards the 
development of `a truly synchronous manufacturing system' as the plant manger 
indicated. The fundamental approach for this system was stated in a company document 
to be the following: 
`Continuous improvement in our capability (people, equipment, facilities, systems, 
processes, supply base) to meet ever increasing customer expectations by eliminating 
waste and reducing variation. ' 
In order to achieve these objectives the company focused on developing mechanisms for 
adopting common practices `that bring the basic engine business principles alive' using a 
common approach to problem- solving and establish a system where employees 
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`consistently follow the same improvement process' as one internal company document 
indicated. CPS concentrated on applying TQM and developing a customer focus ethic in 
all aspects of shop floor operations. CPS was the first real large-scale program in which 
the management made clear its full commitment and support, financial and otherwise, to 
its full implementation and success. The thrust for this approach began in 1991 through a 
joint agreement with a Japanese partner who invested in CMN Engines and signed a joint 
agreement to share its `emissions control' technology in return for help in the 
development of Kaizen in all CMN plants. With the total support of senior management 
and a `no expense spared' attitude, experts from this Japanese partner visited CMN UK 
plants and established the first Kaizen teams. An initial agreement was reached with the 
unions that they give their consent to the changes associated with Kaizen and work 
organisation changes during the introduction period. Later, a more comprehensive deal 
was signed with the unions in which management guaranteed that no workers would be 
made redundant due to any of the work changes associated with these improvements. The 
general premise of CPS was based on what was referred to as the 'CPS Model' shown in 
Figure 7.4. This model encompassed general principles designed to facilitate achieving 
synchronised flows and shorter lead times. It focused on developing customer awareness, 
both internal and external; ensuring that 'quality is built in' at every stage in the process; 
and promoting people involvement' through trainirg, development of problem solving 
techniques, team building, continuous improvement, and an overall `commitment to 
functional excellence'. The translation of this model into the organisation began with the 
introduction of a top-down training program in which every employee in the 
organisation, including senior management, attended a training course. This training 
course was designed to introduce the new concepts and establish a springboard from 
which these principles could be adopted and further developed in the day to day operation 
of each function. 
On the shop floor, the critical element of this training was the focus on applying concepts 
with a high practicable quotient, primarily the ABC of Continuous Improvement. 
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7.4.2 Continuous Improvement (Kaizen) 
Kaizen is based on two Japanese words `Kai' which means `change' and `Zen' which 
means `good, for the better' and is commonly recognised as `continuous improvement'. 
The adoption of Kaizen began with the creation of the first Kaizen team through a two- 
week project with the supervision of the Japanese partner experts. This was followed by a 
three-week trip to Japan for the team in which they worked in the Japanese partier's 
engine factory learning and implementing the mechanisms of the Kaizen system. 
Supervisors were also sent on a one- week training course to the U. S. A Kaizen Institute. 
Differences emerged between the Japanese style and the USA Kaizen Institute style 
where adjustments to the Japanese approach were made to fit with the American and 
European working practices. The Japanese partner approach differed in that it had a `big 
picture focus' and was `more aggressive' with its focus on business needs, while the 
American institute approach focused on developing `small/ isolated' improvements, 
establishing `Islands of excellence', and making life easier for the operators. The two 
approaches were synthesised into the CMN lean production system (CPS) and the first 
Kaizen team project was started in January 1992. Three more teams were implemented 
in March and June of the same year with one of the teams focusing on standardising 
Kaizen changes. By 1993, a fifth team was added to focus on supporting supply base 
activities. Two supervisors from the original first Kaizen team were appointed as overall 
Kaizen supervisors reporting directly to the manufacturing manager (see Figure 7.2). 
The teams focused on achieving a synchronous flow on the block and assembly lines and 
used a 'TAKT TIME' (throughput time) concept to pace the flow, driven by customer 
demand and using levelled machining cycles, single piece flow, and minimum work in 
progress (WIP). The Kaizen process involved a four step approach: 1) Selecting the area 
which needs improvement and establishing improvement objectives; 2) Collecting and 
analysing data; 3) Implementing the improvement; and 4) Standardising the changes. 
Senior management selected areas for improvement and identified improvement 
objectives. The members of the Kaizen team then explained the objectives to operators 
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and support groups, and agreement on the changes was reached by all the people 
involved. 
As the Kaizen Engineer stated, data collection involves understanding the area `warts and 
all' and the use of videos to tape and document the process. A detailed activity chart is 
then developed based on the information from the video- tape. Afterwards, the data is 
analysed and waste is identified. An assessment of the options is then made and solutions 
are proposed. Once an agreement on the proposed changes is reached, an implementation 
plan is agreed upon and is then implemented. At the end of the process, the results of the 
improvements are compared with the original objectives and correctionsare made to any 
outstanding problems. The new method is then standardised and documented. A typical 
example of this Kaizen process can be seen near the FMS area in the Manifold line that 
consisted of a number of CNC machines. Poor utilisation in the Manifold line was 
recognised: Increased demand led to pressures on the batch production which had a two 
day minimum batch throughput dictated by long setup times which created shortages 
during peak times. The Manufacturing manager directed the Kaizen team to address these 
problems. Using the four step approach mentioned earlier, one of the team members 
video taped (in real-time) the operation in the manifold line and through the review 
process all operations were broken down into individual steps and registered on a 
`Standard Work Combination Sheet' (Manzoni chart) seen in Figure 7.5. 
By tracing operator movements, the team was able to develop a layout diagram seen in 
Figure 7.6a, which describes the machine layout before the Kaizen changes. It was clear 
from the diagram that the machines' layout was inefficient and clearly needed 
adjustment. 
From the analysis, it was determined that the machining time for the KV16 engine 
exhaust manifold was set at 207.3 minutes using three operators and a batch production 
of 9 per day. Waste was then identified in areas such as: 
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Figure 7.6: The old layout of the manifold line 
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Needing three set-ups on one machine causing batches; 
1) Lengthy set-up on another machine; 
2) Excessive operator waiting time; 
3) Different floor heights for different machines; 
4) Lack of flow in the machine layout; 
5) Operators lifting parts in/out of bins; 
6) Overall lack of control of the process. 
Once the waste and inefficiency in the process were highlighted, the Kaizen team met 
with the operators and ideas for changes were discussed and agreed upon. In this case, it 
was agreed that the cell layout should be changed to a `U' shape formation and moved to 
a new location smoothing component routing and reducing conveyance as can be seen in 
Figure 7.6b. 
Other changes included requests for engineering changes such as moving the position of 
two bolt holes on one of the machines to eliminate lengthy change over time; raising the 
floor to one common height around the new section; constructing an automatic dip tank 
for oiling components; and a chute system for automatic removal of swarf (machining 
leftovers). With the implementation of these improvements, the team was able to reduce 
the machining time from 207.3 minutes to 67.5 minutes and transform the line into a one- 
piece flow line production of 12 per day instead of 9 per day. The team also reduced the 
manpower needed for the line from three operators to a single operator. Figure 7.6c 
shows the improvements in the `Standard Times' before and after the implementation of 
Kaizen to the Manifold line. 
These types of operational improvements played a significant role in changing the 
attitudes towards CPS. They helped influence the acceptance of the new changes and as 
one of the supervisors indicated: ' ... We recognised after Kaizen that CPS is a serious 
new approach and that it is here to stay'. Overall, the impact of Kaizen was felt in every 
aspect of the plant operations and was summarised by the operations manager: 
204 
ý Y 
< 
J "'+ 
O: 
E-- 
Z) 
O 
ý- 
ý 
3: 
W 
Z 
ý 
< 
ý J 
O N 
O 
CV 
W 
Z 
J 
C] 
J 
0 
U- 
ZI 
_- . _! 
ý 
Iflj1nU 
BEVCFf F-, 
_ 
j 
- iC- 
J 
N 
h 
ý 
1. 'x"x 
r. u 
-- F- za 
t-- 
Z 
w 
F- ww_ 
Z O u) O 
CL º= 
Z 
Z 
w ý. ö cZ 
ý-w- cr 
:E (D Cn 
u. 
Q ti! 
wZ 
Z 
ý -a U- Aý ö°,. ý 
U- Q äwoý. -ý Z CD 
p_ T Z, " 
NZU 
Q Q0 
_ 
X" 
w 
205 
` CPS and especially Kaizen played a major role in changing peoples attitudes. We took 
advantage of neglected process opportunities and it [Kaizen] played a role in attaining 
increases in demand and it freed up people to fund other activities and gave our teams 
confidence to tackle supply base opportunities'. 
Training was a key element in ensuring that workers adopt the right attitude towards CPS. In 
the next section, we will look at the training process within CMN and its impact. 
7.4.3 Training 
The success of the new system depended primarily on developing the necessary skills and 
providing the right environment in which operators or team members could exercise these 
skills in a productive manner. A critical element for the success of CPS was the 
management's ability to establish a common framework for all employees where they 
could exercise these skills and use initiative to achieve desired results. At CMN, training 
played the key role in providing this much-needed common framework. All employees in 
the organisation attend training courses accounting for a minimum of four percent of the 
total man-hours (referred to as `time served'). These courses, organised in cross- 
functional groups, focused mainly on the principles of CPS and TQM including Kaizen, 
problem solving techniques, and the development and understanding of the new 
performance measures and trend charts relevant to the production process. On the shop 
floor, this common induction of supervisors, and operators into the principles of CPS also 
established a common vocabulary between management and operators. A key aspect of 
the CPS model was the development of Kaizen. Yet, in developing the Kaizen training, 
management opted for a selective approach. Instead of applying Kaizen training to all 
operators on the production floor, the approach was to pull selected operators from the 
shop floor - for an extended period of time, to become part of a dedicated Kaizen team. 
The selected operators were then given extensive training on all Kaizen techniques and 
methods. During the operator's tenure with the Kaizen team, the operator also maintained 
close contact with the line through the implementation of the Kaizen process and 
discussions with the other operators. 
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7.4.4 Teamwork 
Early in this study, CMN management was involved in discussions for the development 
of a company wide 'CPS Team Model'. The initiation of this project started with the 
circulation of a `Team transition document' written by a senior corporate vice president 
and was distributed to all senior and middle managers in all CMN factories. This was 
followed by a number of meetings and discussions within each of the CMN plants 
designed to solicit suggestions and criticisms for the proposed transformation into a new 
team structure. On the basis of a `team compliance to commitment' diagram given to the 
participants in these discussions, the current organisation of CMN production teams were 
assessed to be somewhere between the Involved and participative stages described in 
figure 7.7. Team members, through the CPS system implemented in the Delta plant were 
seen to have moved beyond the traditional structure as they had more responsibilities in 
such areas as quality, maintenance, and improvements on their specific job. 
In 1995, efforts at further team development were well under way. The production 
manager indicated that following the guidelines of lean production, it was the intention of 
the plant manager to increase the span of control of the operators. To help the production 
manager in this effort, a `Team Development Continuum' diagram was introduced by the 
human resources department to help in the evaluation of the teams and to point the 
production manager towards the necessary steps for increasing the span of control to 
operators. (figure 7.8). The CPS model and training offered the vehicle for the feasibility 
of this team improvement emphasis. Through CPS focus on five basic aspects: safety and 
housekeeping, quality, elimination of waste and cost improvements, Improving 
throughput, and the overall development of employees. 
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Figure 7.7: The Cps Team Model Compliance to Commitment 
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7.4.5 Total Quality System (TQS) 
At the core of CMN lean production system (CPS) is the introduction of a `Total Quality 
System (TQS)' based on the popular TQM approaches. TQS focused on continuously 
minimising waste and reducing variability in the production processes. New procedures 
were installed which formed the basis for a prevention oriented quality improvement 
effort. All CMN employees were expected to conduct their work in accordance with 
these new practices. 
A CMN Quality Policy statement, seen in Figure 7.9, was introduced and circulated and 
posted throughout the organisation, and was explained to employees as a part of the CPS 
training program. Measurement systems were introduced to ensure high product and 
process quality in all stages of product development. A `Right First Time' approach was 
a key part of this TQS philosophy. A `Baldridge Criteria' based on the Baldridge Quality 
Award standard was used as a benchmark for monitoring quality standards and 
improvements. These measurement systems also formed the basis for the review of 
current practices and the development of the continuous improvement (Kaizen) 
approaches (figure 7.9b). The implementation of the TQS as a part of the CPS system has 
had a dramatic effect on improving product quality. Since the introduction of this 
system, the number of defects per 100 blocks of the K series have been reduced from 
19.9 defects per 100 blocks to 5.0 defects per 100 blocks in less than four years. 
Similarly, a dramatic reduction in the number of warranty actions has also occurred. 
7.4.6 Multiskilling 
Historically, being a manufacturing company, CMN has concentrated on having skilled 
machinists capable of handling the various NC, CNC machinery which are at the heart of 
engine manufacturing. Machinist skill level or grade has followed the national UK 
standards for qualified machinists. A typical route for an operator starts through an 
apprentice system usually for four years. The introduction of CPS has helped focus 
attention on increasing the flexibility of these operators and directed attention on 
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Figure 7.8: - Team development Continuum 
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Quality Policy 
"THE QUALITY POLICY OF CAIN ENGINE COMPANY IS TO PROVIDE PRODUCT 
AND SERVICES WHICH CONSISTENTLY MEET OR EXCEED THE STANDARDS SEA' 
BY OUR CUSTOMERS, ON TIME AND AT THE LOWEST COST. " 
QUALITY IS A CUSTOMER DETERMINATION 
We first must determine who our Customers are, and what their needs are. In order to serve our 
external customers well we must identify our internal customers and fully meet their expectation. 
Meeting customer needs in a quality way goes beyond shipping CMN products without defects. 
It includes all aspects of work. i. e. the way we answer the phone. The quality of a type 
document, the correctness of a service publication and the accuracy of an engineering analysis. 
As quality improves, customer expectations rise. We must identify and deal with these new 
expectations better than our competitors. 
Each entity is responsible for establishing measurement systems which ensure that product and 
process quality is measured during development, manufacture, sale and customer use of the 
product. 
The cost of attaining the necessary customer oriented quality levels will be measured in order to 
monitor progress toward improvement. 
-TOTAL QUALITY- A WAY TO IMPROVE WORK- 
Each individual employee is responsible for the quality of his/her work. The Total Quality 
System procedures form the basis of our Prevention oriented Quality Improvement effort and all 
people are expected to product their work in accordance with these practices. 
Figure 7.9 - the Company Quality Policy 
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increasing not only the degree of skill of operators but also the variety of skills which are 
needed to facilitate the desired flexibility and effectiveness through CPS. An example of 
this increased focus can be seen in the skill progression of a typical Kaizen team leader: 
four years as a mechanical apprentice with first year in a training school and three years 
spent on CNC training as well as learning the operations in various areas of the plant. As 
part of the multiskilling training, he was initially assigned to the Assembly area where he 
learned all the basic fitting and fixturing techniques of engine assembly. Later, he was 
transferred to the machine shop area were he learned the practical skills of machining 
related functions, then he spent time in the maintenance department were he learned skills 
such as mechanical welding and machine maintenance. Then he was assigned to the tool 
room were he learned to set up and develop all needed fixtures and jigs. Afterwards, he 
became an operator on the FMS for a period of two and a half years where he learned all 
the necessary skills of the connecting rod FMS operation. Then he joined the Kaizen 
team and was given special Kaizen training and finally became a Kaizen team leader 
(three and a half years). This progression route involving multiskilling provided an 
example of CMNs' success in achieving desired operator flexibility were they are able to 
handle different tasks at different machines within the production system. 
7.4.7 Communication 
A key element of the corporate philosophy of CMN is establishing clear and direct 
communication lines both top-down as well as lateral communication between 
departments and groups. In any of the shop floor areas, one immediately noticed bulletin 
boards distributed almost in every working area as well as general meeting area across 
the plant. These boards were usually filled with various production and performance data 
and charts indicating the performance of the cell where the board was located. This 
performance information was regularly updated in addition to the posting of relevant 
company memos and notices. These bulletin boards were used mainly as a support for the 
more direct day-to-day communication. Concerning immediate as well as near term 
operational objectives, projects and production activities, group coordinator meetings 
were convened at 8 AM every day. On Fridays, manufacturing was halted between 8 and 
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9: 30 AM where the time was used by the groups to concentrate on communication issues 
and any operator or team problems and /or needed improvement activities. 
7.5 The Flexible Manufacturing System (FAMS) Environment 
The Delta plant specialises in the 12 and 16 cylinder water cooled, high speed, high horse 
power engines with an annual capacity of 8000 engines per annum. A number of engine 
sizes (K 19, K38, and K50) based on the same engine type (K series) are manufactured 
with up to eighty per cent commonality between them minimising down time and 
reducing parts inventories. The plant also produces B-series engines in the 3.9 litre and 
5.9 litre range. The use of the FMS plays an important role in the production of these 
high quality, fuel-efficient engines. 
On the production floor there are fifty machine tools including: five spindle milling 
machine tools, five discrete machine relay/logic programmable controllers, CNC 
machines such as Giddings and Lewis 2500 four axis CNC machine tool, and in the 
cylinder block manufacturing area, a three station Flexible Manufacturing System. In 
addition, a number of specialised machines as well as an ALFING ($4 million) 
specialised machine tool used for special simultaneous line boring of seven to nine bores 
at a time (depending on the engine block size). Other tooling activities in addition to the 
milling/drilling include tapping and finishing operations. One or two operators as a part 
of production area teams operate the majority of these machines. For example, in the 
finishing area there are 10 machine tools operated by five operators (Some of the older 
machines still operate using a computer floppy disk containing the operation program 
written for specific tooling jobs). 
The FMS's used are generally three station FMS with a rail guarding changer used for 
machining a variety of components such as gear housings, exhaust manifolds, and 
thermostat housings for the various diesel engine types. 
The new FMS stations for the new engine design include seven new KOLB FMS 
machines, Varimat machines, and two engine washing machines. A total of 39 people 
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work on these FMS stations working in 3 shifts, an average of one operator for every two 
machines (Operator starts the machining operation on one machine and begins engine 
setup and clamping on a second machine). Additionally, the production area contains 20 
OKUMA LC40 CNC machines some of which are dual machines and are operated by a 
single operator. 
7.5.2 Three Dimensional Measuring Machine 
This type of CNC is closely associated with the FMS. It is located in the FMS area. 
Called the Co-ordinate Measuring Machine it is used to measure tolerances of machined 
engine blocks and components. The machine is a high resolution, three-dimensional 
system. Its use in the FMS environment was said by the production engineers to have 
added another element of complexity of operation and programming to the regular duties 
of the FMS operators. Such a machine required special training in addition to the need for 
proficient programming knowledge. 
7.6 CMN Human Resources Policies 
The implementation of CPS depended on the development of coherent human resources 
policies and practices. CMN management has clearly understood the need to develop 
programs that are designed to affect acceptance and cooperation from all CMN 
employees. In one of the documents used for CPS training courses, the Human Resource 
view was summarised in five points: people are our greatest asset 1) can appreciate in 
value; 2) source of all improvement ideas; 3) can/must be trusted; 4) best when people 
work together as teams; 5) need to be motivated and recognised. These general 
statements provided the guidelines for developing human resource policies that were 
meant to help facilitate the introduction and application of CPS to all levels of the 
organisation. 
The technique used for implementing these human resource guidelines focused on 
encouraging the adoption of common practices that- as the human resources manager 
stated, would: 
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`bring the basic engine business principles alive through the development of operator 
skills based on a common approach to problem solving and consistently following the 
same improvement process. ' 
The effort to harmonise the thinking of the CMN employees to CPS started with a 
detailed employee survey which was conducted by an external consultant. This survey, 
inter alia, contained an employee attitude survey whose results were used to redesign 
some of the work aspects on the shop floor. This survey has also helped managers to have 
a clearer understanding of the needs and demands of employees. 
Another human resources related input of CPS was the use of a performance benchmark 
system based on a percentage point system in which pay incentives (increment pay) are 
used on the basis of a special performance percentage point system. Also, a new CPE: 
recognition system for 'CPS Excellence' was also introduced to provide further incentive 
to maximise the potential of CPS. 
A reduction in the number of job grades was another CPS related change. This reduction 
was possible only through extensive negotiations and finally an agreement with the 
unions. A change in the payment system to reflect reward for new skill acquisition was 
also introduced. 
7.7 Analysis of the CMN lean production system 
Through interviews with the various actors in the manufacturing organisation 
(manufacturing engineers, production managers, production staff, supervisors or team 
leaders, and shop floor operators) and review of the progress over time of the CPS 
system, it was possible to record first hand the transformations and changes in the 
production environment. 
It is clear from the previous sections that this company has adopted the lean production 
system throughout the organisation including the FMS production areas. Accordingly, it 
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is an ideal case to investigate the points of tension in the relationship between the CPS 
lean production system and its application to the FMS system. 
In the rest of this chapter, I will focus on the Flexible Manufacturing Systems 
environment and will further analyse the interaction with the CPS production system. 
7.7.1 The CMN lean production system (CPS): rhetoric versus reality 
With the benefit of hindsight, the decision by CMN management to adopt CPS could be 
seen as a methodical departure from earlier organisational systems. This system was not a 
`flavour of the month' approach that characterised many companies in the same situation. 
Four years after its introduction CPS remains the core organising concept of the company 
and its original language and buzzwords were still being used. Yet, over this four years 
period, CPS has undergone many changes and transformations. These changes were a 
result of the dynamic and complex interactions between management, production staff 
and shop floor personnel. These changes were also the result of tensions between the 
organisational arrangements being practised on the shop floor and the demands of the 
flexible manufacturing system. 
Based on responses to interview questions by managers, production staff, supervisors, 
and operators, many of the original revolutionary ideas of CPS have been watered down 
and in some cases discarded completely. Early in this study, tensions on the shop floor 
were beginning to emerge fuelled by increased pressures on operators as a result of the 
new measures associated with CPS as well as the increases in production volumes. Points 
of stress were detected in the FMS environment which appeared to be caused in part by 
conflicting messages being sent to the operators through the application of CPS to the 
FMS. 
7.7.2 Tensions and Stresses in the CPS System 
As mentioned earlier, at the beginning of this study in 1995, managers were clearly 
excited by the positive impact CPS had on CMN in general and CPS success in 
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increasing productivity on the shop floor. But, over time, as the impact of the initial 
improvements began to plateau, tensions began to emerge. 
By the second year, judging from responses and statements from different levels in the 
organisation, the earlier bright picture of CPS seemed to dissipate and the attitudes of 
operators, supervisor and even mid level managers towards CPS had shifted to the 
negative. 
Many of the operators felt a shift from what they were originally informed about the 
benefits of CPS. There were increased pressures, increased workloads as well as 
increased control by the production manager and production staff on the basis of the new 
CPS measures particularly Kaizen. 
In the manufacturing engineering department, the concern revolved around the degree of 
control over production. The manufacturing engineers (or process engineers as they are 
sometimes called) felt that operator and operator autonomy particularly in the FMS could 
negatively impact production operations. Manufacturing engineering saw that these teams 
were `wasting precious time in group meetings' that did not necessarily lead to concrete 
results. In interviews particularly with production engineers, there were strong feelings 
on the issue of operator FMS programming skills. These engineers clearly felt that the 
programming function should remain with the manufacturing/process engineers and that 
operators should not be allowed to tamper with FMS programming. Even though the 
operators or team members were recognised by the manufacturing engineers as skilled 
and certainly capable of operating the FMS, the view was that there was an increased risk 
of `costly mistakes' that could jeopardise the FMS and the overall production schedule. 
These tensions relating to the practice of CPS and the resultant transformations and 
pressures on the shop floor continued to grow. Dissatisfaction with the direction of CPS 
became more vocal from operators as well as supervisors. Eventually, management 
restructured the CPS and suspended many of the original progressive measures 
particularly the teamwork structures in the FMS areas. 
218 
What were the reasons for this change and to what extent were these tensions the cause 
of the suspension of the team structures and the return to the approaches traditionally 
practised by production and manufacturing engineering? In the next section, I will go 
over the early stages of the development of CPS and the tensions that emerged and will 
focus on the key dimensions of regulation, and complexity, as the key actors in this 
process. 
7.7.3 Implementation of CPS and Increased Pressures on Operators 
With the implementation of CPS pressures on the operators increased and although CPS 
subscribed to multiskilling of operators - typically increasing their span of control over 
the production process, operators felt less rather than more autonomous and saw tighter 
control by production management and manufacturing engineering over the production 
process in their areas. 
Although operators subscribed to the management line on the advantages of CPS and 
Kaizen, they did feel that there was a significant increase in the number of procedures 
and rules associated with the operators individual work areas. Because of CPS, 
everything was measured, charted, and continuously examined. Any weaknesses in the 
production area were now clearly visible and as work increased, operators were 
constantly trying to solve these problems and follow up on the newer problems as they 
emerged. 
Initially, operators felt that with the team changes with CPS that they have gained more 
independence and control over the production process particularly in the FMS areas. 
When the FMS operators were questioned about their independence at the beginning 
stage of the implementation of CPS, the immediate response by most of the operators was 
that `yes they felt increased independence'. Yet, probed further by the questionnaire into 
their daily procedures and routines, they indicated that paper work had increased and that 
there were more charts, tables, performance measures, and reports to be written on the 
status of the FMS and production. 
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What emerged was a complex dynamic of interaction processes between management, 
staff, and operators which appear to be driven in part by the FMS technology and the lean 
production approaches. The responses to the interview questions did not give any clear 
cut answers or agreement by the parties to the question of increased control. Yes, the 
operators are operating under a new regime giving them more tasks and multiskilling as a 
team, but it is also true that the input of the production manager and manufacturing 
engineering staff on the FMS has also reduced the room for autonomy by the operators. 
Nevertheless, The responses of the operators themselves were mixed. Initial responses 
invariably followed the `management line' of tremendous improvements and increased 
responsibility but probed further and as the interviewee got more comfortable with the 
discussion more independent views began to emerge and in a few cases resentments over 
the changes emerged particularly by older, more experienced operators. 
Although the workers had more to do, many did not feel that they had increased their 
independence since the introduction of CPS. The perception was that management 
increased rather than decreased its control over the production process as managers kept a 
close watch over the process and the operation of teams through the various measures 
implemented within CPS. Consequently, operators felt the pressure to deliver as well as 
to keep up with these new changes incorporated through CPS and the performance 
analysis criteria. When the production manager was questioned about the improvements 
resulting from CPS he replied: 
' 
... plenty of improvements, with CPS there is more information available. I know what is 
happening at the floor every step of the way... which machines are performing and which 
are not, I know if a cell is having problems or not and through all the charts and 
statistics I have a continuously updated picture of the situation' 
The use of CPS in the FMS area extended management control by providing faster and 
more precise knowledge of what is happening on the shop floor all the time. CPS also 
provided the mechanism for clarifying what was expected from every level at the shop 
floor by adding a strict measuring criterion for the performance of the various tasks. 
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A number of reasons were given by managers who corroborated this impression: They 
pointed that, among other reasons, that the complexity of the system and the large 
number of product and specification matrix of changes as possible causes for the strict 
criteria and rules imposed on the FMS team. But, the most noteworthy were comments by 
manufacturing engineering manger who cited fear of damaging expensive equipment as a 
reason for tighter control. This comment had been heard on the shop floor making 
operators feel less rather than more independent. When questioned about the meaning of 
`mistakes', one manager's reply was: 
`Take the 3D measuring machine, it is the most sophisticated technology available and 
we bought one. This is a very expensive machine and I can't afford to have the operators 
playing with it. That is why I have left the job to the process engineers. One mistake in 
the calibration would take a long time to fix and would cause costly delays. ' 
Thus, from the perspective of the operator on the shop floor, the new changes resulting 
from CPS led to misapprehensions. In certain instances, the interaction with CPS was 
exasperated by failed attempts to increase capacity by the FMS team. This was due to the 
presence of bottlenecks based on a limited tack-time of two hours (available 
hours/number of units). 
In section 7.4.2, We have seen the high regard expressed by managers for the use of 
videotape in the Kaizen process. Although, on the surface, this seemed to be acceptable 
to the operators, in reality, many operators felt ill at ease with what they viewed as an 
`intrusive' process. A number of operators in the FMS expressed their dissatisfaction 
with this part of the Kaizen procedures and the practice of `choosing and withdrawing an 
operator ' from the FMS area for Kaizen training. Operators did not like the idea of 
pulling a fellow operator off the line to work at a comfortable desk job with the Kaizen 
team. This selection approach was viewed as `elitist' giving the chosen operator an 
advantage over the others in the team in his new white-collar position. 
In general, the attitude towards Kaizen remained timid and it did not flourish as the 
original CPS plan stipulated. The CPS approach of transforming all production operators 
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into Kaizen implementers has not been successful. Kaizen trained operators did not 
follow up on what they have learned through the various Kaizen training initiatives. At 
the same time, management did not follow up and insist on full Kaizen implementation as 
originally planned. This, in my opinion, was a reflection of the tension in the relationship 
between operators and supervisors with production and manufacturing managers. 
Kaizen was another structure that was not adopted wholeheartedly at CMN and its failure 
did not cause any major concerns for management. Instead, the role of the Kaizen team 
was transformed - and Kaizen team members became specialists in `fire 
fighting' 
production line problems through the use of problem solving techniques. This process 
continued and led Kaizen to develop as a separate identity form on the shop floor. 
7.7.4 Managerial Control versus Employee Empowerment 
The response to CPS and its implementation on the shop floor followed the familiar 
managerial control / workers empowerment dichotomy. Although CPS intended to 
increase worker empowerment through the adoption of the teambased structures, at the 
same time, it introduced a new regimentation and discipline that scrutinised every aspect 
within the production process. At the FMS, the new production system added another 
layer of control to the existing extensive set of rules and regulations. This mix of a new 
production system, increased complexity, and increased regulation led to increased 
tensions on the shop floor between management and operators. 
The new production system with its lean production principles led to a series of employee 
reactions over time. Reaction ranged from initial enthusiasm over the introduction of new 
work organisation measures with visible improvements to the production system, to 
passive acceptance of the new changes, to dissatisfaction with particular aspects of CPS. 
Once CPS was fully implemented, there were aspects within it that significantly affected 
the traditional roles of operators, supervisors, and even managers. In this case, operators 
on the shop floor went through an early period of independence through the 
implementation of team structures and multiskilling efforts. Yet, when it came to the 
manufacturing / process engineering staff, they viewed this increased independence as 
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counterproductive. They consistently lobbied for stricter control and regulation over team 
operations. 
One of the lean production ideas introduced through CPS was the development of 
participative team structures where operator teams assumed new responsibilities such as 
internal coordination, and some administrative responsibilities. A key CPS related effort 
was an attempt to transform the role of supervisors into Coordinators -which is one of the 
key roles of supervisors- through a job title change to `Business Coordinator' (BC). This 
novel participative team format where the business coordinator (supervisor) co-ordinates 
operator activities which assumed specific individual responsibilities was short lived. 
Tensions emerged between operators and engineering staff relating to the role of these 
teams and their span of control. At the FMS, the skilled workers were now doing 
programming functions on the CNC machines as well as the FMS. 
Many engineers viewed these changes as giving away too much control to the teams and 
that this type of structure would affect productivity. This attitude towards teams was 
prevalent between the manufacturing/ process engineers whose arguments were anchored 
in the traditional mass production view of the production system. 
7.7.5 Corporate Transformations: macro level changes and CPS 
While mid level managers continued to fine tune and deal with CPS related issues on the 
shop floor, corporate changes on the macro level had a dramatic impact on the 
manufacturing environment and work organisation within the company. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, most of the macro level corporate changes in 
manufacturing companies revolved around strategic, existential issues related to 
competition, mergers, market share, redundancies, and in extreme cases factory closures 
and bankruptcy. These macro level events tended to have severe consequences on the 
shop floor level. Issues such as, for example, incremental quality improvements and other 
production related concerns lost their significance when the company as a whole faced a 
crisis. As managers, supervisors, and operators worried about their livelihood, lean 
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production system and any micro level compatibility or incompatibility issues relating to 
the use of FMS, drastically lost their importance as the organisation as a whole became 
entranced with the dramatic transformations that befell it. 
In the case of CMN, these macro level transformations were of the positive kind. CMN 
had entered into a joint venture partnership with a northern European engine 
manufacturer with the objective of developing a new type of engine (Q Engine) for the 
medium to large engine market (2200 to 6000 cc range). This new partnership resulted in 
a $100 million investment in capital expenditure and manufacturing machinery for the 
new Q engine at the Delta plant. 
The addition of a new manufacturing area for the Q engine while at the same time 
maintaining the production schedules of the k12 and k16 engines also significantly 
increased the complexity of the plant operation and led to increased demands on 
engineering staff as well as for employees on the shop floor, particularly operators in the 
CNC and FMS production areas. This new development had a dramatic effect on the 
overall work organisation of the factory and acted as a catalyst that brought the tensions 
concerning the implementation of CPS in the FMS area in particular to their climax. 
In the flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) area under study, a decision was made by 
management to stream line production and `outsource' the majority of the non core 
elements of the 4000 parts that were traditionally manufactured at CMN. Thus was done 
by subcontracting these parts to outside vendors at more competitive prices. CMN was 
able to focus the manufacturing process on its core block manufacturing. Many of the 
4000 parts which were totally machined and made at Delta were available at a lower cost 
through external suppliers. This outsourcing helped management to take the dramatic 
decision to phase out the MAKINO FMS area and the powerful FMS team was 
disbanded and its members were placed on other CNC's and FMS machining centres. 
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7.7.6 Suspension of Production Teams 
In 1998, CMN management, driven in part by the opinions of the manufacturing 
engineers, opted to limit team operations at the FMS. The company decided to change its 
policy on teams citing the following reasons: the complex nature of the new engine 
introduction process and the need to focus attention on the core issues of new engine 
production and the installation of new CNC and FMS machinery while at the same time 
dealing with increased production demands of the K series engines. 
In effect, the team structure as the corner stone of CPS was practically reversed. Teams 
were practically suspended as their role was relegated to smaller tasks with very specific 
objectives and performance measures. 
The production management as well as the manufacturing engineers viewed CPS 
teamwork operation at this stage of new product introduction as ineffective and Kaizen 
viewed improvements to be a luxury at this stage. Instead, they emphasised that the 
operators (still being referred to as teams) should focus on new systems and 
manufacturing machinery introductions. 
Teams could no longer operate within the ` same environment ' of the FMS. Their micro 
level improvements were overshadowed by macro level changes to the production 
including layout, introduction of new machinery, the phaseout of old machines and 
finally the total dissolution of the FMS unit 
The suspension of teams was presented to the operators as an interim measure to focus all 
efforts on the problems associated with new engine introduction and in order to handle 
the complex `teething problems' associated with creating a new production and assembly 
structures for the new engine. 
This suspension of teams reflected the managerial view that the team operation is mainly 
for Kaizen or continuous improvements in the team cell areas and not for the problems 
relating to new machinery introductions and the numerous problems associated with new 
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vendors, new programming, new tolerances, and new, more complex machinery. As the 
manufacturing manager stated: 
'In a very short time we have seen a significant increase in the number of engine types 
produced, from two engines to fourteen engines. Now we are dealing with the new Q 
engine manufacturing set ups and I need the operators to focus on these problems ... when 
we solve these problems and everything gets back to normal, then we will restart the 
teams. ' 
The justification that teams will not be effective at this stage of new engine introduction 
was not very convincing to the operators. Nevertheless, it appears that the suspension of 
teams did not lead to dramatic outbursts or complaints for the team members. In fact, the 
operators simply accepted the return to the old formulas and worked accordingly. When 
questioned about this seeming lack of interest in the new changes and especially the 
disruption of the team operation, operators pointed to the increased workloads and 
increased pressures that were keeping them busy. 
The production manager reflected on the apparent acceptance of team structure 
suspension as a result of a new mode in the organisation as a whole. The implication for 
job security was such that it tempered operator response to the suspension of teams. The 
new investment of $100 million and the purchase of new CNC and FMS equipment while 
phasing out older equipment gave operators an increased sense of employment security. 
As operators saw the massive new investment in machinery and new product 
development, it made them feel more secure about the future of their jobs. 
Another reason that tempered the reaction to the suspension of teams was the phasing out 
of the old FMS and the introduction of new systems and machinery. This created an 
environment that was ripe for change. By creating this upheaval in the production system 
and moving people, machinery, and resources within the plant, operators accepted the 
suspension of teams and other changes were easier. 
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On a broader level, the general competitive environment, job security was no longer 
guaranteed. Unions no longer had the same clout and bargaining power as they used to 
have. In this environment, the disruption on the shop floor, even the dissolution of the 
teams was accepted and the management reverted to the traditional ways of management 
downsizing the lean production system to specific production related issues at the micro 
level of production. 
7.7.7 Reversal of Operator Programming Privileges 
The new developments and reorganisation of the shop floor was an opportunity for the 
manufacturing engineering department to reassert its control over the programming 
functions of the FMS. Initially, CPS extended management control over the production 
area through the set of performance measures that continually provided timely 
information on the status of production. The development of strict measuring criteria for 
the performance of the various tasks was a way to maintain control over the process and 
reduce the effects of operator autonomy particularly the programming functions of the 
FMS. 
But even these strict performance criteria were not enough to alleviate manufacturing 
engineering apprehension and the fear that this programming autonomy of operators 
would lead to a major mistake that could disrupt the FMS and have significant 
consequence for the production schedule. They argued that the complexity of the system 
and the large number of product specification matrix changes were reasons why the 
management should have kept all the programming functions with the manufacturing 
engineers and maintenance engineers only and not with the operators. 
The prediction of a potential mistake on the FMS eventually came true and a crash on one 
FMS, while machining an engine block did occur prior to the reorganisation of the 
production area. The exact cause of the crash could not be established. Was it an 
operation team member error? Or was it a machine error? The results were inconclusive, 
but the damage and disruption to production was enough to remove these programming 
`privileges' from the system. 
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With the new reorganisation of production, manufacturing engineering was able to revert 
all the programming to its process engineers. An `idiot proofing' mechanism was 
introduced with the computer program being locked from manufacturing engineering. 
Now operators could only program start and program setup latch and unlatch functions 
of the engine blocks. With the program being locked from manufacturing (process) 
engineering, only maintenance engineers and process engineers could now program or 
reprogram the FMS. 
What emerged in this interaction between the lean production approaches and the use of 
flexible manufacturing systems was that the old battle lines of worker autonomy versus 
managerial control were still being drawn. The traditional tension of control between 
management and workers were still present. Even though management had introduced a 
lean production system that embodied all the `in' concepts of operator autonomy, 
multiskilling, and teamwork, on the ground, the success or failure of these measures was 
dependent on the actors in the process. In this case, the coupling of lean production with 
he FMS did lead to initial productivity gains and success stories. But, as time passed, the 
underlying tension between operator autonomy and managerial control led to the reversal 
of many of the lean production system components. In spite of the rhetoric of CPS, it 
seems that management re-consolidated its control over the production floor using the 
new work reorganisation and the complex restructuring process on the shop floor as the 
reason for arresting teamwork and operator programming privileges. 
7.8 CPS on the Production Floor (Key Dimensions) 
In the early stages of CPS adoption, its impact on the shop floor productivity was 
dramatic. Strong corporate commitment and support for CPS's full implementation were 
the key to its early success. Supported by an organised bureaucracy, management used 
extensive training on every aspect of CPS and at all levels in the organisation as a way to 
achieve the widest possible support for CPS. The introduction plan which followed 
clearly prescribed policies and initiatives designed to orient all elements and resources of 
the factory towards the execution of CPS's specified objectives. 
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The written objectives and methods for achieving these objectives were clear enough, 
what was a mystery during the early visits to this company was the degree of acceptance 
and commitment of operators to those objectives. Was management successful in 
ensuring acceptance and compliance? To what extent did these changes constitute a true 
transformation on the part of CMN management? (From traditional organisational 
structure to the lean production organisation). Was this a paradigm shift on the part of 
CMN management embracing lean production system and discarding the traditional work 
organisation that was in use prior to CPS? 
In spite of the fact that CPS did usher in positive improvements in areas of quality and 
productivity, when it came to the issue of devolving power down to the lower echelons of 
the organisation, management was unwilling to let go. Faced with increased competitive 
challenges and increased production demands due to the introduction of a new engine 
class, the company reverted to its traditional ways of doing business and suspended many 
of the key elements of CPS that characterised the innovative content. 
As a result of these tensions on the shop floor, the aspects of CPS which caused these 
tensions and were viewed by management as `problematic' (in particular, those that 
devolved power to the shop floor) were suspended. Accordingly, the use of lean 
production system did not develop enough in this case to constitute a true paradigm shift. 
In fact, when the opportunity arose, it was management who reverted to the traditional 
work organisation structures sensing the tensions on the shop floor particularly in the 
FMS production areas. Even in the implementation process, the key drivers of CPS that 
called for increasing operators' autonomy as well developing teamwork, multiskilling, 
and Kaizen, were met with suspicion by operators due to increased pressures on operators 
and a tightening rather than a loosening of control over the production process, 
Viewed at the shop floor level, stresses in the existing relationships as a result of CPS 
were revealed. CPS implementation in the FMS production areas contained conflicting 
elements. As time passed, these tensions were resolved in a variety of ways: many of the 
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CPS initiatives were diminished and relegated to implementation in specific functions 
rather than across the organisation. Other elements of CPS were completely discarded. 
At the beginning of this study, I set out to investigate the existence of tensions in the 
application of lean production systems to the FMS environment. As I examined this 
company and followed the progress of the CPS system particularly in the flexible 
manufacturing systems area, inconsistencies were recognised. 
The key dimensions that impacted the role of CPS and led to the resultant 
inconsistencies in the FMS area were: the complexity at the FMS stations, the rules and 
regulations that were introduced as part of CPS and the high degree of integration and in 
the system. 
7.8.1 Complexity 
In this case, The complexity in the system, particularly at the FMS, was seen as a key 
factor that led to incompatibilities and tensions. The complexity was, in part, seen by 
operators and production staff to be a result of the inter-relatedness of workstations, 
material handling systems, and control systems. It revolved around the different 
interrelated elements in the system such as the machining, loading and unloading, 
operations control, and cleaning, materials handling for work pieces, and control system 
hardware and software. The large number of product and specification matrix changes 
including fixtures, pallets, pallet-changers, tool storage, tool change devices and 
programs required to operate and maintain the FMS at optimum capacity was a critical 
factor in increasing the complexity of the system. 
Over the four-year period of this study, of the twenty operators asked about the degree of 
complexity in the production system since the introduction of CPS. Fifteen operators 
responded that the system's complexity had `increased'. Reasons provided for the 
increase were primarily related to the increased pressure to improve productivity. 
Perceived increases in the number of rules and regulations were considered by the 
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operators as one of the factors that influenced the complexity of the system. A number of 
operators viewed the operation on the FMS as more complex because: 
`now we are measured every step of the way ... there are 
forms and strict rules that we 
need to follow even if we know a short cut'. 
Management seemed to be aware of this complaint and in an effort to reduce the 
complexity, a number of fail-safe systems were introduced such as a tool life and tool 
breakdown alarms which automatically alert the operator and temporarily halt the 
machining process. 
CPS provided management with a system to maintain a watchful eye on the FMS and to 
keep the complexity in check. In doing so, management ushered in new regulations and 
rules designed to minimise any disruptions and problems that could affect overall 
production schedules. Yet, operators viewed this increase in regulations and rules as 
adding an extra load on their work and it increased the tension on the shop floor as it 
significantly reduced slack time for the operators. Kaizen in particular was seen by three 
FMS operators from different shifts as 'a way to constantly increase our work loads'. 
Although these responses do not constitute a statistical sample to prove or disprove the 
increase in complexity, it provides a sense of the general feelings on the shop floor that 
the introduction of the lean production system complicated rather than simplified the 
work of operators. In management's view, the introduction of lean production system 
exemplified in the CPS production system was supposed to simplify the operation on the 
shop floor and eliminate waste and variation. It is precisely this constant effort to 
eliminate variation that did not bode well with the operators. The variation that 
management sought to eliminate was not limited to the quality of the machined parts but 
it also extended to the work organisation on the shop floor. Although the original 
message called for team work, multiskilling and increasing the autonomy of operators or 
team members, what emerged was a new system of bureaucratic control particularly at 
the FMS with its complexity as the key driver for this new form of bureaucratic control. 
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Even with this new form of control, the complexity on the shop floor in the flexible 
manufacturing areas was the key element used by manufacturing engineering to justify its 
objections to other aspects of CPS that called for increasing employee autonomy. The net 
effect was an increase rather than a lessening of management control over the production 
process through increasing management knowledge of the production status at every step 
in the production process, using the CPS measures and indicators introduced at every step 
of production as a tool to reduce rather than enlarge operator autonomy. 
7.8.2 Integration 
Responses to interview questions indicated the degree of integration in the FMS area has 
increased since the introduction of the CPS system. The operation of the FMS in the 
machining of K12 and K16 was perceived as highly integrated and schedules of the k12 
and k16 engines were complex. Increased demands on the production function in general 
and the FMS in particular also contributed to the engineering staff as well as shop floor 
operators feelings of an increased interdependence. In later visits Both operators and staff 
responded with `significantly increased' in reference to the degree of interdependence of 
work stations and changes as a result of the CPS implementation. The high degree of 
integration was also seen as a factor by operators and production staff of the inter- 
relatedness of workstations, material handling systems, and control systems. 
7.8.3 Regulation 
Regulation by FMS is defined as the influence the system exerts on the work of the 
operators or, in other words, the extent to which the operators work is regulated by the 
system, through rules and procedures incorporated in the system. At the FMS, the close 
supervision of manufacturing engineering (process engineers) and the strict criteria and 
rule imposed on the FMS team including the CPS measures, made operators feel less 
rather than more independent. Initially, CPS increased the span of control on operators 
through teamwork and multiskilling to improve the work area and increase efficiency 
through Kaizen. But as tensions grew between the conflicting demands of operators and 
manufacturing engineers, the degree of discretion the operators had was decreased rather 
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than enlarged as a result of CPS. By increasing the number of rules and regulations that 
govern the operation on the shop floor, manufacturing engineering was able to reassert its 
control over the FMS and eventually was successful in convincing management to do 
away with the team structure altogether. 
There was agreement between operators and supervisors that the number of rules in the 
FMS had increased since the introduction of CPS. CPS added new rules concerning 
computer programming, tool setting, inspection, maintenance, production scheduling 
orders, material flow, quality control, time sheets, etc. In addition, the paper work for 
operators increased. With CPS there were more forms to fillip, books that included 
highly descriptive methodologies of FMS operation were introduced on the shop floor 
with the production manager and manufacturing engineers playing the key role in 
introducing these new formats, rules and regulations. 
CPS introduced very perspective discrete practices with the view that these were 
`predicated on functional excellence'. New `standards for excellence' with mandatory 
measures and audits were introduced. For example, a time-based system which centrally 
established two change frequencies was introduced. The FMS prompted the operator for 
the next insert while the needed tools were delivered daily based on a set schedule. The 
FMS powers down for the tip to be changed. This was in contract to the original system 
were the team leader had the key to restart process. 
In general, CPS improved material flow through the factory which aimed to reduce lead 
times by shortening production routes and to eliminating waste. The underlying 
objectives of this model were achieving synchronised flows and shorter lead times. 
Regulation was viewed as a critical factor to ensure that the synchronised flows were 
maintained. 
The increase in regulation provided engineering management with a way to limit the 
autonomy of the FMS teams. As CPS called for increased operator autonomy and control 
over the process, manufacturing engineering viewed this aspect of CPS as detrimental to 
the production process and predicted that it would lead to crashes and disruptions in the 
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production schedule. The increase in the number of rules, according to the manufacturing 
engineering, was necessary to ensure that the complexity of the FMS system did not 
hinder the operator's ability to keep up with the production schedule. 
It was precisely this increase in the number of rules and regulations that contradicted the 
original view of CPS as giving operators or team members, as they were called increased 
responsibility and autonomy over their production area. This apparent contradiction in the 
original objectives of CPS and its actual application in the FMS area were not recognised 
by the Human Resources department. Instead, Human Resources continued to put 
forward the line of the productivity improvements and the lean production logic calling 
for increased autonomy and independence of operators. The results were an increase in 
the tensions on the shop floor where on the one hand where Human Resources focused on 
operator training and increased control for operators over the FMS. On the other hand, 
the production and manufacturing management were stressing the need for more and 
better rules for production in order to prevent crashes in the FMS as a result of the 
complexity associated with these systems. 
The freedom of operators to plan their work on the FMS was curtailed. Manufacturing 
engineering continued to limit the role of the operators and to pressure the production 
manager to limit the interference of operators in what was traditionally the role of process 
(manufacturing) engineers. 
As the demand for the R12 and K16 engines continued to grow and with the addition of a 
new engine family, the pressures on the production people increased significantly and 
manufacturing engineering was able to convince management to suspend the teamwork 
structures. The suspension of the teams was presented as a temporary measure which was 
necessary for the restructuring and the introduction of new FMS and CNC production 
machines used in the development of the new Q class of engine. 
The surprising fact was that operators have accepted the new changes and the suspension 
of teamwork as a fait accompli. This easy acceptance points to two issues: 1) that the 
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original team structure, which was in practice, was not viewed as effective by managers 
and was not thought of highly by the operators. 
One reason for the lack of enthusiasm for the teamwork component of CPS was the 
degree of increased regulation that accompanied the implementation of CPS. More rules 
and regulations, less autonomy and control for team members meant that these teams 
were not true teams and accordingly the suspension did not constitute loss of an acquired 
privilege. 
The second reason mentioned earlier, was the employees' worry about the future of their 
jobs. Realising the competitive external environment and the constant call by CPS to 
improve productivity and efficiency, operators worried about job security. Because of the 
change in circumstances, unions did not have the same leverage that they had had before. 
CMN management was able to convey to employees through CPS and various steps that 
management was serious about cost cutting and that top management was facing 
increased pressures from share holders to deliver on profitability. This fact was evident in 
the ability of operators to quote the price of CMN stock on the financial markets. The 
joint venture with another company and the infusion of $100 million investment in the 
company was a boost for CMN and it made workers feel more secure about the future of 
their jobs. This overriding fact seemed to have tempered operator objections to the new 
changes and made them accept a return to the bureaucratic, traditional control strategies 
that the company had exercised before CPS and, as it seems, also during CPS. 
Regulations and rules were the key instruments of managerial control and through these 
rules and regulations, manufacturing management was able to limit the degree of operator 
autonomy and freedom over the flexible manufacturing systems and maintain its overall 
control of the production area. 
7.8.4 Flexibility 
The importance of flexibility in the system was underscored by the production manager. 
The company placed considerable importance to its customers and the market demands 
for quitter, more efficient, environmentally friendly diesel engines . The flexibility of the 
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FMS was instrumental in helping the company keep up with the competition in the 
market place. Additionally, operator skill was also seen as an essential element in the 
flexibility equation. CPS with its focus on training of operators to be multi-skilled 
contributed to the development of CMN production flexibility. 
On the shop floor, Although the production manager and manufacturing view was that 
the company possessed both flexible technology and flexible operators, in the responses 
to interview questions concerning changes to flexibility as a result of the introduction of 
CPS, the general view was that it remained `about the same'. Nevertheless,. the flexibility 
was seen by some operators in the FMS area to be constrained by the degree of regulation 
associated with the CPS system. 
7.9 CPS Dilemma: Bureaucratic versus Organic Organisation 
The introduction of CPS was in keeping with the trend for lean production system 
encompassed in the new philosophy for the reorganisation of work through teamwork, 
multiskilling, and increased worker autonomy in addition to TQM, JIT, Kaizen and other 
lean production practices. 
Coupled with the FMS, the lean production system, although showed improvements in 
the initial investigation of the CPS practice in the FMS area, By the end of the four years 
period, it became obvious that CPS has not delivered on its initial promises. Differences 
emerged between the stated objectives and the actual practice on the shop floor. 
CPS introduced a mixture of both the bureaucratic and the organic structures, but this 
mixed organisation led to tensions. These tensions were detected by the production 
manager and production and manufacturing engineering staff. Managerial response to 
these tensions was to deviate from the stated objectives of the CPS philosophy and revert 
to the older structure of close monitoring and control as well as the dismantling of the 
team structure. The three key dimensions of complexity, regulation, and Integration in the 
FMS were seen by the manufacturing engineering staff to be factors in forcing the issue 
of reversal of autonomy and operator control and eventually led to the suspension of the 
236 
organic elements in CPS. By the end of the four years period of this study, teams were 
disbanded, management had asserted its control through the traditional structures and the 
bureaucratic culture that existed before CPS remained in place. 
7.10 Human Resources Department (The other side of CPS) 
The human resources department played the key role in creating the needed environment 
for the early success of CPS. Based on an overall corporate plan to introduce the new 
work organisation concepts to all the company's plants, the human resources department 
was given a strong mandate to develop the new work organisation structure on the shop 
floor in cooperation with production and other management staff. 
In discussions with the human resources manager and the training staff, it was clear that 
they were aware of the trends within the human resources management arena, and `buzz 
words' in the lean production system literature were often used by the human resources 
manager to describe the changes in the company. The fact that CMN is owned by an 
American company with better exposure to the popular management books on 
manufacturing excellence, quality, productivity and other lean production practices also 
contributed to this knowledge of lean production. 
Yet, this familiarity with the key concepts of lean production did not necessarily imply 
that they were truly applied to the production environment and if they were, not 
necessarily in a manner that fits with the original definitions. A key question addressed 
early in the study was the degree fit between this rhetoric on lean production and the 
reality of implementation on the shop floor. Was lean production truly being 
implemented? And if it was, was it successful? 
In the early stages, as the newly introduced CPS measures began to show appreciable 
improvements on the shop floor, the human resources department was able to get 
commitment from the production mangers, manufacturing engineers, and unions on the 
new changes. This, off course, was possible only through the strong initial corporate 
commitment to the success of these changes. 
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The early message from the HR department to the shop floor and the company in general 
was full of hope and great expectations of the revolutionary transformations to be ushered 
in by CPS. This message was relayed to the company at large and to the production area 
in particular through the 'CPS Model' (seen in figure 7.4). This model focused an 
developing customer awareness, both internal and external by ensuring that `quality is 
built in, at every stage in the process; and promoting people involvement' through 
training, development of problem solving techniques, team building, continuous 
improvement, and an overall `commitment to functional excellence'. The human 
resources department introduced a top-down training program in which every employee 
in the organisation, including senior management, attended a training course. This 
training course was designed to familiarise employees with the new concepts and 
establish a springboard from which these principles could be adopted and further 
developed in the day to day operation of each function. 
But, even as the CPS system was being implemented, inconsistencies in the messages 
relating to CPS began to appear. The human resources department pushing for more 
autonomy while the production and manufacturing engineers using the CPS system to 
exercise more control over the process. Although CPS introduced lean production 
approaches such as teamwork, multiskilling, and Kaizen, its role and its name clearly 
indicated that is the domain of production/ manufacturing. Accordingly it was the 
production manager and engineering managers who had the ultimate control over the 
process. The responsibility of the human resources department, as they saw it, was to 
coordinate training schedules, personnel policies, and relations with the unions. 
What CPS introduced is a demarcation of the traditional relationship between the human 
resources and the production and engineering staff. The fact that employee training was 
developed through the human resources department gave it an opportunity to influence 
production workers' attitudes and attempt to develop the lean production concepts. 
The human resources input into the training process was to introduce the new concepts 
and encourage the development of teamwork, multiskilling and the use of continuous 
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improvement as the drivers of the CPS philosophy. Increasing the autonomy of operators 
and empowering the production workers to take charge of the production process was 
mentioned by the human resources manager and training staff as an `essential ingredient 
for the true success of the CPS system'. 
The final objective is to transform the company into a `team based organisation' and 
increase the independence of these teams. This view on team work was supported by 
senior management and gave impetus for the acquiescence of the production and 
manufacturing staff for the new changes and the development of 'CPS Team Model' 
which stated the objective of developing team independence. This focus on team 
development was to evaluate the necessary steps for increasing the span of operator 
control through what was termed 'A Team Development Continuum'. 
Initially, the human resources department was able to develop the team work structures to 
be situated between the involved and participative stages. Team members were made to 
assume more responsibilities in such areas as quality, maintenance, and improvements on 
their specific job. An attempt was made to transform the role of the supervisor into a 
`coordinator' coordinating the activities of team members. Additionally, to further 
expand the abilities of the teams, job rotation was also introduced: 
The CPS model and training offered the vehicle for the feasibility of this team 
improvement emphasis, through CPS focus on five basic aspects: Safety and 
housekeeping, quality, elimination of waste and cost improvements, improving 
throughput, and the overall development of employees. 
In the Flexible Manufacturing Systems area, the team work approaches began to show 
improvements in the operation of the FMS. The lean production structure put forward by CPS 
made the FMS operate smoothly with the multi-skilled operators working as a team. Yet at the 
same time, there was an increase in the rules and regulations governing the operation of the 
FMS with complexity of the system being given by the manufacturing engineers as a reason 
for the need to increase the rules and regulations called for in CPS. Thus, the situation on the 
FMS was becoming a testing ground for two competing practices: on the one hand, the human 
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resources department called for increased autonomy and independence of operators, while, on 
the other, the production / manufacturing engineers tightened their control of the FMS by 
increasing the number of rules and regulations. These two competing objectives could be seen 
as key element in the tensions that developed in the FMS area. The production manager and 
manufacturing engineers saw the need to increase control over the process and CPS was the 
ideal vehicle in that it developed the mechanisms for measuring and evaluating the progress at 
every step of the production system. 
The coupling of these human resources objectives with the production and manufacturing 
engineering objectives led to tensions on the FMS, and it seemed that manufacturing engineers 
did not fully accept the team approaches and viewed them as inefficient leading operators 
wasting time and not taking the necessary decisions. 
These differing objectives and messages left their mark on the operators of the FMS. In 
the early days of CPS implementation, the FMS team was able to develop into the most 
independent team in production. Manufacturing engineers viewed this independence as a 
risk and predicted that it would lead to damaging the FMS station as a result of faulty 
programming or interference from the operators in the tolerance settings of the blocks. 
The human resources objective with the message of increased autonomy was 
counteracted by the production / manufacturing engineering staff with a call for increased 
control and centralisation over the FMS in particular and the production floor in general. 
Both sides used CPS as the basis for the desired changes and in spite of top management 
efforts at developing coordination and soliciting commitment to the new changes, each 
function acted in the traditional way of trying to maintain its control over the process and 
use the available tools within the new system to advance their objectives. 
Based on the interviews, observation of the company these tensions were seen to have 
eventually hindered the improvements and productivity gains expected from CPS when it 
was introduced. Although improvements were seen as `good', the perceived initial 
potential of CPS was far greater. Had it not been for the dissatisfaction in employee 
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attitude towards these contradictory inputs from production and human resources, CPS 
might have achieved far more productivity gains. 
Increased bureaucracy and regulations while trying to introduce teamwork and self 
governance eventually failed and the company opted to do away with the team structure 
all together. 
7.11 Summary and Conclusions 
The key point in this chapter has been that while the initial implementation of these lean 
production strategies led to recognisable achievements in productivity, further 
developments and application of certain parts of the lean production system such as 
increasing employee autonomy and control, faced acceptance problems particularly in the 
flexible manufacturing systems area where the interaction between the demands of the 
FMS and those of the lean production were seen to be in conflict. 
The highly standardised and formalised modes of operation, as they are used concurrently 
with attempts to implement the lean production system in full, point to an incongruity in 
the interaction between lean production and its application to the FMS environment. High 
levels of regulation control coupled with the aspects of lean production that called for 
increasing employee autonomy and control over the production process, sent clashing 
messages to the operators on the shop floor. This, in turn, were perceived to have led to 
less than the optimal productivity and flexibility gains that were expected as a result of 
CPS. These apparently conflicting messages had an impact on the system. 
The human resources department wholeheartedly adopted the lean production steps 
calling for devolving power to the shop floor. CPS was supposed to be the tool for this 
transformation in the structure of the company from a traditional to a progressive 
organisation in tune with all the modem and advanced practices of work organisation. 
Yet, manufacturing engineering still viewed the relationship on the shop floor on 
traditional mass production terms. CPS ushered a new form of work organisation but it 
also increased the potential for better control of the manufacturing process. 
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Initially, manufacturing engineering did object to the changes and viewed operators as 
`they can be a party to the control process', However, on the FMS, manufacturing 
engineering saw the system as too complex to be left to operators and introduced `fail 
systems' adding alarms to minimise problems at the FMS. 
At the same time, they increased the rules and regulations governing the entire operation 
of the FMS in particular. These included a Kaizen team request for authorisation. While 
operators' freedom to do jobs on the FMS initially increased with CPS, the 
manufacturing department through extensive new rules and regulations reduced the 
degree of freedom of the operators to plan and execute their work. 
The lean production components which are commonly associated with worker 
empowerment and devolution of responsibility to the shop floor through team based 
organisation have, in this case, simultaneously increased centralisation and managerial 
control through increased surveillance and discipline through rules and regulations. 
Eventually, the human resources department was unable to continue with its strategy to 
devolve control to the operators and teams were suspended and the FMS team the most 
independent of the teams, were disbanded. With this suspension of teams, manufacturing 
engineering regained its control over the production process, although management 
professed that this suspension of teams was temporary pending the settling down of the 
production process due to the introduction of new production lines and manufacturing 
areas for the new engine design. Thus, the input to the company of a new engine line and 
the need restructure the factory gave management the excuse it needed to address the 
contradictions between CPS and FMS. The old FMS has been replaced, new engines 
were introduced, teams were abolished even though a manufacturing engineering 
manager claimed that they had been `refocused' rather than eliminated. 
The view of production management on the team experiment is that these teams lacked 
the necessary discipline for success and that the teams were driven by a culture that was 
less `hard nosed' and is cost reduction bottom line conscious. 
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At the macro level, pressures from shareholders and the need to improve productivity, cut 
costs, and improve profit margins led CMN to become ` hard nosed'. Awareness of this 
new fact permeated through out the company - in 1995 when a side question was 
directed to shop floor workers if they knew what the stock price of the company was- 
they did not. In 1999 when they were asked the same question -they knew what the 
stock price was. Although the responses were not tabulated, it was clear that shop floor 
employees knew the stock price and followed it as a gauge of the company's performance 
and stability. The new bottom line of management was shareholders equity. This idea 
was then permeated to the company workers as well as operators. 
This could be explained in part because of the rumours of take-overs when the stock price 
was down below the equity and asset level of the company which meant that the 
company could have been ripe for a take over. Although this has changed and the price 
level returned to its normal levels, the people in the company still followed the stock 
price. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis addressed the issue of the application of lean production systems to the 
flexible manufacturing systems environment. It explored the application of lean 
production to the FMS environment and investigated the existence of tensions between 
FMS and lean production in four manufacturing companies in Holland and the United 
Kingdom. As was indicated in the literature review, the original ideal vision of the 
combination of lean production and satisfied workers has been rejected by many 
researchers who examined changes in the quality of work life under lean production 
(Parker and Slaughter, 1988; Klien, 1989; Fucini and Fucini, 1990; Sewell and 
Wilkinson, 1992; Graham, 1993,1995; Babson, 1995; Delbridge, 1995, Landsbergis et 
al., 1996; Nishiyama and Johnson, 1997; Lewchuck and Robertson, 1997). Other 
researchers questioned the claims that lean production practices necessarily lead to high 
manufacturing gains. Researchers like Bennett Harrison (1997, p. 38) referred to this as 
the `dark side of flexible production' while others like Turnbull (1988, p. 18) observed the 
British experience in operating JIT and saw it as illustrating `both the degree off work 
intensification involved and the added stress that is endemic to the system'. Klien (1991) 
questioned the motives of employers who promise `autonomy' when what they really 
intend is for workers to deliver an unprecedented level of cooperation while Lowe et 
al. (1997) findings emphasised the importance of context, specific plant characteristics, 
and choice, for understanding the performance of manufacturing organisations. Lowe et 
al. rejected the notion that the work organisation and human resource policies associated 
with the lean production model represent a universal "best way" for achieving high 
manufacturing performance. 
This study aimed to explore the fit between lean production and its application to the 
flexible manufacturing systems areas in four manufacturing companies located in 
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Holland and the United Kingdom. The choice of the case study approach to study these 
four companies was in an attempt to further clarify the work organisation and human 
resources interactions and evaluate the context in which these interactions occur. 
The literature review in chapter two noted that a number of researchers identified 
discrepancies between the theory and actual results on the shop floor suggesting that the 
combination of lean production and the FMSs may be problematical and pointed to 
potential tensions or mismatches in the emergent new paradigm. The objective of this 
study was to try and elaborate on these interactions particularly in the FMS environment 
and to advance beyond the traditional survey approach typically associated with the study 
of the FMS. The decision to choose a multiple case study methodology was based in part 
on the desire to add comparative value through in depth cases while simultaneously 
engaging both the technical and organisational (social) arrangements side of the literature 
(See Harrison and Storey, 1996). 
Using the dimensions of complexity, integration, regulation and flexibility 
characteristically associated with the FMS (Boer, 1990,1991; Krabbendam, 1988; Boer 
and Krabbendam , 1991), these same measures were used 
in each of the four case studies 
as guideline for the exploration of the lean production interaction relationships in the 
FMS environment. 
The investigation of these four case companies revealed the existence of tension with 
consequences to the production system as a whole. The indication from the four major 
FMS user factories in Holland and the UK pointed to inconsistencies and tensions in the 
interaction between lean production and flexible manufacturing systems which resulted, 
in part, from one or more of the following conditions: 1) lack of true managerial 
commitment to the lean production philosophy; 2) the contradictory messages being sent 
to the FMS environment encouraging increased operator autonomy under lean production 
while at the same time increasing the degree of control and regulation over the 
environment; and 3) macro level pressures such as lack of job security or significantly 
increased production pressures. In the next section, I will analyse the results of the field 
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research and will summarise and present the general conclusions of the study including 
the academic implications, and will set the stage for possible future research in this area. 
8.2 Overview of the research 
8.3 Tensions in the implementation of lean production to the FMS Environment 
The marriage of advanced manufacturing technology and the new wave manufacturing 
including new human resource management strategies is certainly a new phenomenon 
and one which has followed a large body of research that pointed to the disappointing 
results of AMT implementation. While at any level of automation there was a striking 
differences between the least and most efficient plants (Womack et al., 1990) and that in 
many cases increasing automation lead to a decreases rather than an increases in plant 
flexibility (Upton, 1995), the high failure rate of technology implementation was mainly 
attributed to non technical, people related organisational causes (Rosenthal, 1984; Voss, 
1985; Jaikumar, 1986; New, 1986; Tarnfield and Smith, 1989; Bessant et al, 1990,1993). 
This realisation led to increased focus on ways to develop appropriate structural, 
organisational, human resources and personnel policies to achieve better results from the 
new manufacturing technologies (Wall et al, 1987; Campbell and Warner, 1992; Clark, 
1993; Storey, 1994; Harrison and Storey, 1996; McLoughlin and Clark 1994). The 
development and adoption of lean production seemed to offer companies a magic 
solution and the answer to their AMT problems. 
Most of the manufacturing companies that opted to adopt these lean production 
techniques tended to 'mix and match' between the various systems and organisational 
approaches and many hybrid systems were developed. Although these programs, 
systems, and structures carried widely varying labels, their core concepts, i. e. the basic 
organisational innovations were all based on key approaches such as JIT, TQM, 
teamwork, multiskilling, continuous improvement, and increased operator autonomy and 
empowerment. These, together, are recognised as the core elements of the lean 
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production and they were presented by the consultants as offering the magic pill for AMT 
success. 
In this study I set out to examine the interaction between the use of the lean production 
and FMS in four manufacturing companies in the truck, aircraft, diesel engines, and 
refrigeration compressors manufacturing areas. 
After the initial visit to these companies, criteria for inclusion or exclusion for each of 
these companies was developed. The choice of the companies was based on the adoption 
of lean production and FMSs and thus, restricts the generalisable nature of this research. 
Primarily as a result of being allowed access to these four manufacturing companies in 
the United Kingdom and Holland, I was able to investigate the nature of interaction 
between the lean production and the FMS on the shop floor. These four companies had 
adopted or were in the process of adopting lean production to the production floor where 
Flexible Manufacturing Systems were being used. 
All four companies had reported various degrees of productivity and flexibility gains as a 
result of the coupling between the two. Nevertheless, the productivity and flexibility 
gains derived through the implementation of lean production did not appear to be as 
extensive or far reaching as originally predicted by the implementers. 
The stresses found in the interaction between lean production in the FMS environment in 
three of the four cases do not support the far reaching claims of the emergence of `new 
technology paradigm' and the associated revolutionary change from the coupling of lean 
production and the FMS feature of advanced manufacturing technologies. 
Combining flexible production technologies with flexible work (i. e. the lean production) 
promised to usher in improved operational control, increased flexibility, and drastically 
reduced lead times. Proponents of this paradigm argued that only through the coupling 
between AMT and lean production would the full potential of AMT be realised and 
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translated into true productivity gains (see Bessant 1990; 1993, Clark, 1993, Adler and 
Cole 1993). 
This coupling or linkage between the FMS form of advanced manufacturing technology 
and lean production maximised the potential gains resulting from the use of advanced 
manufacturing technologies. Only through, inter alia, employees multiskilling, giving 
jobholders greater span of control (i. e. autonomy and discretion over the production 
machinery), and operating in teams will the new technology be able to achieve the 
optimum level of performance. 
The proponents of this new paradigm presented a rosy picture of the fit between lean 
production and the advanced manufacturing technology used. In this study, I looked at 
the practices that pointed to the `emergent paradigm' in the four chosen manufacturing 
companies and asked the question: might these practices contain internal contradictions? 
McLoughlin and Clark (1994) pointed to the potential failure of achieving the benefits of 
AMT because of managerial resistance to, inter alia, increasing employee autonomy. This 
study supports this observation and extends it to point to situations where managerial 
resistance is not visible and where lean production is implemented in a complex 
manufacturing environment. The coupling of lean production to the FMS did not achieve 
the desired productivity gains. 
This study investigated the relationship and coupling between lean production systems 
and the use of FMS in the four manufacturing companies. The result, that can be best 
determined in the complex dynamic that each of these companies was going through, was 
that indeed there were stresses and tensions in the existing relationships and that such 
tensions indicate the importance of looking at the context in the application of lean 
production in every case of implementation thus further questioning the universality of 
the `new paradigm'. 
In all the cases, the underlying and forceful change factor was often more existential. 
Macro-level issues relating to employment, redundancy, and the future survival of the 
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company were always at the forefront. Thus the traditional issues of power relationships 
and control over the process remained hostage to these Maslows' hierarchy of needs 
related issues. 
In the theoretical formulation at the conceptual level. The failure to achieve the optimum 
productivity gains in EBG Truck and CMN Engine where tensions were detected was 
deemed to be the result of inadequate managerial commitment to the full implementation 
of the Lean production in particular those aspect that called for increased employee 
autonomy and control over the production process. The results from the third company 
(Fokker Aircraft) where inconsistencies were detected but, due to the closure of the 
company were, could not be followed through, and thus were inconclusive. 
In the two cases of EBG Truck and CMN Engine, there was disappointment in the failure 
to achieve predicted productivity gains. The tensions detected were deemed to be the 
result of inadequate managerial commitment to the full implementation of the lean 
production in particular those aspects of lean production that called for increased 
employee autonomy and control over the production process. The results from the third 
company (Fokker Aircraft) where inconsistencies were detected, but, due to the closure 
of the company were, could not be followed through, and thus were inconclusive. The 
fourth company CMC compressors, appeared to have adopted lean production and 
achieved a better fit than the other three companies in this study. 
In CMN, the application of lean production to the FMS environment led to initial 
improvements and productivity gains in the manufacturing process. But later, because of 
the opposing messages between the human resources and the manufacturing engineering, 
inconsistencies in the relationship between the lean production and the Flexible 
Manufacturing Systems began to appear. These inconsistencies eventually appear to have 
contributed if not lead to the suspension of the team structures in the organisation (helped 
by macro level changes which forced the change in the structure). 
Although this company professed to implement the lean production, its approach to the 
implementation followed traditional mass production logic. The key actors in this process 
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who exercised the greatest influence were the production and manufacturing departments 
with the production managers, supervisors, and manufacturing engineers still clinging to 
maintain their control over the production process. 
8.4 The Key Dimensions 
8.4.1 Complexity 
The complexity dimension was seen to be a key factor in the interaction relationship 
between lean production and the flexible manufacturing area in two of the four 
manufacturing companies examined 
In EBG truck manufacturing company, at least two levels of complexity associated with 
the FMS operation were manifested. The first level involved tool management and tool 
kitting needed for the operation of the six FMS stations. This process is typically 
complex in the FMS operation, is this case, the operation is further complicated by the 
fact that at least two types of engines (an 8 litre and an 11 litre engines) and four types of 
engine heads were being machined at these stations. Operators had to go through a series 
of steps and operations which involved tool set-up and tool kitting, using an extensive 
tool library database. The second level of complexity involved the inter-relatedness 
between the elements of the six stations of the FMS and the machining operations 
preceding it. Coming from two different areas: one type of engine block coming directly 
to the FMS (referred to as the `block line'), and another type of engine block coming 
directly to the FMS from other areas. 
The increased complexity was seen in organising the timing and planning of the capacity 
for the four types of engine blocks. 
Another aspect of the complexity involved actual programming and operation of some of 
the machinery related to the FMS. An example can be seen in the operation of a newly 
introduced `Three-Dimensional Measuring Machine. This type of machine is a computer 
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numerical controlled (CNC) machine used in conjunction with the FMS primarily for 
testing tool tolerances. 
Based on the interview and questionnaire to the area manager and production and 
manufacturing engineers dealing with the FMS area, two different perceptions relating 
the complexity of the production technology emerged: 
While the both managers and operators viewed the technology as complex, a significant 
part of the complexity was seen by the operators in terms of the increase in the 
interrelatedness of the system and the increase in capacity of the FMS. The complexity 
was reflected as much as in the use of the technology as it is reflected in the increase in 
pressure on the operators. While characterised as complex by all the operators 
interviewed, the actual programming of the FMS did not appear to present a problem 
particularly to the multi-skilled operators. This view was manifested in terms of an 
apparent sense of pride in their programming abilities. 
This operators' view of complexity contrasted with the views of the area manager as well 
as the views of the manufacturing, production, and logistics engineers who saw a higher 
degree of complexity in the FMS environment. Discussions with the area manager and 
production engineers pointed to a view by the managers which appeared to overstate the 
degree of complexity of the operation as opposed to the operators who saw the FMS 
operation as, although complex, but not unmanageable. 
The difference in the perception of complexity was much more pronounced when the 
interview questions referred to the complexity of the `ThreeDimensional Measuring' 
CNC. This new CNC measuring machine could be considered as a part of the FMS 
system as it is used to measure FMS tool tolerances insuring the proper operation and 
quality of the FMS machining operations. Two divergent perceptions of its complexity 
were detected: Production and logistics engineers saw the 3D measuring machine as `too 
complex for the FMS operators to operate and accordingly its operation was left to a 
specialist quality control engineer. On the other hand, the Facilitator and a number of the 
operators did not see this machine as `any thing special except for the controls and that 
251 
its programming is similar to those of the FMS although it takes only tolerance 
measurements'. 
The results confirmed that the role of teams has been enlarged as a result of lean 
production. Yet, equally, control over the FMS process was still being exercised 
primarily by the area manager and production and logistics engineers through the vehicle 
of the `objective matrix' and team meetings. Operators indicated that the operational 
objectives of the teams or cell groups are strictly specified in the team meetings, and that 
the `what, when, where, and how' of operations are thus established. A key component 
of this `Objective (productivity) Matrix' review is the assessment of productivity levels 
and the achievement of set objectives. Accordingly, two apparently contradictory 
circumstances appear to be in operation here and that the complexity of the FMS system 
is being presented as the justification for its existence. 
Taking a closer look at the FMS environment, it was evident that, individually or 
collectively, the technology used was complex: Interviews with the supervisor and 
operators in area confirmed this initial view complexity. The complexity was evident 
from the fact that operators had to undergo extensive programming training by the 
vendors as well as through in house multiskilling technical training programs. 
Responses to the question on general operational complexity pointed to mixed opinions 
with the majority of respondent indicating that it `remained the same' and only one 
operator indicating that it has `increased'. There was general agreement that complexity 
in the FMS area did not exhibit any appreciable change as a result of the introduction of 
the lean production approaches. Responses to the complexity questions in the 
questionnaire regarding the degree of interdependence between work stations, the need 
for increased coordination between the FMS and other stations and areas, did not point to 
any appreciable changes as a result of the introduction of new organisational changes. 
Programmers on the other hand, having recently been moved to the production floor near 
the FMS, did agree that the complexity of the FMS played a role in justifying the need to 
252 
increase supervision of the FMS and monitoring the use of the specialised CNCs and the 
DNC database. 
From the human resources manager perspective, the complexity of the manufacturing 
process and by extension the FMS has been handled through increased training and 
multiskilling of the operators. By introducing lean production approaches, and giving 
operators more control over the production process, he expected the teams to handle the 
complexity depending on the instructions of the production manager and the group 
leaders. On the other hand, the responses by the production manager indicated that the 
degree of complexity in the FMS did not appear to increase appreciably. He indicated 
that he `had and continues to exercise firm control over the production process' and that 
with lean production, because set objectives are closely measured and are consistently 
evaluated, he expected any complexity problems to manifest themselves quickly and be 
taken care of very early. He also expressed the view that by transferring the production, 
programmers, and quality staff to the production area and by monitoring team actions, 
particularly in relation to cost cutting measures, he made it easier for the teams to seek 
help in any arising complexities. 
In chapter six With the skilled machinists and the relatively simple machining tasks 
required for the compressor housings, complexity of the FMS did not seem to be a key 
issue. The use of tools and fixtures as well as the programming of the FMS was viewed 
as `relatively standard' by the operators. In their view, once operators achieved 
familiarity with the system, the FMS operation became easier. Accordingly, no increases 
in complexity were detected in this case. Operation of the FMS by the skilled operators 
was `not so difficult' and tools and fixtures were seen as universal. In addition, as 
mentioned earlier, the two programmers who were retained from the technical / planning 
department and had been moved closer to shop floor, provided support to the production 
teams on the shop floor by checking the FMS and CNC programs. 
In early interviews with staff engineers in the Technical/planning department two of the 
respondent did agree that the complexity of the FMS was a factor in their decisions to 
keep a closer watch over the operation of the FMS. Yet in later interviews post the 
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dismantling of the technical / planning department, responses to questions about the 
changes in the degree of complexity, there was general agreement that it remained 
relatively unchanged. 
In chapter seven, the complexity in the system, particularly at the FMS, was seen as a key 
factor that led to `incompatibilities' and tensions. The complexity was, in part, seen by 
operators and production staff to be a result of the inter-relatedness of workstations, 
material handling systems, and control systems. interrelated elements such as the 
machining, loading and unloading, operations control, and cleaning, materials handling 
for work pieces, and control system hardware and software. The large number of product 
and specification matrix changes including fixtures, pallets, pallet-changers, tool storage, 
tool change devices and programs required to operate and maintain the FMS at optimum 
capacity was a critical factor in increasing the complexity of the system. 
The view of operators on t the system's complexity was that it had `increased'. Reasons 
provided for the increase were primarily related to the increased pressure to improve 
productivity. Perceived increases in the number of rules and regulations were considered 
by the operators as one of the factors that influenced the complexity of the system. 
CPS provided management with a system to maintain a watchful eye on the FMS and to 
keep the complexity in check. In doing so, management ushered in new regulations and 
rules designed to minimise any disruptions and problems that could affect overall 
production schedules. Yet, operators viewed this increase in regulations and rules as 
adding an extra load on their work and it increased the tension on the shop floor as it 
significantly reduced slack time for the operators. Kaizen in particular was seen by FMS 
operators as 'a way to constantly increase our work loads'. Although these responses do 
not constitute a statistical sample to prove or disprove the increase in complexity, it 
provided a sense of the general feelings on the shop floor that the introduction of the lean 
production system complicated rather than simplified the work of operators. In 
management's view, the introduction of lean production system exemplified in the CPS 
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production system was supposed to simplify the operation on the shop floor and eliminate 
waste and variation. This constant effort to eliminate variation that did not bode well with 
the operators and was seen to be adding to the complexity. The variation that 
management sought to eliminate was not limited to the quality of the machined parts but 
it also extended to the work organisation on the shop floor. Although the original 
message called for team work, multiskilling and increasing the autonomy of operators or 
team members, what emerged was a new system of bureaucratic control particularly at 
the FMS with its complexity as the key driver for this new form of bureaucratic control. 
Even with this increased control, the complexity on the shop floor in the flexible 
manufacturing areas was the key element used by manufacturing engineering to justify its 
objections to other aspects of CPS that called for increasing employee autonomy. The net 
effect was an increase rather than a lessening of management control over the production 
process as a whole through increasing management knowledge of the production status at 
every step in the production process, using the CPS measures and indicators introduced at 
every step of production as a tool to reduce rather than enlarge operator autonomy. 
The different responses in the use of the same technology by these four companies clearly 
pointed that the view of the degree of FMS complexity was driven by control and 
demarcation issues rather than by the actual characteristics of the technology. This 
conclusion was clearly visible in the view of the complexity of the 3-Dimensional 
measuring machine used in the FMS area. The 3-D measuring machines in the EBG and 
Fokker Aircraft case studies, although they were not made by the same company, both 
CNC machines could be described as very similar in nature and complexity. Yet, at EBG 
it was viewed as to complex for the operators to use while at Fokker, the same 
equipment was used by the FMS operators. The difference between the approach of both 
companies related to training. At Fokker, the 3-D machine vendor developed a training 
program for the operators and in a relatively short period of time, Fokker operators 
became skilled in the use of the machine. At EBG, the 3D machine was the domain of 
the production staff programmers. No training was given to the operators on the machines 
even though it was a central tenant of the lean enterprise system implemented at EBG. 
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8.4.2 Integration and Regulation 
The integration dimension in the FMS production at EBG also operated on two levels: the 
first involved the degree of FMS integration within the overall production function, while 
the second involves its harmonisation within the total system including the organisational 
arrangements and its internal cooperation mechanisms (such as teamwork). In the FMS 
area, the CNCs were integrated into cell groups organised around teams. These teams 
were responsible for all the activities in their cells including engine block machining 
operations prior to their transfer to the FMS stations. Accordingly, there was a high 
degree of interdependence between the operation of the six stations of the FMS and when 
viewed in totality, a high level of integration between the operation of the CNC cells and 
the operation of the FMS was identified. The new organisational arrangements through 
their focus on eliminating the functionalism of the past and fostering lateral 
communication between teams and groups within the various work areas, helped to 
develop the internal cooperative mechanisms between groups and made it possible to 
manage the various interdependence relationships within these areas. An organisational 
factor which helped support this integration within the production area was the 
elimination of many well entrenched departments (such as planning, manufacturing 
engineering, maintenance, and materials / production control), and the transfer of key 
personnel in these functions closer to production under the control of the area managers. 
At Fokker Aircraft, the levels of integration in the FMS were seen to have increased as a 
result of the lean production approaches. Production units were physically moved closer 
to each other. Group leaders and operators clearly perceived an increased interaction and 
coordination between functions and the production manager also pointed to the tighter 
coupling of the production process and considered it to be at the heart of the lean 
production philosophy. This increased integration was consistent with management 
efforts to capitalise on lean production and reduce lead times driven by a sense of 
urgency and the realisation of the need to show concrete results. 
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In the eight month period between Nov. 1994 and June 1995 the lean production 
approaches seemed to take route and gain increasing acceptance by the supervisors, 
operators, and even the programmers on the shop floor. The teams were showing 
increasing signs of cohesion and increased confidence. Operators clearly stated that they 
felt that they had more autonomy in spite of the high degree of regulation that typically 
existed on the shop floor. 
One reasons put foreword by the group leader (supervisor) of the FMS group for the 
increase in autonomy was, in part, due to the reduction in the number of engineering and 
production staff `dictates' as a result of the redundancies. Mid-level staff positions 
suffered the largest percentage of cuts and the ratio of salaried employees to the total 
number of employees was reduced to ratio of 1: 3 from a ratio of 1: 1. Although by the 
standards of lean production systems this 1: 3 ratio was still high, the change was 
considered to be significant. 
Nevertheless, by the last visit to the Papendrecht plant, apparent resistance to increases to 
operator autonomy by the production staff declined. The production managers' attitude in 
respect to the existing high degree of regulation and control over the shop floor was 
transformed into a recognition of the need to give operators and teams more freedom and 
control over their individual work areas. Group members also perceived an increase in 
the cohesiveness of the groups and saw themselves as better able to distribute tasks and 
increase their ability to control the process. Yet some functions such as maintenance 
remained separate and maintenance staff still followed a prescribed preventive 
maintenance program. 
In CMC Compressor manufacturing company, responses by operators to questions on 
changes to the interdependence of work flows and degree of interdependence between 
work stations as a result of the introduction of lean production did not point to any 
discernable trends. Responses by operators indicated that it `remained about the same'. 
Nevertheless, lean production was seen by most operators to have standardised the 
operation in the FMS area through a set of rules and measurements introduced in the 
reorganisation. 
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Lean production team development had given the teams the freedom to decide on 
sequencing and delivery schedule. This resulted in sequencing and time delivery 
problems and confusion between departments. The production manager indicated that 
these problems were encountered in the as a result of the independence of the teams and 
existence of this problem was also confirmed by the team leader and operators of the 
FMS. 
This process `was taken a step too far' according to the production manager and the 
department teams became `too independent and led to variances and confusion in the 
planning times : As a result from these perceptions of team over independence put 
foreword primarily by the production and logistics staff, It was later decided to re- 
centralise the planning function for all departments by deciding on an end time for each 
team. Accordingly, the planning for the departments was re-centralised under the 
direction of the production manager. Now, working in teams with the aid of 
transparencies, each team's `end-time' is set for every department. The production 
manager looked at efficiencies `of the total rather than the old method of measuring 
efficiency for each team'. 
Again, this case points to the differences in attitudes towards the degree of integration 
within the system. Although it was possible to handle the problem by providing the 
operators within the team more training, the decision in CMC was to revert to the old 
method of control over the process. But this reversal of control issue appeared to work 
and the operators accepted the arrangement made by the production manager and the lean 
production approaches appeared to achieve the desired results expressed by management. 
In the CMN Engine case, the degree of integration in the FMS area increased since the 
introduction of the CPS system. The operation of the FMS in the machining of two 
engines was perceived as highly integrated and the schedules for these engines were seen 
as complex. Increased demands on the production function in general and the FMS in 
particular appear to have contributed to the engineering staff as well as shop floor 
operators feelings of an increased interdependence. In later visits Both operators and staff 
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responded with `significantly increased' in reference to the degree of interdependence of 
work stations and changes as a result of the CPS implementation. The high degree of 
integration here was also seen as a factor by operators and production staff of the inter- 
relatedness of workstations, material handling systems, and control systems. 
In the case of EBG truck manufacturing company, a key aspect of the dimensions 
characterising the FMS were its influence on the work of operators and team members. 
This influence, owing to the high degree of complexity and integration in the FMS area, 
was seen through the rules and regulations incorporated by the system. Historically, EBG 
was highly functionalised with the planning department controlling every aspect of FMS 
operation. With the transformation of the company into new EBG, and the adoption of 
lean production (including the call for increasing employee autonomy), it seemed logical 
to expect that the degree of regulation associated with the FMS would also be positively 
affected by the new organisational transformations. However, responses of facilittors 
and operators to interview questions about the increase or decrease in the number of 
procedures and rules indicated that the number of rules and regulations associated with 
the FMS has increased rather than decreased since the introduction of the lean 
production. This in spite of an overall, organisation wide move to devolve more power 
and control to the shop floor including the FMS area 
These circumstances pointed to the inconsistencies and tensions which appear to be 
driven by contradictory internal messages sent to the FMS. A general feeling of an 
increase, rather than a decrease, in the number of rules and regulations associated with 
the FMS operation was detected. The interviews indicated that there was indeed a 
development in the role of FMS operators particularly within the new teamwork 
structures and an apparent expansion of operator roles to include quality control and 
maintenance functions. But coupled with this increase in operator responsibilities, there 
was also an increase in the operational rules and regulations governing the detailed 
execution of these new responsibilities. Added to this increase in rules, is the demands of 
team meetings and the establishment of the `Objective Matrix' as the instrument for 
setting immediate goals and objectives for each of the cells. 
259 
From the operator's perspective, the objective matrix appeared to be acting as a 
measuring device to insure compliance to the specified goals and objectives as well as the 
adherence to the new rules. From the area manager and production engineers viewpoint, 
the justification for this increase in rules and regulations is the need for tighter control 
over the production process. Based on the interviews with the area manager, the 
production engineers and the logistics engineers, the need for tighter control of the 
system was internalised in the need limit any possible disruptions to the operation and 
flow of the production system. This was emphasised by the area manager as especially 
true at `this critical juncture in the development of company', and the imperative need to 
increase production and maintain tighter control over the production process. This is 
reflected in statements such as `... operators have freedom as long as they follow the 
block line', indicating the limit of operator control over the process. The high complexity 
and integration perceived to be associated with the six FMS stations and the production 
of 2x4 (two types of engine x four types of engine heads) was deemed enough to justify 
the need for the increase in regulation. 
In the early interviews, both the area manager and the FMS facilitator were asked about 
the `degree of operator freedom to do the job' in the FMS area. Both responded 
enthusiastically and positively indicating that `operators have a greater freedom to do 
jobs now (with the introduction of the lean production) than they did before in the 
control culture of the old EBG. However, when the question is shifted to the `degree of 
operator freedom to plan the work' both responded was less enthusiasm (although still 
indicating that in their view `it was still high'). On the other hand, interviews with the 
FMS operators, both `All Rounders' and `Rounders', responding to the same question of 
`degree of operator freedom to do the job' pointed to positive responses. Thus confirming 
the high degree of operator `freedom to do the jobs' (owing to their high skill and training 
levels). The response to the planning aspect of their job indicated that it was about the 
same or slightly better than before. As one operator indicated: directives on what, 
where, and how, are still being dictated from above'. The fact that operators indicated 
that in spite of the organisational changes and the efforts made towards increasing the 
level of operator control over their work, when it comes to the planning aspects of that 
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work, the new organisational arrangements did not alter the existing relationships. In fact 
the general view of operators pointed to an increase in the degree of control. 
At Fokker Aircraft, by virtue of the critical safety aspect of the aviation industry, the 
company had traditionally adopted a high degree of regulation in the manufacturing of 
aircraft parts and components. Over the years the company developed a highly 
functionalised bureaucracy that oversaw the establishment of rules, regulations and 
procedures. Prior to the introduction of lean production approaches, the company had a 
high ratio of one salaried employee (staff) for every worker on the shop floor. Although 
the number of salaried staff positions has been reduced under the lean production to a 
ratio of one staff for every three workers, as the Fabrication Unit manager stated `the 
organisation had a long way to go and still suffered a high degree of red tape'. 
The situation in the FMS area of production appeared to be similarly highly regulated. 
Every aspect of production had to follow a set of prescribed rules and be documented 
appropriately. According to the production manager, `Fokker developed a bureaucracy 
with rules and regulations for every aspect of the production operation'. The extent of the 
`red tape' as it was described by the group leader and operators at shop floor was so 
pervasive that it was estimated that for one `15 cent part the paperwork costs $150'. 
The extensive degree of regulation in the production area was further increased following 
a joint Fokker-Boeing project. Both companies had extensive, well established, 
bureaucracies that added to the demands on documentation at the production floor. Of the 
66 parts produced, 324 changes were made. The Boeing contract required, as per the 
conditions of the Boeing's company, extensive sets of rules and regulations governing the 
operation on the shop floor. Differences in part names and part numbers for the same 
manufactured items between the two companies led to complications and defaults in the 
paper work which caused the large percentage of parts changes. 
Another shop floor problem revolved around the bureaucratic delays between engineering 
and the manufacturing cells concerning the new parts manufacturing. It took weeks to 
complete the manufacturing process for a single new part as a result of `delays and 
261 
excessive red tape' between engineering and production in finalising the manufacturing 
process. This problem was multiplied significantly considering the large number of parts 
required for each assigned job. 
The high degree of regulation was reflected in the supervisors and operators responses to 
the interview questions concerning the number of procedures regarding operations, 
process planning, production planning, maintenance, and the degree of paperwork. There 
was a general agreement that the set work procedures and the number of rules and 
regulations relatively remained the same. Yet even with the increased operator autonomy 
and multiskilling, the regulation was still seen as very high. 
Programmers responses to the same questions on regulation and the degree of control 
over the FMS operation indicated that they generally accepted the existence of high 
number of rules and procedures but that they viewed it as necessary for the efficient and 
proper function of production. The complexity of the FMS being used as one of the 
reasons for the need for the regulation. The Complexity of the three dimensional milling 
machine and the possibility of programming errors was one example put foreword by 4 of 
the programmers interviewed. The high degree of regulation and tight control over the 
production process was even confirmed by the production manager `to be excessive'. 
Nevertheless, as testified by the group team leaders and operators, he continued to 
exercise control of the process through set team objectives that were closely measured 
and consistently evaluated. 
At CMC compressor, With the full implementation of the lean production philosophy, the 
degree of autonomy of operators working through teams has been increased. This was 
reflected in operator responses to questions on the number of rules and procedures as 
`decreased' and the degree of operator discretion as `significantly increased'. Subsequent 
discussions with the operators and team leader in the FMS area informed the following: 
Operators concurred that there has been a significant increase in their ability to do the 
work and their control over the production process as compared to the situation prior to 
the managerial change and the implementation of lean production. Similarly, with 
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multiskilling and job rotation as well as the ability of the production teams to take 
corrective actions when necessary made it possible for CMC management to claim that 
the operators were `partners' and not merely employees. 
Operators were multi-skilled and were capable of doing the programming of the 
machines. This ability to program the machines including the FMS by the operators gave 
CMC an additional advantage in simplifying the steps it took from planning to 
programming to machining and corrections. Operators were given the freedom to do their 
own programming and accordingly increased their confidence in their skills. The 
programming was traditionally the role of the technical / planning department. However, 
with the dismantling of this department and the elimination of most its staff jobs, skilled 
operators were allowed to do the programming. 
Nevertheless, as a result of this increased autonomy being granted to teams, some 
problems arose in the sequencing of jobs. However, the production manager reverted to 
the older system of direct control by the production manager over the sequencing and 
delivery times. 
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At CMN Engine company, the close supervision of manufacturing engineering (process 
engineers) and the strict criteria and rules imposed on the FMS team including the CPS 
measures, made operators feel less rather than more independent. Initially, CPS increased 
the span of control on operators through teamwork and multiskilling to improve the work 
area and increase efficiency through Kaizen. But as tensions grew between the 
conflicting demands of operators and manufacturing engineers, the degree of discretion 
the operators had was seen to decrease rather than increase as a result of CPS. By 
increasing the number of rules and regulations that govern the operation on the shop 
floor, manufacturing (production) engineers were able to reassert control over the FMS 
and eventually were successful in convincing management to do away with the team 
structure altogether. 
There was agreement between operators and supervisors that the number of rules in the 
FMS had increased since the introduction of CPS. CPS added new rules concerning 
computer programming, tool setting, inspection, maintenance, production scheduling 
orders, material flow, quality control, time sheets, etc. In addition, the paper work for 
operators increased. With CPS there were more forms to fillin, books that included 
highly descriptive methodologies of FMS operation were introduced on the shop floor 
with the production manager and manufacturing engineers playing the key role in 
introducing these new formats, rules and regulations. 
CPS introduced very perspective discrete practices with the view that these were 
`predicated on functional excellence'. New `standards for excellence' with mandatory 
measures and audits were introduced. 
In general, CPS improved material flow through the factory which aimed to reduce lead 
times by shortening production routes and to eliminating waste. The underlying 
objectives of this model were achieving synchronised flows and shorter lead times. 
Regulation was viewed as a critical factor to ensure that the synchronised flows were 
maintained. 
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The increase in regulation provided engineering management with a way to limit the 
autonomy of the FMS teams. As CPS called for increased operator autonomy and control 
over the process, manufacturing engineering viewed this aspect of CPS as detrimental to 
the production process and predicted that it would lead to crashes and disruptions in the 
production schedule. The increase in the number of rules, according to the manufacturing 
engineering, was necessary to ensure that the complexity of the FMS system did not 
hinder the operator's ability to keep up with the production schedule. 
It was precisely this increase in the number of rules and regulations that contradicted the 
original view of CPS as giving operators or team members, as they were called increased 
responsibility and autonomy over their production area. This apparent contradiction in the 
original objectives of CPS and its actual application in the FMS area were not recognised 
by the human resources department. Instead, human resources continued to put forward 
the line of the productivity improvements and the lean production logic calling for 
increased autonomy and independence of operators. The results were an increase in the 
tensions on the shop floor where on the one hand where human resources focused on 
operator training and increased control for operators over the FMS. On the other hand, 
the production and manufacturing management were stressing the need for more and 
better rules for production in order to prevent crashes in the FMS as a result of the 
complexity associated with these systems. 
The freedom of operators to plan their work on the FMS was curtailed. Manufacturing 
engineering continued to limit the role of the operators and to pressure the production 
manager to limit the interference of operators in what was traditionally the role of process 
(manufacturing) engineers. 
As the demand for the two engine models continued to grow and with the addition of a 
new engine family, the pressures on the production people increased significantly and 
manufacturing engineering was able to convince management to suspend the teamwork 
structures. The suspension of the teams was presented as a temporary measure which was 
necessary for the restructuring and the introduction of new FMS and CNC production 
machines used in the development of a new class of engine. 
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The surprising fact was that operators have accepted the new changes and the suspension 
of teamwork as a fait accompli This easy acceptance points to two issues: 1) that the 
original team structure, which was in practice, was not viewed as effective by managers 
and was not thought of highly by the operators. 
One reason for the lack of enthusiasm for the teamwork component of CPS was the 
degree of increased regulation that accompanied the implementation of CPS. More rules 
and regulations, less autonomy and control for team members meant that these teams 
were not true teams and accordingly the suspension did not constitute loss of an acquired 
privilege. 
The second reason mentioned earlier, was the employees' worry about the future of their 
jobs. Realising the competitive external environment and the constant call by CPS to 
improve productivity and efficiency, operators worried about job security. Because of the 
change in circumstances, unions did not have the same leverage that they had had before. 
CMN management was able to convey to employees through CPS and various steps that 
management was serious about cost cutting and that top management was facing 
increased pressures from share holders to deliver on profitability. The joint venture with 
another company and the infusion of new capital into the company was a boost for CMN 
and it made workers feel more secure about the future of their jobs. This overriding fact 
seemed to have tempered operator objections to the new changes and made them accept a 
return to the bureaucratic, traditional control strategies that the company had exercised 
before CPS and, as it seems, also during CPS. 
Regulations and rules were the key instruments of managerial control and through these 
rules and regulations, manufacturing management was able to limit the degree of operator 
autonomy and freedom over the flexible manufacturing systems and maintain its overall 
control of the production area. 
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Inconsistencies and tensions in the interaction between lean production and FMS 
resulted in part from one or more of the following: 
I. Lack of true managerial commitment to full Lean Production philosophy 
implementation. 
II. Contradictory messages sent to the FMS area were human resources 
encourages increasing operator autonomy through the LP system while 
production staff and supervisors increase the degree of regulation and 
control over the production process through a variety of means. 
III. Macro level, existential pressures, such as redundancy, loss 
of job security, and significantly increased production pressures 
leading to a return to the pre Lean Production work methods. 
Figure 8.1: Key issues revealed in the case studies: Existence of tensions with 
consequences to the production system as a whole. 
267 
8.4.5 Flexibility 
At EBG Truck manufacturing company, Under the new organisational arrangements, the 
company concentrated on increasing overall flexibility of the organisation with the 
intention of improving its competitiveness and maintaining production costs at 
competitive levels. The new focus was primarily on labour flexibility with flexible 
working hours and longer operating times. The company also adopted a `buildto-order' 
philosophy and reorganised the manufacturing functions through the adoption of new 
wave manufacturing techniques such as `lean enterprise' with the objective of increasing 
flexibility, reducing lead times, as well as coping with the changing environment and 
future demand. In the FMS area, the focus was on mix flexibility. Responses to the 
interview questionnaire by operators indicated that the overall flexibility of operations 
associated with the lean production in the FMS area appears to have remained at the same 
level. Because the FMS operators were Group 7 salary group, i. e. highly skilled and 
experienced workers, the ability of these workers to exercise judgement and make `on the 
spot' operational changes remained the same. Probed further is subsequent interviews, it 
was noted that the implementation of operational teams and the Objective Matrix appears 
to have put certain constraints on the operators' discretion. On the other hand, by virtue 
of increased flow of information between production areas and increased knowledge of 
incoming production changes and targets, operators are better able to organise their work 
and alter their operational schedules to better advantage and hence increase their 
flexibility. 
At Fokker Aircraft, the overall flexibility of the production system benefited from the 
lean production approaches. As the operators in the FMS were organised into teams of 10 
-15 of multi-skilled operators and with the participation of staff programmers and quality 
personnel in addressing production problems, the flexibility of the system improved 
considerably. By its very nature, the flexibility of the FMS system and the CNCs in the 
area operated by multi-skilled operators, made possible for the company, in times of low 
manufacturing activity, to offer its production capacity to external clients. These FMS 
services were offered for other aviation companies as well as to the military. During the 
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research, the two contracts in operation were for NATO as well as for the Boeing Aircraft 
company. 
Production efficiencies and flexibility continued to be viewed by the group team leaders 
and operators as having been improved since the introduction of lean production. The 
responses to the questions on the degree of flexibility; the ability to adjust at any moment 
to changing market conditions; and the ability to change production parameters and make 
design changes scored positively by all respondents (ranging from increased to 
significantly increased). 
In chapter six, CMCs decision to adopted lean production was predicated on the 
expectation that the full adoption of lean production would make the company more 
flexible and increase its ability to respond to market demands at very short notice. In 
retrospect, The plant manager viewed the company as `having increased its overall 
flexibility' through Outsourcing of small parts production, multiskilling of operators, and 
the use of FMS in addition to the skilled workforce. These three components were 
present at CMC and as a result, the production team was able to adopt the new 
compressor design without any major disruptions and CMC did not experience the 
traditional teething problems that were usually associated with manufacturing of a model 
as we saw in the CMN case. 
At CMN Engines, the importance of flexibility in the system was underscored by the 
production manager. The company placed considerable importance to its customers and 
the market demands for quitter, more efficient, environmentally friendly diesel engines . 
The flexibility of the FMS was instrumental in helping the company keep up with the 
competition in the market place. Additionally, operator skill was also seen as an essential 
element in the flexibility equation. CPS with its focus on training of operators to be 
multi-skilled contributed to the development of CMN production flexibility. In the FMS 
environment, Although the production manager and manufacturing view was that the 
company possessed both flexible technology and flexible operators, in the responses to 
interview questions concerning changes to flexibility as a result of the introduction of 
CPS, the general view was that it remained `about the same'. Nevertheless,. the flexibility 
269 
was seen by some operators in the FMS area to be constrained by the degree of regulation 
associated with the CPS system. 
8.5 Thematic Analysis 
There is an underlying assumption in most of the new 'Management of AMT' literature 
(Noori, 1990; Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992; Zairi, 1992; Karwowski and Salvendy, 1994) 
that the combination of AMT and NWM will lead to very high productivity and 
competitive gains. These gains are achieved through, inter alia, extensive increase in 
flexibility and significantly reduced lead times. In the four cases reported here 
interviewees reported a very different picture. The evidence from the four case studies 
indicated that there were indeed inconsistencies and tensions in the relationship between 
elements of the lean production and the adopted forms of AMT. 
Accordingly, these tensions had an impact on the ability of three of the four 
manufacturers to realise the productivity and flexibility advantages managers sought. 
These tensions were primarily discovered in the type of procedures and rules associated 
with FMS use. The high degree of automation inherent in FMS embraced high levels of 
integration, as well as a high degree of regulation, and it included extensive sets of rules 
and procedures. These rules and procedures, when juxtaposed with the message of the 
new wave manufacturing approaches - which called for increased aitonomy and 
employee empowerment and control-sent conflicting messages to the employeeson the 
shop floor. 
A central aim was to explore whether these tensions and consistencies were due to an 
intrinsic incongruity in the application of lean production to the FMS environment. 
In the CMC compressors case we saw that the coupling did lead to significant 
productivity and flexibility gains. Thus for this particular company no visible 
contradictions were discovered suggesting that these tensions and contradictions are not 
the result of an inherent flow in the concept. 
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Case study Key issues findings Resulting 
Developments 
Increased complexity Contradictory Failure to achieve 
EBG Truck Company and demands on the messages between optimum 
FMS - LP coupling Human Resources productivity gains as 
lead to increased versus a result of inadequate 
regulation, manufacturing managerial 
inconsistencies and production staff commitment to full 
stresses on the lean production 
system implementation 
CMN Engine Initial Contradictory Initial improvement 
implementation messages: HR and productivity 
of LP lead to versus gains but later 
recognisable gains. Manufacturing tensions lead to 
Further development suspension of teams 
of LP system lead to 
inconsistencies and 
resistance 
Fokker Aircraft LP lead to Traditional high Job security pressure 
improvements yet degree of due to increased 
uncertainties over job regulation redundancies making 
security and high contrasted with LP and demarcation / 
degree of regulation move towards power relationships 
contributed to increasing less of an issue 
inconsistencies autonomy 
CMC compressors Adopted lean Combination of Operator autonomy 
production and small size, was viewed 
appeared to have autonomous excessive by 
achieved a better fit multiskilled management and 
between LP and workers and lead to reverting to 
FMS simpler production tighter control of job 
process lead to sequencing process 
gains 
Table 8.1 Summary of case study results 
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Based on the investigation of these four manufacturing companies, it was found that 
when contradictions existed, these were more attributable to certain managerial, 
operational, or structural considerations and not due to a fault in the theory informing 
these concepts. 
In the case of EBG Truck manufacturing company, inconsistencies were identified and 
the complexity of the FMS was presented as one of the reasons for the retreat from the 
earlier stated lean production and the return to more traditional manufacturing operations. 
For EBG, as production increased, the complexity of the operation on the FMS increased. 
For example, while in 1994 the FMS area machined two types of timing cases, later they 
machined 10 different types of timing cases. Problems resulting from this increase in 
production also affected the MIS system of the company and led to reports of increased 
system breakdowns, problems in machinery breakdowns, as well as some quality 
problems associated with semi-skilled operators. The Management's response was to 
institute new rules and regulations particularly in the FMS. 
The new team structure seen in Figure 4.15 was identified as a part of the EBG 
managements'increase in regulations at the FMS. It institutionalised the differences 
between the semi-skilled and multi-skilled operators and created an elite group of core 
multi-skilled operators who were flexible, moved from place to place on the production 
line depending on the need at the time, and gave directions and mentoring to the new 
semi-skilled operators. Yet, when it came to the specific production activities, 
management increased its control by focusing on `departmental efficiencies' and a `paper 
system' with `performance indicators' detailing the set targets and the variability between 
them and what was actually being done on the shop floor. This `paper system' related to 
all aspects of the operation including the man utilisation, maintenance, machine 
breakdowns, machine utilisation, training, and so on. 
What was significant over the period of investigation of this company was that its general 
focus had shifted from the traditional issues of quality, delivery, and price that were the 
key terms in 1994 to `man utilisation' as the key focus of EBG management. Targets 
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were set top down based on managerial estimates and weekly controls are instituted 
through this `paper system' to check on these targets. 
The complexity of the FMS operation and the increase in the number of semi-skilled 
operators was given as one of the reasons why management opted for the new 
bureaucratic structure. Either way, the result was a definite move away from the original 
principles of the Lean Enterprise and a shift back to the more traditional manufacturing 
operation. These new arrangements led a reported decrease in the level of job satisfaction 
of the operators and even a decrease in the response to the set targets as well as to the 
production requests from other functions. This was directly attributed to the lean 
enterprise concept of continuous improvement where management was continuously 
optimising the process and setting new and more difficult targets once the old targets 
were reached without any recognition (in the view of workers) of the operators' efforts in 
achieving the set targets. 
The return to traditional manufacturing operation was not limited to the advanced 
manufacturing areas (i. e. FMS and CNC production areas) but it also extended to the 
engine assembly. Driven by the decrease in multi-skilled assemblers/operators, a number 
of quality problems arose as a result of the inexperience of the new workers. 
Management moved to reorganise the assembly area and separate the work into simpler 
tasks within the cell so as to minimise the risk of quality defects. 
Thus, at EGB, as pressure on the company increased, the interaction between the NWM 
strategies and the increased complexity and demands on the FMS led to increased 
regulation and inconsistencies that eventually led EBG management to revert to taking 
full charge of the production process. 
The dramatic increase in demand for the EBG truck led its management to return to a 
functional, traditional form of work organisation. This, does not detract from the fact that 
while originally the NWM strategies implementation were very ambitious, the company 
often kept a significant number of these strategies intact even as it reverted to the 
traditional manufacturing operation. 
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In the second case, the Fokker aircraft manufacturing company, which adopted various 
forms of new production technologies in addition to lean production, the result of the 
interaction between the two did lead to reported improvements in productivity and 
efficiency. The human resources department played a key role in trying to increase the 
degree of autonomy and control of operators through the introduction of teamwork, 
multiskilling and problem solving techniques. Other managers, on the other hand, 
focused on reducing costs, eliminating waste, and improving lead times as key drivers for 
the company's survival, yet the company continued to be burdened with over-capacity 
and decreased demands for its products. In addition, the company carried the baggage of 
a complacent and inflexible bureaucracy that regulated every aspect of the production 
process. The restructuring of the company and the introduction of lean production played 
a major role in giving the company a second chance. Nevertheless, it still needed to be 
leaner and while the financial position worsened, the company continued to eliminate 
excess capacity and reduce the number of employees. 
Given this state of flux, it was difficult to reach a conclusion on the degree of 
compatibility or incompatibility between the advanced manufacturing technologies and 
the lean production approaches. The central issue reported by all employees in the 
company was `job security' and the uncertain future of the company. Given this 
pessimistic outlook and the continued stream of layoffs, it was almost impossible to instil 
the desired new culture in the company and the ability to solicit cooperation in all areas 
of operation was diminished. 
What was different in this case was the fact that on the production floor and particularly 
in the AMT areas, there was already a high degree of regulation. Even managers realised 
this fact and attempted to decrease the regulation through lean production. Again, looking 
at the interaction between the lean production approaches and the utilisation of AMT, 
although this company had utilised lean production, it was possible to identify 
inconsistencies and contradictions in the relationship between the approaches of the 
human resources and that of the production department and manufacturing staff. This was 
because the company was still operating on traditional terms and its adoption of lean 
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production was not accompanied by an evident change in philosophy but rather sprang 
out of the need to drastically reduce costs. 
Looking at the production floor and the FMS areas in particular, the dramatic impact of 
all the layoffs on the company had a severe negative impact on the atmosphere and the 
attitudes of operators and staff alike. The issue of compatibility or incompatibility 
between FMS use and lean production was not a major concern for employees. As 
mentioned earlier, there were tensions on the shop floor but these tensions were also a 
result of the uncertainty and fear of job loss. There were conflicting messages between 
the human resources department (with its call for increased operator autonomy and 
control) and the production staff (calling for increased managerial control). It was due, in 
part, to the complexity of the technology, that these messages were overshadowed by 
overriding tension between management and operators about the future of their jobs and 
distaste for the lean production approach. Lean production was viewed as the instrument 
for eliminating jobs, as well as a pervasive bureaucracy and high degree of regulation 
already being practised on the production floor and in the FMS area. 
At CMN, the diesel engine manufacturing company, the key conclusions were that while 
the initial implementation of these lean approaches led to recognisable productivity and 
flexibility gains (through the coupling of LP and FMS), further developments of the more 
progressive stages of the lean production concepts faced acceptance problems. This was 
particularly true in the flexible manufacturing systems areas were the interaction between 
the demands of the FMS and those of the lean production where seen to be in conflict. 
Over the years, the company developed standardised and formalised modes of operation 
which still affected the attitudes and behaviours of employees in the areas. With the 
attempts to implement the more progressive forms of new wave manufacturing (i. e. those 
that endeavour to increase employee level of autonomy and control), two contrasting 
messages were being sent to the shop floor. Here too, high levels of regulation and 
control coupled with these new wave manufacturing approaches confused the operators 
on the shop floor. 
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The human resources department wholeheartedly adopted the lean production particularly 
those calling for devolving power down on to the shop floor. CPS, the company's new 
production system, was the tool used to transform this company from a traditional 
organisation to a progressive organisation that is synchronised with all the modern and 
advanced practices of work organisation. Yet, on the opposite side, manufacturing 
engineering still viewed the relationship on the shop floor in traditional terms. CPS 
ushered in a new form of work organisation but it also increased the potential for 
improved control of the manufacturing process. 
Initially, manufacturing engineers did object to the changes and viewed operators as; 
`they can be a party to the control process'. But, at the FMS, manufacturing engineers 
saw the system as too complex to be left to operators and introduced `fail systems' 
adding alarms to minimise problems at the FMS. 
At the same time, management increased the rules and regulations governing the entire 
operation of the FMS. These included kaizen team requests for authorisation. While 
operators' span of control on the FMS initially increased with CPS, the manufacturing 
department through extensive new rules and regulations reduced the degree of freedom of 
the operators to plan and execute their work. 
In this case, the adopted lean production approaches which also called for worker 
empowerment and devolution of responsibility to the shop floor through team based 
organisation have simultaneously increased centralisation and managerial control through 
increased surveillance and discipline through rules and regulations. 
The company's new production system (CPS) improved the productivity of the company 
and reduced lead times. Yet with the contradictory messages and increased formalisation 
and regulation at the shop floor, it was not possible to sustain this same lead time level. 
By the last visit to the company in 1999, charts showed the lead-time for the engines to 
be around 23 days per engine a slight increase from before. Other factors could have 
contributed to this lead time change. It was clear that a contributing factor was the 
conflicting messages between human resources and manufacturing engineering and the 
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dissatisfaction on the shop floor over the increased pressures and control from 
manufacturing engineering. 
Eventually, the human resources department was unable to continue with its strategy to 
devolve control to the operators and teams were suspended and the FMS, the most 
independent of the teams was disbanded. With this suspension of teams, manufacturing 
engineering regained control of the production process. Although management professed 
that this suspension of teams was temporary pending the `settling down' of the 
production process due to the introduction of new production lines and manufacturing 
areas for the new engine design, it is doubtful that the experiment will be repeated in the 
same way. Thus, the input to the company of a new engine line and the need to 
restructure the factory gave management the excuse it needed to address the 
contradictions between CPS and FMS. The old FMS has been replaced, new engines 
have been introduced, teams have been abolished even though manufacturing engineering 
manager claimed that they were `refocused' rather than eliminated. 
The view of management of the team experiment was that these teams lacked the 
necessary discipline for success and that teams were driven by a culture that was less 
`hard nosed' and less `cost reducing /bottom line' conscious. 
In CNM, the coupling of the lean production and FMS lead to productivity gains in the 
manufacturing process. But later, because of the contradictory messages between the 
human resources and the manufacturing engineering, inconsistencies in the relationship 
between the lean production and the Flexible Manufacturing Systems began to appear. 
These inconsistencies eventually led to the suspension of the team structures in the 
organisation helped by macro level changes that forced the change in the structure. 
Although this company professed to implement the lean production, its approach to the 
implementation followed a traditional manufacturing logic. The key actors in this process 
who exercised the greatest influence were the production and manufacturing departments 
with production managers, supervisors, and manufacturing engineers still clinging to 
maintain their control over the production process. 
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In the third company CMC Compressors, which provided an example of a relatively 
small size company (180 employees) which adopted lean production to its FMS 
environment, This coupling was exemplified in its adoption, in full, of the lean 
production philosophy as well as its use of flexible manufacturing systems (FMS). The 
results of this interaction appear to have led to increases in productivity and reductions in 
lead times as well as helped in making the company become more flexible and responsive 
to market changes. The success of the company in increasing its productivity, introducing 
a new compressor design for production and keeping up with increased product demands 
can be seen to be the result of its full-hearted adoption of the lean production philosophy. 
Management perceived CMC to be totally transformed from the its older traditional ways 
of operation using multi-skilled workers who apply new technology as well as utilise 
teamwork to achieve the company's desired objectives. All this is done quietly, and 
efficiently. Two important qualifications from the analysis of this company relate to 
production volume to be the contributor to the successful coupling of FMS and LP. 
CMC's relatively low volumes eased the pressure on the production function. Secondly, 
CMC's relatively small size made it is easy to maintain a small company atmosphere and 
develop the necessary teamwork structures to maximum efficiency and advantage. In 
contrast, the companies that had the apparent incongruity in the coupling of lean 
production to the FMS (EBG Trucks and CMN Engines) were relatively large in size and 
the pressures on the production function were much more acute. 
In all the cases, the underlying and forceful change factor is often more existential. 
Macro-level issues relating to employment, redundancy, and the future survival of the 
company are always at the forefront. Thus the traditional issues of power relationships 
and control over the production process become secondary and lose their effect when the 
survival of all actors, managers and employees, is at stake. 
The application of lean production systems to the flexible manufacturing systems 
environment will not mean an automatic improvement in productivity, reduction in lead 
times, or guarantee improvements in the desired type of flexibility. This study addressed 
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some of the dimensions related to the interaction between lean production and FMS and 
pointed to areas that revealed the points of tension and addressed their consequences. 
To date, the issue of AMT and NWM still occupies a significant portion of the interest of 
researchers and practitioners alike. Manufacturing companies are continually facing new 
challenges that call for an ongoing process of analysis and examination of the core 
competencies and contingencies necessary for their survival. Choices are being made 
about advanced manufacturing technology and these new organisational arrangements, 
structures and systems are being adopted and adapted in an effort to maximise these 
competencies and achieve and maintain competitive advantage. 
Lowe et al. (1997) emphasised the importance of context, specific plant characteristics, 
and choice for understanding the performance of manufacturing organisations. They 
rejected the notion that the work organisation and human resource policies associated 
with the lean production model represent a universal "best way" for achieving high 
manufacturing performance. The evidence from the four manufacturing companies who 
adopted lean production to the FMS similarly points in the same direction. 
8.5 Limitation of the Study 
As is the case with all case study research, it is difficult to make a valid generalisation 
beyond the specifics of each case. By choosing four case studies with relatively similar 
flexible manufacturing and lean production systems, an attempt was made to find 
common themes and provide some insights on the dynamics of the interaction between 
the lean production system and the FMS. Nevertheless, each of the companies 
investigated had its own unique characteristics that made a true comparison between 
them suspect to methodological errors. 
1. There any tensions in the interaction relationship between lean production concepts 
and systems and its coupling with Flexible Manufacturing Systems. 
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2. Some of the constraints to the overall flexibility seem to be associated with the 
application of lean production to the FMS. 
3. Upon closer examination of the dimensions of these lean production formulas, when 
set along side the realities of FMS use in Western manufacturing, a more complex, 
even problematic relationship emerges. The reality of the actual coupling of lean 
production to the FMS environment points to a different picture. 
The emphasis of production managers on tighter control and the regulation work process 
codification seems to contradict the human resources stated focus on increasing employee 
discretion, a contradiction similar to that between the "lean" and "team" approaches 
described by Applebaum and Bart (1994). The apparent increase in tensions between 
these approaches was particularly visible in the EBG and CMN cases. 
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8.6 Directions for future research 
These tensions are affecting the ability of manufacturers to truly realise the claimed 
productivity and flexibility advantages. These tensions can be seen in the type of 
procedures and rules associated with FMS use. The high degree of automation inherent in 
the FMS embraces high levels of complexity, integration, as well as a high degree of 
regulation, which include extensive sets of rules and procedures. These rules and 
procedures, when juxtaposed with the message in lean production -which call for 
increased autonomy and employee empowerment and control- are sending oppoing 
signals. compatible but due to certain managerial, operational, structural, environmental, 
or other similar considerations, the tensions exist - or are being allowed to exist. These 
tensions were an issue in the literature on job design particularly in repetitive operations 
such as auto assembly (e. g., Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990; Berggren, 1992; Adler and 
Cole, 1993). Similar concern were expressed in companies were work is far less 
repetitive such as software development (Cusumano, 1991; Lecht, 1991; Scat, 1991). The 
varied nature of these debates reflect the conflicting assessments of the core features of 
regulation dimension discussed in this thesis. These are the outstanding issues which 
require further elaboration. 
The application of lean production systems to the FMS environment will not necessarily 
mean an automatic improvement in productivity, reduction in lead times, or guarantee 
improvements in the desired type of flexibility. Future research on the interaction 
between lean production and the AMT could explore more closely how firm size affect 
might affect the interaction between the two. 
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APPENDIX I 
3.2.5.6 List of Questions 
Interviewee job title 
Interviewee, background 
Interviewee Duties, job description 
Nature of the factory studied 
Number of employees 
Ratio of total number of employees to salaried employees 
Business strategy 
Key components of strategy 
Main customers 
Market changes? 
Company performance 
Major competitors 
Types of products produced 
Product range 
Major kinds of manufacturing activities 
Recent History? 
Any major changes or developments on the manufacturing technology side 
How many organisational levels are at the plant? 
Organizational form? 
Detailed description of the technology, nature of the production technologies used 
Type of AMT (FMS) 
Identify major kinds of equipment 
The functions performed 
How many of each kind 
Characterise the production process type 
(one of a kind? small batch? medium? large? mass? ) 
Date of introduction of equipment (FMS)? 
Capacity of the equipment? 
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Types of employees and their numbers in the FMS? 
Nature of the components produced? 
How many different components typically use the equipment? 
Identify the most important components typically produced? 
What final product of the factory is each a component of? 
Manufacturing Operations? 
How? Number of shifts? 
Amount of direct versus indirect labour performed? 
Detailed description of the organisational arrangements 
Lean production: JIT, TQM, SPC, Training, Zero defects, Teamwork, Multiskilling, 
Kaizen 
Teams? history, details? 
Self-regulating? 
Does group make its own internal distribution of work tasks? 
Monitoring of own performance: lead time, quality costs, suggestions for improvement 
Monitoring of team performance? Haw? By whom? 
Understanding key variances in the product and process? 
Inspection? 
Maintenance? 
Programming? 
Tool Setting? 
Other? Specify 
Interaction and coordination with others? 
Lean Production 
What effects did the use of lean production have on the organisation of work? 
What is your view of the lean production components? 
Lean production focus: approach to production? 
What do you think is your primary focus? And how does the technology affect that focus 
Haw are the lean production measures defined by the company: by managers? Staff? 
Supervisors? Operators? (at each level of the organisation. ) 
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Questions on Key dimensions 
Complexity 
Has the production process become more or less complicated? 
Do you do more or less jobs than you did before the FMS? 
To what extent do you have different products following different process routings? 
Control complexity (Resource complexity + product complexity)? 
Number and Variety of machines are needed to transform or produce a part? 
What are the skills needed to run the FMS? 
Integration 
Interdependence of workflows 
Interdependence between work stations 
Since the introduction of the FMS: 
What Changes? 
The level of responsibility of operators? 
Regulation 
Number of procedures? 
Degree of adherence to these procedures and rules? 
(Managerial perspective versus operator perspective? ) 
The degree to which operators' tasks are well defined and structured? 
Has the actual duties associated with the machines/operation increased? Decreased? 
Lets talk about: 
The Rules, Procedures 
Rules Type? Documentation? Supervision? Explain 
Has pressure on you to perform work increased or decreased or remained the same? 
Do you consider the technology (equipment) your using as highly regulating? 
(Does it require uniform behaviour as regards to data inputs)? On the FMS Do you use 
the thing every time? 
Parts fixturing? Change of worn-out tools? 
(Predictable reaction to disturbances) 
do you think this increase in rules and regulations had an impact on your work 
(autonomy)? 
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Are there any obstacles that you see due to rules and regulations and the nature of FMS 
work? 
What changes have occurred in the policies, procedures relating to your area? 
What changes have occurred on how you record and report your work (operating 
information)? 
The following are questions relating to degree of control (autonomy) 
Degree of discretion operators have over execution and planning of work: 
Decision on where to work? 
Decision on when to work? 
Decisions on the pace of work? 
Decision on activities? 
Decisions on the use-age? (FMS) 
Decisions on maintenance 
The scope of initiatives for operators since introduction of lean production? Increased? 
Decreased? 
Changes to operator's ability to reorganise individual jobs since the introduction of lean 
production? 
The number of rules associated with work since the introduction of the lean production 
systems? 
Flexibility 
Type of flexibility? 
Degree of flexibility for component 
Production capacity 
Material inputs 
Organisation of work 
Importance of flexibility? 
Views of the extent of flexibility of the production process as understood by the users? 
Ease in changing volume, lot sizes, number of different components, work organisation 
allocation of tasks, ease in changing output rate? 
Has flexibility in your area increased, decreased, or remained the same as a result of the 
new technology? 
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Has flexibility in your area increased, decreased, or remained the same as a result of the 
organisational change? 
Impact of FMS on flexibility? 
What type of flexibility is the key actor here? 
Work organisation: 
Use of the technology 
Automation levels in FMS area 
How is work organised? 
Describe your work 
What changes have occurred since the introduction of the new technology? 
Were these changes coupled (introduced together with organizational changes? 
How do you view these changes? 
Doing the job? Control? New skills learning? 
Job rotation 
Skill type 
The range of skills used by an operator 
The qualification level of the operators 
Haw many shifts? 
Haw many operators are under the responsibility of a supervisor (foreman) in Assembly 
and in Manufacturing. 
How much change has occurred? 
TQM programs used? Details? 
When were these techniques (Org. changes, TQM) introduced 
What effects? 
Changes since implementation? 
What type of adjustments did you make to these programs? 
How extensive was the training? 
What about multiskilling? 
Job definitions? Employee roles? 
What are your views about the organizational arrangements: lean production 
Role of individual in FMS environment 
Role of equipment/machine operators before/after/currently? 
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What changes have occurred in the activities, skills, and training of supervisors 
What changes have occurred in the activities, skills, and training of operators 
What changes have occurred in the policies and procedures of the following: 
Production scheduling? Maintenance? Quality control? Inventory control? 
What changes have occurred in the reporting of operation information? 
What are your biggest problems with the organisation of your work on the FMS? 
Criteria of effectiveness? 
Productivity: 
Labour productivity (output/man-hour)? 
Machine utilisation? 
Quality and reliability of produced components? 
Length of time it takes to manufacture a component? 
Cost of manufacturing equipment? 
Human resources policies: 
Personnel management policies 
Selection 
Reward systems 
Pay scales 
Training 
Degree? Extent. 
Do you think that the training was enough? 
Or did you have to learn on the job from others 
Empowerment? 
Skilling 
Multiskilling 
Job reduction 
Management Delayering 
Team working 
Human Resource Policies; 
Personnel management policies? 
Effectiveness and impact? 
Haw many different job classifications in the manufacturing plant? 
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Suggestions for process and product improvements? 
The control activities needed to perform the tasks: 
Need to maintain control over the shop floor activities? 
Degree of integration? 
Inter-relatedness to other functions? 
Degree of complexity? 
The most important focus of manufacturing/production department at this time? 
Improving lead times? Improving flexibility? Other? 
The scope of initiative for operators since introduction of the FMS? 
Since the introduction of the (FMS), your views on operators ability to reorganise 
individual jobs? 
Questions for operators: Do you feel that supervisors listen to your inputs? 
Your views on the Role of operator in the [FMS] environment 
Before/ after introduction of FMS 
What changes have occurred in the activities, skills, training of supervisors, team 
members, operators. 
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Questionnaire 
These questions were developed to prepare the interviewees for the nature and 
scope of the questions and to gain insights on the key dimensions under study. 
These dimensions were used as the research tool for evaluating the consistency 
or tensions between 'Lean Enterprise' concepts and its application to the FMS 
environment. While the answers were collected and reviewed in terms of their 
differences, they were not further analysed. 
Most of the inten-iew started at question 5 
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Loughborough University Business School 
Human Resources and Change Management Unit 
Questionnaire: 
This questionnaire is part of a Ph. D study investigating the compatibility between 
advanced manufacturing technologies (AMT) and the use of new organisational 
innovations and structures in manufacturing firms (recently termed New Wave 
Manufacturing). 
NOTE: The Answers will be treated with full confidentiality and the names of the 
company, business unit, products, and individuals will not be released 
Name 
Company 
Job title 
Industry Sector 
Nature of the factory studied 
Number of employees 
Types of products produced 
Major kinds of manufacturing activties 
Organisational form 
Please answer all questions that apply to your plant 
Greenfield site? Yes/No 
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1. Type of production in the Plant: Assembly ? Manufacturing ? Both ? 
2. type of process used in the plant (tick all appropriate types) 
One-off? 
(Frequently used, sometimes used, Rarely used, Never used? ) 
Batch? 
( Frequently used, sometimes used, Rarely used, Never used? ) 
Line? 
( Frequently used, sometimes used, Rarely used, Never used? ) 
New work arrangements and organisation: 
3. Please tick if your company is using any of the following work organisation 
methods and concepts. ( Use a `? ' if you are not sure about usage or unfamiliar with 
the term) 
1= extensively implemented; 2= partially implemented, 3= beginning to implement; 4= 
Do not have 
IS09000 / BS5750 
Just-in-time delivery (JIT) 
Total Quality Control (TQC) 
Total Quality Management (TQM) 
Pull schedulling (e. g. Kanban) 
Statistical Process control (SPC) 
Zero defect programs 
Continous Improvements (Kaizen) 
Manufacturing organised into "plant-with-in-plant" 
Machines organised into cells (Cellular layout) 
Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) 
Design for Assembly (DFA) 
291 
Design for Manufacturability (DFM) 
Activity Based Accounting (ABC) 
Master Production Schedule (MPS) 
Lean Production system (LP) 
Simultaneous Engineering 
Benchmarking 
Business Process Reengineering 
Employees organised into teams 
In-house training programs 
Cross training of operators on different equipment 
Job rotation 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
4. Please tick if your company is using any of the following manufacturing 
technologies ( Use `? ' if you are not sure about usage or unfamiliar with the term) 
Numerical control machines (NC) 
Computer Numerical Control (CNC) 
Direct numerical control (DNC) 
(Multiple machine controlled by 
central computer) 
Group Technology (GT) 
Industrial Robots (IR) 
Flexible Manufacturing Cells (FMC) 
Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS) 
Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM) 
Automated Storage and Retreival (AS/AR) 
Automated materials handling (MH) 
Computer Aided Design (CAD) 
Computer Aided Engineering (CAE) 
Material Requirement Planning (MRP) 
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Manufacturing Resources Planning (MRPII) 
5. Consider the degree of importance of the following goals to your company in your 
opinion 
(please indicate by numbering from 1 to 5 your opinion on the order of importance 
where: 
1= most important and 5= least important 
Having lower manufacturing costs than our competitors 
Offering faster deliveries than our competitors 
Offering superior product design and manufacturing 
Quality as compared to our competitors 
Offering wider product range than our competitors 
Having superior customer service 
6a. Please indicate the extent of increase (or decrease) in each of the following 
activities since the introduction of the new (or advanced) manufacturing technology 
( FMS) to your plant. 
1= Significantly decreased; 2= Deceased; 3= About the same; 4= Increased; 5= 
Significantly increased 
Interdependence between work stations 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
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Need for coordination between manufacturing and other areas 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
Number of rules and procedures associated with work 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
The complexity of operations 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
The need for increased supervision and tighter management control 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
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Degree of freedom of operators to do the jobs 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
Operators span of control over work assignments 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
Operators freedom to plan the work 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
6b. Please indicate the extent of increase (or decrease) in each of the following activities 
since the introduction of the new manufacturing technology to your plant or area 
7. The degree of flexibility: 
1= Significantly decreased 
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2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
The ability to adjust at any moment to changing market conditions 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
Ability to change quickly between products 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
Ability to easily change each of the following: 
Production volume 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
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Lot size of a given component 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
Ease of allocating tasks among operators 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
Ease of rerouting components 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
Ease in making design changes 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
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Ease in changing output rates 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
The extent to which managers communicate the importance of the various performance 
dimensions to you has? 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
S. For each of the following measures and activities, the use of the Flexible 
manufacturing technology has led : 
Capacity 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
Machine Utilisation 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
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3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
cost of manufacturing a component 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
Productivity of labour (output/man-hour) 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
Quality and reliability of components produced 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
The time it takes to manufacture a component 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
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The level of in-process inventories 
1= Significantly decreased 
2= Deceased 
3= About the same 
4= Increased 
5= Significantly increased 
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